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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters on topics in applied microeconomics. In the first chapter.
I investigate whether voters are more likely to support additional spending on local public services
when they perceive current service quality to be high. My empirical strategy exploits discontinuities
in the Texas school ratings formula that create quasi-random variation in perceptions about school
quality. I find that receiving an "exemplary" versus a "recognized" rating increases support for a
school district's bond measures by about 10 percentage points. Voters respond to the level of a
district's rating. not just to whether the district has improved or slipped. I develop and implement
a test for whether these patterns of voter behavior lead to efficient outcomes; however, the results
are inconclusive.
The second chapter. written jointly with Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Mark Cullen.
investigates whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their response to the non-
linear pricing common in health insurance contracts. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that
employees who join an employer-provided health insurance plan later in the calendar year face
the same initial price of medical care but a higher expected end-of-year price than employees who
join the same plan earlier in the year. Our results reject the null of completely myopic behavior;
medical utilization appears to respond to the future price, with a statistically significant elasticity
of medical utilization with respect to the future price of -0.4 to -0.6. To try to quantify the extent
of forward looking behavior., we develop a stylized dynamic model of individual behavior and
calibrate it using our estimated behavioral response and additional data from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment. Our calibration suggests that the elasticity estimate may be substantially
smaller than the one implied by fully forward-looking behavior, yet it is sufficiently high to have
an economically significant effect on the response of annual medical utilization to a non-linear
health insurance contract. Overall. our results point to the empirical importance of accounting for
dynamic incentives in analyses of the impact of health insurance on medical utilization.
In the third chapter. I exploit a discontinuity in federal financial aid rules at age 24 to estimate
the effect of financial aid on college enrollment. school choice. and persistence and degree completion
rates. Undergraduate students who are not married and do not have children are classified as
"dependent" or "independent" for purposes of federal financial aid based on whether they have
turned 24 as of January 1 of the "award year." Independent students qualify for additional grant aid
and are eligible to take out much larger federal loans. Using data from the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study and the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study. I show that
average grant aid per student increases by about $1.100. or 55%. at age 24. while 12% of students
take advantage of the higher federal loan limits. Estimates of the effects of additional aid on
enrollment, persistence. and degree completion are inconclusive; while not statistically significant.
they do not allow me to rule out sizable effects. I do find evidence of an increase in enrollment at
for-profit colleges. concentrated among students whose parents are not college graduates.
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Chapter 1
How Does Perceived Service Quality
Affect Voters' Willingness to Pay for
Public Services?1
1.1 Introduction
In their capacity as voters, individuals regularly face decisions about their desired levels of taxes
and spending. These decisions require them to assess whether or not additional public spending is
worthwhile. a complicated inference problem with many potential inputs.
In this paper. I examine how voters' views about the quality of existing public services influence
these decisions. Specifically. I test whether voters are more or less likely to support additional
spending on local public services when they receive information telling them that current service
quality is high. A priori, whether and how voters will respond to such information is ambiguous.
One might expect that voters would be more willing to increase spending and taxes when they
think the local government is doing a good job. Conversely, voters might reason that it is precisely
when current quality is low that additional funding is needed. Or they might base their decisions
on factors orthogonal to current quality.
In order to distinguish among these possibilities, I exploit quasi-random variation in perceptions
of service quality created by Texass school district ratings. Each year. Texas assigns school districts
one of four ratings: exemplary. recognized. acceptable. or unacceptable. based on whether they meet
cutoffs for standardized test pass rates and other indicators. As discussed below, these ratings are
heavily publicized by school districts and in the press. and so it is likely that the ratings (and not
'I am grateful to Amy Finkelstein and David Autor for extensive feedback on this project. I also thank David
Chan, Matthew Fiedler, Gregory Leiserson, Christopher Palmer, Henry Swift, Christopher Walters, Xiao Yu Wang,
Tyler Williams, and participants in the MIT Public Finance Lunch for helpful comments and suggestions, Laura
Slaughter and Aaron Bradley for assistance with data, and Miikka Rokkanen for help implementing the Imbens-
Kalyanaraman bandwidth selection algorithm. Financial support from the National Science Foundation Graduate
Fellowship is also gratefully acknowledged.
just the underlying formula inputs) affect individuals' perceptions of school quality.2
For districts close to a ratings cutoff. what rating the district receives depends on small. unpre-
dictable fluctuations in test scores and other measures that should be outside the district's control
and effectively random. This allows me to employ a regression discontinuity (R.D) design strategy
to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of the school district ratings on support for school
bond measures. I interpret these estimates as measuring the effect of changes in perceived school
quality on voting behavior.
My central finding is that improvements in perceived school quality increase support for school
bond measures. In my preferred specification. receiving a rating of exemplary rather than recognized
increases support for a district's bond measures by 10 percentage points. (Receiving a rating of
recognized rather than acceptable has no statistically significant impact on support for school bond
measures. although I cannot rule out an effect as large as 9 percentage points.) I find that voters
respond to the level of their district's rating. not just to whether the rating is better or worse than
the previous year's.
The main contribution of this paper is additional insight into how voters make decisions about
the level of taxes and spending. The paper adds to the small but growing economics literature
that uses quasi-experimental approaches to identify causal factors influencing voter preferences and
decisions about these issues. 3 For example. Hoxby (2001) exploits differences among school finance
equalization schemes to show that school districts impose higher taxes when more of the money
is spent within the district, rather than elsewhere in the state, and Cabral and Hoxby (2011) and
Finkelstein (2009) examine how cognitive limitations, specifically inattention and susceptibility
to salience effects. influence opinions about taxes. My findings contribute to this literature by
identifying another important input into voters' decisions about taxes and spending.
The results here also bear on two other literatures. First, my finding that the school district
ratings affect voting behavior confirms my initial presumption that the ratings influence voters'
perceptions. My results thus add yet another example to the growing list of settings in which indi-
viduals respond to discrete ratings cutoffs even though the underlying formula is publicly available. 4
Second, the results have implications for the effect of introducing school ratings systems. as more
than a dozen states have now done. 5 The existing literature on these systems focuses primarily
on the penalties the systems impose on the worst-rated schools (see for example Figlio and Rouse
(2006) and Reback (2008)). My results imply that introducing a rating system may also have
important consequences for the funding capacity of schools on different sides of the ratings cutoffs.
If funding is productive. then introducing a rating system may exacerbate the initial disparities
2 Consistent with this, Figlio and Lucas (2004) find that similar Florida school ratings affect home values.
3 A much larger political science literature relies primarily on survey evidence and focuses on identifying correlates
of voter beliefs about taxes and spending. See for example Campbell (2009).
4 For other examples, see Luca (2011) (Yelp), Luca and Smith (2011) (U.S. News and World Report college
rankings), Pope (2009) ( U.S. News and World Report hospital rankings), and Lacetera et al. (Forthcoming) (odometer
readings).
5 The No Child Left Behind law, which categorizes schools and districts as having made or failed to make "Annual
Yearly Progress," is also a type of school rating system.
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among schools. More broadly. the pattern of voter behavior I document here. in which voters are
more willing to approve additional funding when current service quality is high. is a mechanism
that will always tend to amplify initial differences in service quality (assuming the marginal product
of funding is positive).
A natural question is what my results imply for the efficiency of public spending levels. Ob-
viously. the large responses to miniscule differences in quality that result from voters reacting to
the discrete ratings categories are probably not socially optimal.6 More interesting to consider.
however, are the efficiency implications of basing decisions about additional funding on current
service quality.
Optimal policy requires that voters - whether by intent or merely in effect - set tax and spending
levels based on the marginal productivity of public funds. Thus, the decision-making heuristic I
have uncovered will produce efficient spending outcomes if and only if the total product of public
funds (i.e. quality) is a good predictor of the marginal product. A standard, single-production
function model of school quality would imply the opposite: lower-quality school districts would be
expected to have higher returns to additional funding. On the other hand, it could also be the case
that higher quality school districts operate on a different production function than lower quality
school districts, one that is more steeply sloped for any reasonable level of inputs (perhaps due to
more competent leadership).
In the penultimate section of the paper, I develop and implement a test for the correlation
between initial quality and the marginal product of public funds in my setting. While the results
are unfortunately inconclusive. I discuss ways the test could be improved to hopefully yield more
definitive answers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides relevant background regarding
the Texas ratings formula and Texas school bond elections. and Section 1.3 describes my data.
Section 1.4 explains the estimation strategy and the procedure by which I construct the running
variable. Section 1.5 presents the results. Section 1.6 examines potential threats to the validity of
the research design. Section 1.7 discusses efficiency implications, and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 The School District Ratings
The Texas school district ratings system (officially known as the "Texas Accountability Rating
System") was first introduced for the 1993-1994 school year. with the first ratings issued in August.
1994. Since then. the Texas Education Agency (TEA) has published new ratings annually (except
in 2003). placing school districts into one of four categories: exemplary. recognized. academically
acceptable ("acceptable"). and academically unacceptable ("unacceptable").7 The ratings are based
61t may be individually rational for voters to respond to the discrete categories, depending on the cognitive costs
of acquiring information about the underlying formula inputs.
7In the first two years of the system, the bottom two ratings were instead labeled "accredited" and "accredited
warned." The TEA also publishes ratings for individual schools; I focus on the district ratings because school bond
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primarily on standardized test scores. but also depend on dropout and. in some years. attendance
rates. (I provide a more detailed description of the ratings formula in Subsection 1.4.1 below.)
Several features of the Texas ratings system are useful for my purposes. First. despite changes in
standards and criteria, the system has retained the same basic structure since it was first introduced
in 1994. allowing me to pool many years of data. Second. there are no monetary rewards or penalties
attached to any of the Texas ratings. This allows me to interpret voter responses to the ratings
as entirely responses to perceived quality. rather than responses to additional or reduced state
funding. 8 Third. while the TEA does publish all the ratings formula inputs., it does not publish
any summary measure of district quality except the ratings. This makes it more likely that voters'
perceptions will be influenced by the discrete ratings categories. 9
Also important for my purposes. the Texas ratings receive substantial attention and publicity.
Each of the Texas daily papers included in the Lexis-Nexis database consistently publish front-page
stories about the ratings. often accompanied by editorials. The news stories and. where applicable.
the editorials, invariably highlight local school districts' performance. In addition, Texas requires
all school districts to post their ratings oin their websites and to mail information about the ratings
to parents along with students' report cards.
On average, over the 18 years in which the Texas ratings system has been in place, 8% of districts
have been rated exemplary. 31% have been rated recognized. 59% have been rated acceptable. and
2% have been rated unacceptable. Figure 1.1 shows that these averages mask considerable variation
over time. When the ratings system was first introduced, the overwhelming majority of districts
were rated acceptable. Over the next seven years. due to some combination of actual improvement,
learning about the system. and falling standards. most districts moved up to one of the top two
ratings categories. In 2003. no ratings were issued. and in 2004, the TEA made substantial changes
to the system, introducing new criteria and new standardized tests and raising standards. Under
the new ("post-2004") rating system. many districts initially saw their ratings fall; ratings then
rose again until new criteria were introduced for 2010-2011.
Table 1.1 gives the average transition probabilities for districts receiving a given rating (omitting
the switch to the new ratings system in 2004). The table shows that most districts keep the same
rating from year to year. However, the table also makes clear that it is not uncommon for districts
to rise or fall one or even two ratings categories between years. For example, while about 55% of
the districts that receive an exemplary rating in some year retain that rating the next year. 36%
drop to recognized. and 8% drop to acceptable.
elections take place at the district level. If voters base their decisions on their individual school's rating, rather than
the school district's rating, this will bias my results towards zero.
8
rThe Texas ratings have significant direct consequences only for districts that are rated unacceptable, which must
work with the TEA on an improvement plan. Districts that are rated exemplary are excused from compliance with
certain minor regulations and reporting requirements.
9 Florida is the other large state with a long-established and high-profile school ratings system. However, under
the Florida system, top-rated schools receive financial rewards. In addition, Florida assigns each school district both
a rating and a numerical score and publishes both.
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1.2.2 Texas School Bond Elections
Texas requires school boards to obtain voter authorization for all bond issues. Legally. bonds can
be issued for construction maintenance, purchases of land or buildings. or certain investments
in equipment or technology. While money is fungible. Section 1.7 presents evidence that school
districts do in fact spend bond proceeds mostly or entirely on construction and maintenance. Thus.
my measure of voters' willingness to pay for public services is more specifically a measure of their
willingness to pay for capital improvements.
Bond refenda in Texas require a simple majority to pass. Referenda generally either include
specific tax increases or authorize the school board to increase taxes as needed to pay the interest
on the bond issue. Based on the arguments employed in favor and against, school bond measures
appear to be widely understood as encompassing both spending and tax increases.
School boards have considerable latitude in scheduling school bond elections. Because of state
requirements that voters be given advance notice of elections, the school board must make the
decision to place a school bond measure on the ballot at least three months in advance of the
vote. However, there is no requirement that school bond elections take place on the same day as
statewide primary or general elections. In practice, about 25% of school bond elections coincide
with a statewide election, and about 10% coincide with a high-profile election. 10
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
1.3.1 School District Data
I obtained data on Texas school districts from two sources: the TEA and the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core data system. From the TEA, I have data for 1994-
2011 for all school districts on all major elements of the school ratings system. (I defer a detailed
discussion of these data elements to the next section, where I explain the ratings formula.) I also
have data on a limited set of district characteristics, including total enrollment and enrollment by
race and by free or reduced price lunch status.
From NCES. I have data on per-student total. capital, and instructional expenditures. Where
applicable, I adjust these data for inflation using the CPI-U. I use these measures as covariates and
also to examine the effect of passing a bond measure on spending in Section 1.7.11
i0 By a high-profile election, I mean a statewide election involving a presidential, senatorial, or gubernatorial election
or a presidential primary. While outside the scope of this paper, the question of why school boards schedule bond
votes for high versus low turnout elections is an intriguing one.
"The NCES data cover fiscal years, which run from July I to June 30 and thus coincide with school years. Because
the NCES financial data are available only through fiscal year 2009, I use TEA financial data for fiscal years 2010
and 2011. I do not use the TEA data for earlier years because until fiscal year 2006 these data appear to include only
a subset of expenditures.
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1.3.2 Elections Data
I obtained data on school bond elections from the Municipal Advisory Council of Texas. an associ-
ation of Texas municipal bond underwriters. The data include the date of the election. vote totals.
the bond amount authorized. and the purpose of the bond issue. The data are available since 1996
and cover approximately 85% of all school bond elections held during the 1996-2011 period. with
better coverage in later years.' 2 In total. I have data on 2.070 school bond elections.
I match school district ratings data and characteristics to votes taking place in the year after
the ratings are issued. Thus, for example. 1995-1996 ratings data and characteristics are matched
to votes taking place between August 3, 1996 and August 3. 1997. For the remainder of this paper.
references to elections data from a particular year refer to the year of the relevant ratings. not the
year of the elections (i.e. 1996 elections are those held from August 3. 1996 to August 3. 1997).
1.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1.2 displays summary statistics for all school districts as well as broken down by ratings
category and restricted to those districts with a school bond election in the following year. (I
restrict the sample to 1996-2011 because. as noted above, I observe school bond elections only
starting in 1996.) Over the course of the 15-year sample period. I observe 1.303 distinct school
districts (about 1,200 in any given year). for a total of 17.198 district x year observations. Most
districts are small: the median district enrolls only 842 students, although mean enrollment is
almost 4.000. (There are currently about 5 million students enrolled in Texas public schools.)
Texas is a relatively poor state: in the average district. 52% of students are eligible for free or
reduced price lunch. On average. 9% of students are black, and 31% are Hispanic.
Higher-rated districts are higher-income and less diverse than lower-rated districts, and they
spend more per student. Setting aside the small fraction of districts rated unacceptable. higher-
rated districts are also smaller than lower-rated districts, probably because more of them are located
in suburban areas where school districts are more fragmented. (All of these differences across ratings
categories are statistically significant at the 1% level.)
Out of the full sample of 1.303 districts. 782 held at least one bond election between 1996 and
2011. For the most part. districts that hold elections look similar to those that do not. The one
exception is that districts that hold elections are considerably larger. perhaps reflecting the fact
that larger districts are more likely to have some facility in need of replacement. renovation, or
major maintenance expenditures in any given year.
Table 1.3 provides additional election-related summary statistics broken down by ratings cat-
egory. In any given year. an average of 13% of districts hold elections. The table shows that
districts rated exemplary hold fewer bond elections than districts rated recognized or acceptable.
In addition, their bond measures are smaller. and turnout is lower. These differences, which are
12 The Texas Bond Review Board provides a complete list of all school bond votes but unfortunately without vote
totals. There is no relationship between the ratings formula discontinuities and the probability that the Municipal
Advisory Council vote data for a given election are missing.
13
significant at the 1% level. probably reflect the above-noted fact that higher-rated districts are
generally smaller., together with the fact that smaller districts seem to have a lower propensity to
hold school bond elections.
About three quarters of bond measures pass. 13 Conditional on holding a vote. districts rated ex-
emplary are somewhat more likely to approve bond measures. but this difference is not statistically
significant (at the 5% level).
1.4 Estimation Strategy
As noted in the introduction, the idea behind my empirical strategy is that. for districts sufficiently
close to the ratings cutoffs. which side of the cutoff the district falls on is as good as randomly
assigned. Hence. sharp discontinuities in voter preferences at the ratings cutoffs can be interpreted
as the result of the ratings.
More formally, I implement an RD design with distance from the ratings cutoffs as the running
variable and support for school bond measures as the outcome. Because my measure of distance
from the ratings cutoffs does not perfectly predict actual ratings, I use a "fuzzy RD" approach.,
instrumenting for actual with predicted ratings. In this section, I explain how I construct my
distance measures. provide a more precise description of the estimation strategy. and present results
from the first stage regressions.
1.4.1 Quantifying Distance From the Cutoffs
The Ratings Formula
This subsection provides an overview of the Texas school ratings formula. Detailed explanations of
each year's formula can be found on the TEA website.1 4 (The TEA's summary of the 2010-2011
ratings system is reproduced in Figure 1.3 and conveys some sense of the complexity of the formula.)
The Texas school district ratings are based on districts' performance on a large set of indicators.
including:
* Pass rates on state standardized tests in English language arts. writing. math. social studies.
and science. evaluated for all students and for four subgroups: black. white. and Hispanic
students and "economically disadvantaged"' students (students eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch). (25 indicators)
" High school completion rates for all students and the same four subgroups. (5 indicators)
" Seventh and eighth grade dropout rates for all students and the same four subgroups. (5
indicators)
1 3Interestingly, that fraction fell markedly beginning in 2008, at the start of the recession.
" http://ritter.tea.state.tx.is/perfreport/accouint/.
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" Attendance rates for all students and the same four subgroups. (5 indicators)
" Pass rates on state tests for special education students. (1 indicator)
" Pass rates on state tests for English Language Learners. (1 indicator)
" The share of all students and of economically disadvantaged students achieving "commended
performance" in English language arts and math. (4 indicators)
The specific set of indicators considered has varied by year, and in no year have all of the above
indicators been used. However, in some years districts have been evaluated on as many as 40
separate criteria.
In order to achieve a given rating. a district must meet the standards for that rating for all
applicable indicators. (Districts do not have to meet standards for student groups in which they have
sufficiently few students. generally groups with fewer than 30 students or groups with fewer than 200
students that also comprise less than 10% of the district's student population.) The standardized
test measures are at the heart of the rating system and are the binding indicators for the large
majority of districts. 93% of districts rated recognized. 94% of districts rated acceptable. and 68%
of districts rated unacceptable fail to achieve a higher rating because of one of the standardized
test indicators, rather than any of the completion. dropout. or attendance rate indicators (i.e. they
are eligible for the higher rating on the basis of the completion, dropout. and attendence rate
indicators).15
Depending on the year. the indicator. and the rating involved, districts may have various options
for meeting the ratings standards. First, they may meet the "absolute standard" for a given rating
and indicator. For example, to achieve an exemplary rating in 2010, a district needed at least a
90% pass rate on all the standardized test indicators, high school completion rates of at least 95%
for all groups. and seventh and eighth grade dropout rates of less than 0.2% for all groups.
In most years. for most indicators, meeting the absolute standard is the only option for achieving
an exemplary rating. But for purposes of obtaining a recognized or acceptable rating. districts often
have the option of instead meeting "required improvement." For example, the absolute standard
for a recognized rating in 2010 was an 80% pass rate on all standardized tests. But if a district's
standardized test pass rate was between 70% and 80%. it was considered to have met the standard
if its rate of improvement since 2009 was sufficient to meet the 80% standard in two years. Notice
that the required improvement option still produces a sharp cutoff for receiving a recognized rating.
If a district's 2009 pass rate was 70%, for example. it meets the standard if and only if its 2010
pass rate is at least 75%.
15 A noteworthy feature of the Texas rating system is that it puts most of the emphasis on the weakest students.
The absolute standards for standardized test pass rates have ranged from 25% to 70% for a rating of acceptable
and from 65%3 to 80% for a rating of recognized and have always been 90% for a rating of exemplary. Thus. except
for districts at risk of being rated unacceptable. a district's rating is generally determined by the weakest third (or
less) of students in the worst-performing student group. It is not clear whether voters understand that this is the
dimension of quality the ratings are capturing.
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In 2009 and 2010 only. districts could also meet standards by using adjusted standardized test re-
sults (the "Texas Projection Measure") in place of the raw scores. 16 Finally, in some years. districts
could claim a specified number of exemptions. excluding their worst indicators from consideration.
1.4.2 Constructing a Distance Measure
As noted above. I obtained detailed data on nearly all elements of the ratings formula from the TEA.
In particular, I have data for all districts for all years on standardized test pass rates and dropout.
completion. and attendance rates for all student groups. allowing me to evaluate whether districts
have met the absolute ratings standards and whether they have achieved required improvement.
I also have data on the number of students in each student group (to evaluate minimum size
requirements) and data on the Texas Projection Measure and on allowable exemptions. 17
In order to implement my proposed RD design. I need to turn the 46 distinct ratings criteria
and the even larger number of separate standards into measures of districts' distance from each
ratings cutoff.18 My approach is as follows. I first compute each district's distance from each of
the ratings cutoffs for each indicator, basing my calculation on the most lenient available option for
meeting the standard. 19 Next. I apply the relevant exemptions. dropping those indicators for which
the district is furthest from meeting the standard. I use the minimum of the remaining distances
as my measure of distance from the ratings cutoff. Districts should be eligible for the higher rating
if their distance from the cutoff is greater than or equal to 0 and ineligible if their distance is less
than 0. (I normalize the final distance measures by dividing them by their standard deviations, to
put them into interpretable units.)
To make this clearer, consider as an example a district that needs to meet only the English
language arts. writing, and math pass rate standards for all students and is not eligible for any
exemptions. The absolute standard for an exemplary rating is 90. and the absolute standard for a
recognized rating is 80. The district's scores are 90. 82. and 75; last year. its scores were 70. 70.
and 70.
To achieve a rating of exemplary. the district must meet the absolute standard for all three
indicators. Thus. its distances from meeting the standards are 0. -8. and -15. Taking the minimum.
the district's distance from the exemplary cutoff is -15; it is not eligible for a rating of exemplary.
To achieve a rating of recognized. the district can either meet the absolute standard or achieve
required improvement. which. given its prior-year scores. means achieving a pass rate of 75 or
16 Since the Texas Projection Measure adjusts the raw scores according to a predetermined formula, there is no
reason to think that the existence of this option undermines the RD design.
1 7One might worry that districts could manipulate the minimum size requirements or student classification more
generally. I address this concern in Section 1.6 below.
181 considered using Papay et al.'s (2011) approach to implementing an RD design with multiple assignment cutoffs,
but concluded that this approach was neither feasible (with 46 assignment criteria) nor particularly informative in
this setting. The key advantage of Papay et al.'s proposed method is that it allows one to estimate how treatment
effects vary depending on which criteria bind, which is not a question of particular interest here.
'
9 Using this approach, the standardized test measures end up on a very different scale than the dropout rate
measures, with standard deviations on the order of 10 versus 2. In an attempt to increase power, I rescale each
measure by dividing by its standard deviation. Omitting this normalization has essentially no impact on the results.
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above on all three tests. Thus. achieving required improvement is the more lenient option. and the
district's distance from meeting the standards are 15. 7. and 0. Taking the minimum. the district's
distance from the recognized cutoff is 0: it just barely qualifies for a rating of recognized.
Note that. because different options are available for meeting the standards for different ratings.
as well as because different criteria may be binding for different ratings cutoffs. the distance from
the exemplary cutoff will not be a linear transformation of the distance from the recognized cutoff.
which will not be a linear transformation of the distance from the acceptable cutoff. (Figure 1.2
illustrates this graphically.) For this reason. I in fact have three running variables - the distances
from each of the cutoffs - not one.
There are two reasons that these distance measures will not perfectly predict actual ratings.
First, my data do not allow me to implement certain minor elements of the ratings formula.20
Second. districts have access to an appeals process: a district dissatisfied with its initial rating can
file an appeal with the TEA. Appeals are supposed to be based primarily on data and computation
errors. but the TEA has considerable discretion to grant appeals for other reasons. Since these
appeals decisions are not made based on predetermined objective criteria. I cannot (and would not
want to) incorporate them into my computations of distance from the ratings cutoffs.
1.4.3 Estimating Equation
I implement a "fuzzy RD" design where distance from the ratings cutoff is the running variable and
predicted rating - specifically. an indicator for whether the distance measures described above are
greater than or equal to 0 - instruments for actual rating. My basic specification uses local linear
regression with a uniform kernel, and so the estimating equations are:
YesVoteShared,t+1,e = lo + 1(Ddt >= 0)131 + Ddt02 + 1(Ddt >= 0) * Ddt3 + Ed,t+1,e (RF)
Ratingte = 60 + 1(Ddt >= 0) 61 + Ddt 6 2 + 1(Ddt >= 0) * Ddt 63 + pate (FS)
where D denotes distance from the ratings cutoff. YesVoteShare is the share of voters voting in
favor of the school bond measure. d indexes districts. t indexes years. and e indexes elections (some
districts hold multiple elections in a given year). Year here refers to "rating year;" that is, years run
from when one set of ratings is published to whenever the next set of ratings is published (generally
August to August).
I estimate separate regressions for each of the ratings cutoffs. My preferred specification uses a
bandwidth of 0.5 standard deviations of the distance measure, which is approximately the optimal
bandwidth implied by the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm and also seems reasonable
based on visual inspection. As shown in Subsection 1.5.2 below. my results are robust to using a
variety of alternative bandwidths and to using quadratic or cubic rather than local linear regression.
Standard errors are clustered at the district x year level.
2 0 In particular. ratings also depend on data quality criteria, and I do not have access to the state's data quality
measures.
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1.4.4 First Stage Results
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 graphically depict the first stage. or. equivalently, my success at matching
the actual district ratings. The X-axis plots distance from the relevant ratings cutoffs. computed
as described in Subsection 1.4.2. The Y-axis plots actual assigned ratings. with these ratings
converted into numbers (0 = unacceptable. 1 = acceptable. 2 = recognized. and 3 = exemplary).
The datapoints represent means for 0.1 standard deviation cells of the distance measure. Figure
1.4 plots the results for the primary estimation sample., districts with school bond elections, while
Figure 1.5 plots the results for all district x year observations.
Predicted ratings match actual ratings 94% of the time in the vote sample and 90% of the time
in the full sample. 21 In the graphs plotting distance from the exemplary and recognized cutoffs,
there is a sharp break at 0. with the average rating increasing by almost a full rank. In contrast,
there is at most a small increase in the average rating where distance from the acceptable cutoff
equals 0. This is largely because most of the districts with distances less than 0. which should -
according to the formula - be rated unacceptable. are instead rated acceptable. Apparently, the
TEA is quite receptive to appeals from districts at risk of an unacceptable rating.
Table 1.4 shows the regression results for both samples. I have again converted the ratings into
numbers. and so the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as fractions of a rating. Consistent
with the graphical evidence, the first stage at the exemplary and recognized cutoffs is strong and
highly statistically significant in both samples. The average rating increases by almost one full
rating at the exemplary cutoff and by about four fifths of a rating at the recognized cutoff.
In contrast. there is no statistically significant first stage at the acceptable cutoff in the elections
sample and only a small (three tenths of a rating) first stage in the full sample. Because most
districts that would be rated unacceptable under the formula are instead rated acceptable, meeting
the formula standards for an acceptable rating has little or no effect on a district's actual rating.
This means that there is no quasi-experiment for perceived service quality around the acceptable
cutoff. In the remainder of the paper. therefore. I restrict my analysis to the exemplary and
recognized cutoffs.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Main Findings
Figure 1.6 depicts the main reduced form results. The figure plots the average vote share in favor of
the school bond measure ("yes-vote share") for 0.1 standard deviation cells of the distance measure.
As the figure shows. yes-vote share is basically flat below the exemplary cutoff. averaging around
60%. and then jumps sharply to about 70% at the cutoff. In contrast. yes-vote share increases
smoothly with distance from the recognized cutoff. but there is no discontinuous break.
2 1 The match rate is higher in the vote sample because a disproportionate fraction of votes occur in later years,
where I am more succesful at matching the ratings.
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Table 1.5 presents estimates from two-stage least squares regressions of the effect of a higher
rating on yes-vote share. The 2SLS regressions scale up the reduced form effects depicted in the
figure to reflect the fact that the distance measures do not perfectly predict actual ratings. As
shown in Table 1.4. the scaling factor is about 1/0.95 at the exemlplary cutoff and about 1/0.85 at
the recognized cutoff.
Consistent with the graph. the regression results indicate that receiving an exemplary rather
than a recognized rating leads to a roughly 10 percentage point increase in yes-vote share (p = 0.01).
The point estimate is essentially unchanged when I add year dummies and district characteristics
to the regressions. although the standard errors fall modestly. While the point estimates for the
effect of receiving a recognized versus an acceptable rating (shown in columns 4-6 of Table 1.5) are
positive, they are considerably smaller than the estimated effects of receiving an exemplary rating
and not statistically significant. 22
How large is a 10 percentage point increase in yes-vote share? As one way of putting this
estimate in context, the average within-district standard deviation of yes-vote share (among districts
that hold more than one school bond election during the sample period) is 11 percentage points.
Thus, the impact of receiving an exemplary versus a recognized rating is sizable relative to typical
fluctuations in a given district's election outcomes.
To really interpret the magnitude of the estimated response, however, one would want to know
how much the ratings influence voters' perceptions of quality. As discussed in Subsection 1.2.1
above, the Texas ratings receive enough publicity that one would expect them to have at least
some effect on perceptions; moreover, the existence of a discontinuity in yes-vote share at the
exemplary cutoff confirms that the ratings influence voters' views to some extent. Ideally. though,
I would be able to directly estimate the true first stage: the effect of the ratings on perceived school
quality. I considered whether it might be possible to do this using data from a website such as
greatschools.org where parents rate their children's schools. Unfortunately. none of these websites
seem to be sufficiently popular in Texas. Thus. I would probably need to field my own survey.
asking potential voters what they think of the local schools.
For now. as a simple benchmark, I impose the assumption that voters think their school district
is as good as the median district with the same rating. For example. in a year in which 40% of
districts are rated recognized and 10% are rated exemplary. I assume that voters in districts rated
recognized think their districts are at the 7 0 'h percentile of district quality, and voters in districts
rated exemplary think their districts are at the 9 5 th percentile of district quality. Under these
assumptions. I find that voters would rank exemplary districts an average of 25 percentiles above
recognized districts in the district quality distribution. This implies that each percentile increase
2 2The estimate for the effect of receiving an exemplary rating remains highly statistically significant (p = 0.02)
even with a correction for multiple inference. If I instead pool the cutoffs, the point estimate (from the specification
including year effects and district characteristics, which has the smallest standard errors) is that a higher rating
increases yes-vote share by 5 percentage points, with a p-value of 0.055. This finding is a mechanical result of the
fact that the point estimate at the exemplary cutoff is large and positive, while the point estimate at the recognized
cutoff is small but positive. Because the point estimates at the two cutoffs are so different. I regard the results from
the separate regressions as more meaningful.
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in perceived quality is worth a 0.4 percentage point increase in yes-vote share. If the actual impact
of the ratings on voters' perceptions is less (more) than under my benchmark assumption. then the
implied effect of perceived quality on voting behavior is larger (smaller)."
It is not clear what to make of the fact that voters appear to respond strongly to an exemplary
but not a recognized rating. The estimates are fairly imprecise. and I cannot rule out increases in
yes-vote share at the recognized cutoff as large as 9 percentage points. Thus. it is possible that the
responses at the two ratings cutoffs are not actually that different (or even different at all). and I
simply lack the statistical power to detect the response at the recognized cutoff.
It is also possible that voters really do respond differently at the two cutoffs. Perhaps voters
care more about whether their district is ranked at the very top of all districts than about whether
it is ranked in the upper or lower middle of the distribution, or perhaps voters in higher-performing
districts pay more attention to the school ratings than voters in lower-performing districts.
Both of the above hypotheses imply that receiving a recognized versus an acceptable rating
should have more of an impact on yes-vote share in years when the ratings criteria are more
stringent and fewer districts rank as high as recognized. As Figure 1.1 shows. there is considerable
variation across years in the share of districts rated recognized or above; the recognized category
is most selective from 2004-2008. Intriguingly, when I split the sample into the 2004-2008 period
and all other years, the estimated effect on yes-vote share is 5 percentage points (p = 0.16) in the
years where the recognized category is most selective, versus 2 percentage points (p = 0.54) in the
other years. While the difference between these estimates is not statistically significant, the results
are consistent with the notion that information about district quality may have a larger impact on
voting behavior in higher quality districts.
1.5.2 Robustness and Specification Checks
Table 1.6 shows that my main results are highly robust to alternative regression specifications.
Allowing bandwidth to range from 0.3 to 1.0 standard deviations of the distance measure. the point
estimates for the effect of an exemplary rating on yes-vote share range from 8 to 13 percentage
points, with p-values ranging from 0.01 to 0.03. If I instead estimate the effect of the higher rating
using a quadratic or cubic polynomial (including all bond elections in the regressions and allowing
the coefficients on the polynomial to differ above and below the cutoff). the point estimates are
somewhat larger (16 to 18 percentage points)., with p-values of 0.002. The estimates of the effect of
a recognized versus acceptable rating are also robust to alternative specifications. in that the point
estimates remain small and statistically insignificant.
Table 1.7 changes the dependent variable, estimating the effect of a higher rating on the prob-
ability that a district's bond measure passes. While the point estimate indicates that receiving an
exemplary versus a recognized rating improves the odds of passage by 14 percentage points., the
2 3At first blush, it seems unlikely that the ratings would shift voters' perceptions this much, since voters presumably
have other sources of information about school district quality besides the ratings. On the other hand, my results
may be driven by low information voters for whom the ratings are a or even the main source of information about
school quality.
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standard error is large. and the p-value is 0.14. Naturally., substituting a binary for a continuous
outcome measure provides less information and less statistical power. Moreover. it is not clear that
one should expect large effects on yes-vote share to translate into large effects on passage rates in
this setting. As noted above. nean yes-vote share just below the exemplary cutoff is about 60%.
Given that bond measures in Texas need only a simple majority to pass. even large increases in
yes-vote share may have little effect on the fraction of bond measures approved.
The estimated effect of receiving a recognized versus an acceptable rating on passage rates is
small (less than 1 percentage point) and not statistically significant.
1.5.3 Extensions
Levels Versus Changes
As explained in Subsection 1.2.1 above, the TEA issues new school district ratings each year. As
shown in Table 1.1. the majority of districts retain the same rating from year to year. while some
move up in the ratings. and a smaller fraction move down. One might expect that. in districts
where the ratings do not change from year to year, the ratings announcements would receive less
attention. and the ratings would cease to affect behavior. On the other hand, it could also be
the case that voters attach less weight to the ratings in districts where the ratings have changed.
Suppose that voters are fully rational in how they process the information provided by the ratings
(but do not look at the underlying formula inputs, because doing so is costly). In that case. voters
would take into account that a district where the rating has changed is probably closer to the
rating boundary than a district where the rating has stayed the same. For example. consider four
districts. District A is rated exemplary in years 1 and 2, district B is rated recognized in years 1
and 2. district C is rated recognized and then exemplary, and district D is rated exemplary and
then recognized. When going to the polls in year 2. rational voters should perceive a larger quality
differential between districts A and B than between districts C and D.
The first panel of Figure 1.7 and column 2 of Table 1.8 restrict the sample to districts that
have received the same rating for at least two years, while the second panel of the figure and
column 3 of the table show results for districts whose most recent rating differs from their prior-
year rating. Consistent with rational information processing. voters seem to respond more strongly
to the ratings in districts where the ratings remain constant from year to year. The point estimate
for the effect of an exemplary versus a recognized rating among districts whose ratings did not
change is essentially the same as the full sample point estimate. while the point estimate for the
districts whose ratings did change is considerably smaller. However, the difference between the
two estimates is not statistically significant. Thus. the evidence that voters respond less to the
ratings where the ratings have changed is only suggestive. What is clear is that voters respond to
the level of their district's rating. not just the change in the rating. Equivalently. they respond to
information about quality levels, not just information about changes in quality.
Panels C and D of Figure 1.7 examine whether voters respond differently to increases versus
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decreases in their district's rating. The sample in Panel C is restricted to districts that received
a rating of recognized or acceptable the previous year. Thus. in this graph. districts that are to
the right of the cutoff have improved their rating relative to last year. while districts to the left
of the cutoff have mostly held steady. Meanwhile. the sample in Panel D is restricted to districts
that received a rating of exemplary the previous year. Thus. in this graph. districts that are to
the left of the cutoff have slipped a rating since last year. while districts to the right have held
steady. One can therefore interpret the discontinuity at the cutoff in Panel C as voters "rewarding"
improvement and the discontinuity at the cutoff in Panel D as voters "punishing" slippage.
Looking at the graphs. it seems more clear that voters are rewarding improvement than that
they are punishing slippage. Unfortunately. however, there is a large difference in sample size
between the two graphs. since districts are much more likely to improve than to slip. Columns 4
and 5 of Table 1.8 show that the estimated increase in yes-vote share due to improvement is about
equal to the estimated decrease in yes-vote share due to slippage (both are about 10 percentage
points), but only the former is statistically significant.
Rational voters would distinguish slippage in the ratings due to changes in a district's perfor-
mance from slippage due to changes in the ratings system. Thus, rational voters would not be
expected to punish districts for the drop in the ratings that occurred for the large majority of
districts following the switch to the new ratings system in 2004. Interestingly, when I omit 2004
from the regressions in Table 1.8. the point estimate in the slippage column increases from 0.11 to
0.15. However, the estimate is still not statistically significant.
Figure 1.8 and Table 1.8 Panel B provide the corresponding breakdown for the effects of a
recognized versus acceptable rating. In this case. none of the estimates are statistically significant
or strikingly different from one another.
Timing and Types of Elections
As a plausibility check on the main results. I examine how the effect of receiving a higher rating
on yes-vote share varies with the length of time between when the ratings are issued and when the
election is held. In most years. the TEA publishes the ratings around August 1. at which point.
as discussed in Subsection 1.2.1 above, they receive considerable media attention. Districts then
have the opportunity to appeal their ratings; appeals decisions are issued in October and typically
result in another flurry of local news stories.
School bond elections can be held at any time but are most commonly scheduled for September.
November. February. or May. I divide each year in my sample into four quarters beginning when
the ratings are issued in August; each quarter includes one major election date. I then estimate
the baseline regressions separately for the four quarters.
The results are shown in Table 1.9. Reassuringly, the effect of receiving an exemplary rating
on yes-vote share is larger for elections held sooner after the ratings are issued. Interestingly. this
is not the case for the effect of receiving a recognized rating. perhaps suggesting that the effect at
the recognized cutoff is a true null.
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Also interesting to consider is how the effect of receiving a higher rating on yes-vote share
varies with voter turnout rates. While I do not directly observe turnout rates. it seems reasonable
to assume that turnout will be highest for school bond elections that coincide with "high-profile"
state or national elections (defined as in Subsection 1.2.2 above as presidential. gubernatorial. and
senatorial elections and presidential primaries) and higher for school bond elections that coincide
with statewide elections than for those that do not.2 4 One might expect the voters who turn out
for lower-profile school bond elections to be those with strong opinions about the bond measure.,
who might be less swayed by the ratings. On the other hand. it might also be that the voters who
care enough to turn out for elections where only a school bond measure is on the ballot also pay
more attention to the school ratings.
The results. shown in Table 1.10. indicate that the large effect of receiving an exemplary rating
on yes-vote share is driven entirely by school bond votes that do not coincide with statewide elec-
tions. Since only a small number of elections in districts close to the exemplary cutoff coincide with
statewide and especially with high-profile elections, the estimates for these samples are imprecise.
and I cannot rule out the possibility that the ratings affect voting behavior in these elections as
well. What is clear, however. is that voters in low-turnout, off-cycle school bond elections make
decisions partly based on the ratings.
Mechanisms: Effects on Turnout
There are two possible mechanisms by which the ratings could affect yes-vote share. They could
cause individual voters to change their minds, or they could change the mix of voters coming to
the polls. For example, individuals might be more motivated to vote in the school bond election if
they feel more positively about the local schools.
Figure 1.9 and Table 1.11 attempt to look at this by estimating the effect of the ratings on log
turnout. While the results are somewhat imprecise. there is no evidence that turnout increases at
either of the ratings cutoffs. This suggests that the more likely mechanism behind the results is
that some voters actually vote differently when the district is rated exemplary versus recognized.
1.6 Threats to Validity
The validity of any regression discontinuity design depends on the assumption that small fluctu-
ations in the running variable around the cutoff are as good as random. It is not necessarily a
problem if subjects can manipulate the running variable; for example. in my setting, it would not
necessarily be a problem if some districts cheat on state tests. What would be a problem would be
if certain districts can manipulate their scores precisely enough to systematically move themselves
2 4 An alternative would be to define high turnout elections based on actual turnout levels. However, since I do not
observe turnout rates. only the number of voters, and since large districts may schedule elections differently than
smaller districts, this approach could produce arbitrary sample splits. I considered proxying for turnout rates by
dividing the number of voters by the number of students enrolled in the school district but was concerned that there
might be large differences across districts in the ratio of eligible voters to school-age children.
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from just below to just above the ratings cutoffs. Because successful manipulators might differ from
less successful manipulators in their underlying levels of support for school bond measures. such
manipulation could bias the estimates.
There are two standard approaches to testing for problematic manipulation of the running
variable. The first involves testing for a discontinuity in the density of observations at the cutoff:
manipulation will produce "bunching" on the more favorable side of the discontinuity (McCrary.
2008). The second involves testing for discontinuities in covariates around the cutoff; manipulation
will produce such discontinuities if manipulators are systematically different from non-manipulators.
I implement both of these tests. To increase power (and thereby increase the likelihood that I will
identify problems), I implement the tests in the full sample of all district x year observations, rather
than in the smaller sample of districts with bond elections.2 5 I also consider another possible threat
to validity: that the ratings may influence school boards' decisions about whether to schedule bond
elections.
1.6.1 Density Analysis
As explained in Subsection 1.4.1 above, in practice. the Texas school district ratings depend primar-
ily on standardized test pass rates. For more than 90% of districts rated recognized or acceptable.
the binding constraint preventing them from receiving a higher rating is one of the test score
measures. I therefore focus on testing for manipulation of test scores. 26
In general, one would not expect school districts to be able to manipulate standardized test pass
rates precisely enough to cause any problems for the validity of the RD. particularly given that
tests are scored centrally. not by the individual schools or districts. The problem is that ratings
outcomes depend not just on test performance but also on which students' tests are counted and
which students are counted as belonging to which student groups. In the early years of the Texas
ratings system, school districts had an opportunity to "correct" their enrollment and demographic
files after receiving the standardized test results. This opportunity was eliminated in the post-2004
system. In addition, the post-2004 ratings system is much more complex and nonlinear than the
old system. making it more difficult for districts to determine which few students' scores are the
obstacle to a higher rating.
Figure 1.10 plots the density of test outcomes in the full. pre-2004. and post-2004 samples.
Datapoints in this figure are numbers of standardized test indicators (rather than numbers of
2 5 When I implement the tests in the sample of districts with bond elections, I find no evidence of manipulation,
but the estimates are also much less precise.
26I did attempt to test for manipulation of the other indicators (dropout, completion, and attendance rates), but
it was difficult to get any traction since so many districts were "heaped" at dropout rates of 0 or completion rates
of 100%. Table 1.15 shows that the estimated effect of an exemplary rating on yes-vote share is virtually unchanged
if I construct the distance measure using only the standardized test indicators, and so manipulation of the other
indicators cannot be driving this result. When I exclude the non-test score indicators from the construction of the
running variable, I find a statistically signficant 5 percentage point increase in yes-vote share at the recognized cutoff.
However. this is the only specification in which I find a statistically significant response to receiving a recognized
versus an acceptable rating, and the result would not survive a multiple inference correction.
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districts) at a given distance from the relevant cutoff. For example. if the cutoff for recognized is a
pass rate of 75% and a district has three student subgroups with pass rates of 72% in math. then
the district contributes three standardized test indicators at a distance of -3 percentage points from
the recognized cutoff. Manipulation would be expected to result in too many test indicators just
at the cutoff and too few just below it.
From the figure. it does not appear that there is any discontinuity in the density at the exemplary
cutoff. But there is clear evidence of bunching above the recognized cutoff. The remaining panels of
the figure show that this bunching is driven entirely by the earlier period: in the post-2004 sample.
the density around the recognized cutoff is quite smooth.
Table 1.12 presents the corresponding regression results. The regression specification is the same
as for the primary results, except that the outcome variable is now the number of standardized
test indicators at a given distance from the cutoff (the bandwidth is 5 percentage points). The
regressions provide no evidence of a discontinuity in the density at the exemplary cutoff or at either
cutoff in the post-2004 sample. but strong evidence of a discontinuity at the recognized cutoff in
the earlier sample.
1.6.2 Covariate Balance
Figures 1.11 and 1.12 and Tables 1.13 and 1.14 examine whether the apparent manipulation of test
scores gives rise to any imbalances in covariates around the cutoffs.2 7 The figures present results
for the full sample, but the tables also show results for the pre-2004 and post-2004 samples.
I examine the share of a district's students that are black. Hispanic. or eligible for free or reduced
price lunch as well as total enrollment. prior-year test pass rates, and per-student spending.2 8 There
are no statistically significant discontinuities. even in the pre-2004 sample. While some of these
results are noisy, the results for student characteristics and prior-year test scores are quite precise,
especially at the recognized cutoff. which is the cutoff at which there is evidence of manipulation.
For example. I can rule out a discontinuity of more than 0.019 percentage points in the share of
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch and a discontinuity of more than 0.6 percentage
points in prior-year pass rates.
1.6.3 Discussion
Despite the absence of any discontinuities in observable covariates, the manipulation documented
in Subsection 1.6.1 is troubling., since, in principle. differences between manipulators and non-
manipulators could be driving my results. To address this concern. Table 1.15 shows results for
the effect of a higher rating on yes-vote share restricting the sample to the post-2004 period, where
2 7 The data in the figures are purged of year effects, primarily because the per-student spending series is otherwise
extremely noisy.
28 The prior-year test pass rate variable is computed as the average (across subjects) share of students in the district
passing state tests. The ideal covariate to examine would be prior election yes-vote share. Since most districts in my
dataset hold at most one election during the sample period, that measure is not available.
25
there is no evidence of (and should be no opportunity for) manipulation. As shown in Panel A
column 2. the estimated effect of an exemplary rating on yes-vote share in the post-2004 period
is highly statistically significant (p = 0.01) and is actually larger than the full-sample estimate.
though not statistically distinguishable.
Given that the covariate balance tests provide no evidence that the pre-2004 manipulation leads
to important differences between districts just above and just below the cutoff. and given that there
is no evidence of manipulation at the exemplary cutoff even in the pre-2004 subsample. I continue
to prefer the full sample results. which are considerably more precise. The fact that these results
are robust to excluding the early years is highly reassuring, in that it indicates that manipulation
cannot be the driving force behind the main findings.
1.6.4 Endogeneity of Elections
In addition to the standard concerns about the validity of the RD. a concern specific to my setting
is that the availability of the outcome variable may be endogenous to the discontinuity. That is. I
only observe yes-vote share when a district holds an election, and school boards might be more or
less likely to schedule bond elections depending on the district's rating.
Figure 1.13 and Table 1.16 attempt to test this concern directly by examining the effect of a
higher rating on a district's propensity to hold elections. As indicated in Table 1.3. on average.,
higher-rated districts are less likely to hold elections. However, there is no evidence of a discontinuity
in the propensity to hold an election at either the exemplary or the recognized cutoff.2 9
While the standard errors on these results are large, two other considerations should be reas-
suring. First. if school boards are more likely to place bond measures on the ballot in years where
the district receives a higher rating, this is presumably because they think voters are more likely to
approve the measures in those years. Thus. assuming school boards have an accurate understanding
of the electorate. endogenous scheduling of elections could bias the magnitude of my results but
should not lead me to inappropriately reject the null.
Second. as explained above, school bond elections in Texas must be scheduled at least three
months in advance, and so elections held within three months of the publication of the ratings
should already have been scheduled when the ratings were issued. While it is possible that school
boards anticipate the district's rating and act accordingly. it is still somewhat reassuring that. as
shown in Table 1.9. the effect of receiving an exemplary versus a recognized rating is strongest for
elections held within three months of the date the ratings are issued.
1.7 Implications for the Efficiency of Spending Levels
The results discussed above enhance our positive understanding of voter behavior, as well as of the
effects of school ratings systems. But they do not answer the normative question. posed in the
21I also test for and find no evidence of a discontinuity in the size of the bond issues school boards place on the
ballot.
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introduction. of whether these patterns of voter behavior result in efficient spending levels.
For school bond election outcomes to be efficient, bond measures must pass if and only if the
marginal product of new capital spending exceeds the marginal cost of public funds. It seems
unlikely that the school district ratings provide voters with new information about the mnarginal
cost of public funds. but more plausible that they might provide information about the marginal
product. Put differently. it is possible that the total product of public funds (i.e. school district
quality) predicts the marginal product in this setting. One can easily imagine reasons why this might
be the case. For example. more competent school boards might both achieve higher ratings and
allocate the district's capital budget more productively. At the same time, it also seems plausible
that the value of new facility investments might be greatest in the worst-performing school districts.
To evaluate whether the voting behavior I have documented leads to efficient spending levels.
I need to determine the correlation between quality (as measured by the ratings formula) and the
marginal product of capital spending. Below. I outline a procedure to estimate this correlation and
present the - unfortunately inconclusive - results. I then discuss how the test could be improved
to perhaps give more definitive answers.
1.7.1 The Test
In order to test for the correlation between school district quality and the marginal product of
capital spending. I first need a way to estimate the treatment effect of additional capital spending.
To do this. I take advantage of the fact that. in sufficiently close elections, whether a bond measure
passes (i.e. whether it receives just over or just under 50% of the vote) is effectively random. This
allows me to again employ a "fuzzy RD" design where yes-vote share is now the running variable
and passing a bond measure instruments for capital spending. (The same basic approach is used by
Cellini et al. (2010) to estimate the effect of California school bond measures on housing values and
test scores.) I then stratify the results on "initial" distance from the exemplary cutoff (distance
from the cutoff in the year before the bond measure) to estimate treatment effects for districts
at different levels of initial quality. The relationship between these treatment effects gives me the
correlation between the marginal productivity of funds and initial quality.
The estimating equations are:
TestPassRatdt+4 = 00 + 1(Vdte > 0.5)31 + Vte 3 2 + 1(Vte > 0.5) * Vdt 3 + Ed,t+4,e (RF)
4
E Capitaldt+k = 60 + 1(Vate > 0.5)61 + Vdteo3 + 1(Vte > 0.5) * V0te 3 + 11d,t+4,e (FS)
k=O
where V is the vote share in favor of the school bond measure. TestPassRate is the average (across
subjects) share of students in the district passing state tests, and Capital is per-student capital
expenditures. d indexes districts. t indexes fiscal/school years. and e indexes elections. (Fiscal and
school years coincide, since the fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30.) For reasons explained in
Subsection 1.7.2 below. I estimate the effects on test scores four years after the election. Presumably.
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test scores depend on the total additional capital spending that results from the bond measure.
rather than just on capital spending in the year of the test. and so the endogenous variable is total
construction spending in the year of the vote plus the subsequent four years. I use a bandwidth
of 10 percentage points of vote share (the results are generally insensitive to bandwidth selection).
All regressions include year dunnnies and control for pre-election district characteristics. including
spending and test scores. to enhance precision. Standard errors are clustered at the district x year
level.
To determine the correlation between the treatment effect and quality, I rerun the above re-
gressions splitting the sample approximately in half based on distance from the exemplary ratings
cutoff in the year before the election.30 The quantity of interest is the difference between the two-
stage least squares coefficients on construction spending estimated in the high versus low quality
samples.
Note that the results I obtain using this strategy are local average treatment effects for districts
with close bond elections. If the correlation between initial quality and the marginal productivity
of new capital spending is different for these districts than for other districts, then this strategy
could give the wrong answer to the question of whether voting based on initial quality produces
efficient outcomes on average. Table 1.17 compares districts with close elections (defined as those
where a measure passed or failed by 5 percentage points or less) to other districts with votes. For
the most part. the two samples look fairly similar on observable measures, although the districts
with close elections are larger and spend less per student at baseline.
1.7.2 First Stage Results
One possible concern about the above research design (discussed extensively in Cellini et al. (2010))
is that the outcome of close elections may not actually have much effect on capital spending,
because school boards in districts where the school bond measure goes down to defeat may just
keep putting measures on the ballot until one eventually passes. There is certainly some evidence
of this phenomenon in my sample. Districts where a bond measure just barely fails are almost 50
percentage points more likely than districts where a measure just barely passes to hold a second
election within four years.3 1
Nonetheless. Figure 1.14 and Table 1.18 show that passing a bond measure has a strong and
statistically significant effect on capital spending. at least at lags up to four years. In the first
panel of the graph and column of the table, the dependent variable is per-student capital spending
in the year of the election. Each additional panel and column add an additional year of capital
3 0 This approach splits the sample at one standard deviation below the exemplary cutoff. Given that I find that
voters' response to the ratings is concentrated around the exemplary cutoff, it would be better if I could split the
sample at that cutoff. Unfortunately, there are not enough close elections in districts above the exemplary cutoff to
make that feasible. Ideally. of course, I would be able to trace out the relationship between initial quality and the
treatment effect over the entire distribution of quality.
3 1This estimate comes from running the above specification with a dummy for holding a second vote on the left
hand side.
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expenditures to the dependent variable (that is. the dependent variable is cumulative).
Reassuringly. in the year of the vote. there is essentially no difference in capital spending between
districts where a bond measure just barely fails and districts where a measure just barely passes.
In each of the next two years. passing a bond measure leads to about a $1.500 per student increase
in capital expenditures (compared to a base year mean of about $900). and in the third year it
leads to an increase of about $1.000. By the end of three years. districts where a measure just
barely passed have spent nearly $4,000. or about 70%. more per student than districts where a
measure just barely failed. The estimated difference in cumulative spending falls a bit by the end
of year four. presumably because many districts where the inital bond measure failed have by then
managed to approve a subsesquent measure. By the end of year five, the estimated difference is
still more than $2.000 per student but no longer statistically significant.3 2
Panels B and C of the table show results for the low and high quality samples respectively. Bond
issues have larger effects on spending in districts with lower initial quality. In both samples. however.
the pattern of spending mirrors the full sample results, with the gap in cumulative expenditures
growing through year three. shrinking modestly in year four, and fading to statistical insignificance
in year five.
These results guide my decision to look for effects on test scores four years after the bond
election. It seems likely that any positive effect of construction on test scores would take some time
to materialize; in fact, the initial impact of a major construction project could well be disruptive
rather than beneficial. Four years is the longest lag at which there are large and strongly statistically
significant differences in cumulative construction spending between districts where measures just
barely passed and just barely failed. Moreover. in the fourth year after the bond election, average
(annual) capital spending in districts that approved a bond issue has fallen most of the way back to
its initial level, suggesting that whatever projects the bond issues funded are now complete. Cellini
et al. (2010) find no effect of school construction on test scores., but Neilson and Zimmerman (2011).
who do find that school construction raises test scores. find that the positive effects materialize as
soon as the new buildings are finished.
Table 1.19 provides estimates of the effect of passing a bond measure on instructional spending.
Legally, Texas school districts may use school bonds only to finance capital expenditures. but. since
money is fungible. one might expect that districts would still use some of the bond proceeds for
other purposes. The table shows that this does not seem to be the case. 33 The estimated impacts on
instructional spending are small. mostly negative, and uniformly insignificant. Thus. the reduced
form and two-stage least squares results should be interpreted as capturing exclusively the effects
of additional construction spending.
3 2 fBecause my data series ends in 2011. I observe different districts for different numbers of years after their school
bond elections, and so Figure 1.14 and Table 1.18 show results for an unbalanced panel. The basic pattern of results
is the same if I restrict the sample to districts that I observe for all six years.
3 3 This result is consistent with the large literature on the "fly paper'" effect, which finds that states and localities
generally spend dedicated revenues and intergovernmental grants on their designated purpose. For an overview of
this literature, see Hines and Thaler (1995).
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1.7.3 Reduced Form and Two-Stage Least Squares Results
Figure 1.15 shows the effect of passing a bond measure on test score pass rates four years after the
election for the full sample and for the low and high initial quality samples. In none of the three
panels does there seem to be any discontinuity in test pass rates at the threshold for bond measure
passage.
Table 1.20 provides the two-stage least squares results. parameterized to give the effect of a
$1.000 per student increase in capital spending on average pass rates. Column 1 shows that there is
no statistically significant effect on test pass rates in the full sample. The results are actually quite
precise, largely because I control for test pass rates in the year before the election. I can rule out
(at the 95% confidence level) effects as small as a 0.23 percentage point (0.04 standard deviation)
increase in pass rates from a $1,000 increase in per-student spending.
Unsurprisingly given the lack of any treatment effect in the full sample. the results provide no
basis for comparing the marginal product of capital spending in low- versus high-quality districts.
The point estimates for both sub-samples are small and statistically insignificant. Column 4 shows
that the coefficient of interest, the interaction between the treatment effect and having high initial
quality is positive; the point estimate implies that a $1.000 increase in per-student spending has
a 0.4 percentage point larger impact on test pass rates in a high- versus a low-initial quality
district. However. this estimate is both small (roughly 0.08 standard deviations) and statistically
insignificant. 34
1.7.4 Discussion
It is possible that my findings indicate that the two thirds of Texas school districts that passed
bond measures at some point during the past fifteen years were all making a mistake. It seems more
likely. though. that I am simply testing for productivity effects using the wrong outcome measure.
I use standardized test performance as my outcome measure because it is an obvious objective
measure of school productivity. 35 But improvements in test scores may not be the main benefit of
increased capital spending. While Neilson and Zimmerman (2011) find that school construction in
New Haven raises test scores. Cellini et al. (2010) find that school bond votes in California have
no effect on test scores but sizable effects on home values. This suggests that homebuyers value
school construction for some reason other than an impact on test performance. perhaps because
it makes their children's school experience more enjoyable or because it enhances the aesthetics of
the neighborhood.
3I also tried looking at the effect of capital spending on dropout rates. Again, neither the full sample treatment
effect estimate nor the estimated interaction between the treatment effect and initial quality is statistically significant.
Unsurprisingly, these results were also much less precise than the test score results, since there is much less variation
in dropout rates, especially in the high initial quality sample. In the full sample, I cannot rule out the possibility
that a $1,000 increase in per-student spending reduces dropout rates by as much as 0.2 percentage points; the mean
dropout rate in the full sample is about 1 percentage point.
35I use pass rates rather than mean scores because of data constraints. A better measure would be average test
scores, since it would incorporate the performance of all students, rather than just those near the threshold.
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One possible direction for future research. therefore. would be to implement the same test for
the correlation between the marginal productivity of funds and initial quality but use housing values
in place of test scores as the productivity measure. This change would improve the test by using
a more comprehensive measure of the effects of new spending. In fact. theoretically. the effect on
home values is the best possible measure of the marginal productivity of additional capital spending
since. under standard rationality assumptions. changes in home values should reflect all benefits of
the new construction (test scores gains, amenity value. etc.).
It may seem odd to test for the efficiency of voting outcomes based on the assumption that
housing values are efficiently determined. All that is required for this approach to make sense.
however. is that individuals be substantially more likely to make socially efficient decisions when
buying a home than when voting on a ballot measure. This seems plausible for two reasons. First,
individuals likely devote considerably more attention and investigative effort to buying a house
than to voting in a school bond election. Second. home values will be efficient as long as each
individual correctly accounts for his own preferences, whereas efficient voting outcomes depend on
appropriately aggregating everyone's preferences.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates how voters make decisions about whether to increase local taxes and spend-
ing. Using variation generated by Texas's school district ratings system. I test the hypothesis that
voters are more likely to support additional spending on schools when they perceive current service
quality to be high. I find that support for school bond measures is 10 percentage points higher in
districts that receive an exemplary versus a recognized rating. Voters respond to the level of the
district's rating. not just to whether the most recent rating is better or worse than the previous
year's.
From the standpoint of economic efficiency. decisions about new spending should be based on
the marginal product of funds, not the total product (i.e. quality). In Section 1.7 above, I attempt
to test whether the total product predicts the marginal product in this setting by estimating the
correlation between initial quality and the effect of passing a bond measure on standardized test
outcomes. I find that passing a bond measure has no effect on test scores in either the high or the
low initial quality subsample. suggesting that test scores may be the wrong outcome for measuring
the productivity of new capital spending. One direction for future work would be to improve this
test for efficiency by substituting a more comprehensive measure of the effect of bond measures.
perhaps the effect on housing values.
Another direction for future work would be to examine whether the school district ratings affect
voters' preferences about funding for other levels of government. In particular. during my sample
period. Texas voters had the opportunity to vote on several state constitutional amendments dealing
with funding issues. Employing the same research design I have used here. one could examine
whether perceptions of local school quality affect voters' support for increasing or reducing state
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taxes and spending. If local school ratings did affect votes in statewide elections. this would suggest
that voters make funding decisions at least in part based on their general sense of how government
at all levels - is performing. rather than by reference to the specific policy under consideration.
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Figure 1.1: Share of Districts Receiving Each Rating By Year
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Unacceptable Acceptable Recognized Exemplary
Notes: The years shown refer to the years in which the ratings were
issued. No ratings were issued in 2003.
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Figure 1.2: Non-Linearity of the Ratings System
Recognized Versus Exemplary Distance Measures
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Figure 1.3: Texas Education Agency Ratings Formula Summary for 2010-2011
Table 8: Requirements for Each Rating Category
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Figure 1.4: Distance Measures Versus Actual Ratings - Vote Sample
Recognized v. Exemplary
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Dtst om uof
0
Dist fom Cutoff
Unacceptable v. Acceptable
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Notes: Sample is districts with school bond elections in subsequent year. X axis units are standard deviations of the
distance measure. Data points represent means for 0.1 standard deviation cells. Ratings are converted to numbers as
follows: unacceptable = 0, acceptable = 1, recognized - 2, exemplary = 3. 94% of constructed ratings match actual
ratings (97% where constructed rating is not unacceptable).
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Figure 1.5: Distance Measures Versus Actual Ratings - Full Sample
iNotes: sample is all eistrict x year ooservations. A axis units are stanaara aeviations or tne aistance measure. uata
points represent means for 0.1 standard deviation cells. Ratings are converted to numbers as follows: unacceptable
= 0, acceptable = 1, recognized = 2, exemplary = 3. 90% of constructed ratings match actual ratings (94% where
constructed rating is not unacceptable).
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Figure 1.6: Yes-Vote Share Around Ratings Cutoffs
Recognized v. Exemplary
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Notes: X-axis units are standard deviations of the distance measure. Datapoints are means for 0.1 standard
deviation cells. Sample size in left panel is 887 districts; sample size in right panel is 1,693 districts.
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Figure 1.7: Yes-Vote Share Around Exemplary Cutoff By Prior-Year Rating
Notes: X-axis units are standard deviations of the distance measure. Datapoints are means for 0.1 standard
deviation cells. Sample sizes: Panel A - 485 districts; Panel B - 402 districts; Panel C - 795 districts; Panel
D - 92 districts.
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Figure 1.8: Yes-Vote Share Around Recognized Cutoff By Prior-Year Rating
Panel A: Same Rating As Last Year
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Notes: X-axis units are standard deviations of the distance measure. Datapoints are means for 0.1 standard
deviation cells. Sample sizes: Panel A - 1,132 districts; Panel B - 561 districts; Panel C - 1,043 districts;
Panel D - 650 districts.
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Figure 1.9: Log Voter Turnout
Notes: Log voter turnout is the log of the number of individuals voting in the election. X-axis units are
standard deviations of the distance measure. Datapoints are means for 0.1 standard deviation cells. Sample
size in left panel is 887 districts; sample size in right panel is 1,693 districts.
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Figure 1.10: Number of Standardized Test Indicators By Distance From the Ratings Cutoffs
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Notes: Sample is all standardized test pass rate indicators included in the ratings formula (i.e.
standardized test pass rates for all students and for the four subgroups for those subjects included
in the formula, in a given year). X-axis units are percentage point distances from the ratings cutoffs.
Y-axis units are numbers of indicators. Datapoints within 5 percentage points of the cutoffs are
shown as solid red circles, while datapoints further from the cutoff are shown as hollow blue circles.
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Figure 1.11: Covariate Balance Around the Exemplary Cutoff
iNotes: )ampie is an aistrict x year oDservations. A-axis uris are percentage point aistances iroM tne ratings cuto
Datapoints are cell means for 0.1 standard deviation cells. Data are purged of year effects.
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Figure 1.12: Covariate Balance Around the Recognized Cutoff
Notes: Sample is all district x year observations. X-axis units are percentage point distances from the ratings cutoffs.
Datapoints are cell means for 0.1 standard deviation cells. Data are purged of year effects.
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Figure 1.13: Share of Districts Holding Votes
iNoTes: oampie is an uisuricb x yeai uusti vatauns. U-ax1 I uin ul a putIILbnaUs Pu11U
ratings cutoffs. Datapoints are cell means for 0.1 standard deviation cells.
46
Figure 1.14: Capital Expenditures Per Student
Notes: Sample is all school bond elections. Capital expenditures are cumulative and include the year of the vote
plus the specified number of subsequent years. X-axis units are percentage points of yes-vote share. Datapoints are
cell means for 5 percentage point bins of yes-vote share. The vertical line is drawn at 50%, so means to the right of
the line are for districts where bond measures passed.
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Figure 1.15: Average Pass Rate on State Standardized Tests Four Years After School Bond Election
Notes: Sample is all school bond elections. Pass rate is the average test pass rate across all tested subjects tour
years after the election year. X-axis units are percentage points of yes-vote share. Datapoints are cell means for 5
percentage point bins of yes-vote share. The vertical line is drawn at 50%, so means to the right of the line are for
districts where bond measures passed.
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Table 1.1: Ratings Transition Matrix
Rating in Year t+1
Rating in Year t Exemplary Recognized Acceptable Unacceptable
Exemplary 55.3 36.3 8.2 0.0
Recognized 12.4 54.5 32.8 0.0
Acceptable 1.1 21.6 74.5 2.9
Unacceptable 1.0 10.7 68.6 19.7
Notes: The table shows the average shares of districts transitioning between ratings categories, omitting
the 2002-2004 switch to the new ratings system. On average, 8% of districts are rated exemplary, 31% are
rated recognized, 59% are rated acceptable, and 2% are rated unacceptable.
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Table 1.2: District Summary Statistics
Exemp Recog Acc Unacc All W/Votes
Mean Enrollment 1.099 3.078 4.865 1.723 3.879 6.682
Med. Enrollment 352 751 1.122 392 842 1.804
Mean Share F/RP Lunch 0.40 0.47 0.55 0.72 0.52 0.47
Mean Share Black 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.09
Mean Share Hispanic 0.21 0.27 0.35 0.42 0.31 0.32
Mean Tests Pass Rate 0.96 0.91 0.83 0.68 0.86 0.87
Mean Spending/Student 14.031 12.616 11.411 11,663 12.040 11,542
Med. Spending/Student 11.246 10.614 10.184 10.514 10.413 9.905
N (districts x years) 1.387 5.507 9.207 388 17.198 1.577
N (districts) 1.303 782
Notes: Sample is all observations for 1996-2011. Districts with votes are those with a school bond vote at some
point in the year following the reference ratings year. The state tests pass rate is computed as the average share
of students in the district passing tests in reading, English language arts, math, and (when applicable) science and
social studies.
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Table 1.3: Election Summary Statistics
Exemp Recog Ace Unacc All
Total Elections 116 692 1.245 17 2,070
Elections Per District Per Year 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.13
Elections Per District 1.6
Share of Bond Measures Passed 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.82 0.74
Mean Yes-Vote Share 0.67 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.61
Std. Yes-Vote Share 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16
Mean Amt. Authorized (Millions of $2011) 22.0 44.2 50.8 54.0 47.0
Median Amt. Authorized (Millions of $2011) 6.3 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.3
Mean Turnout 1.597 2.364 2.300 3.400 2.892
Median Turnout 639 912 1.124 1.192 1.010
N (districts x years) 1.387 5.507 9.207 388 17.198
N (districts) 1,303
Notes: Sample is all observations for 1996-2011. Amount authorized is the bond issue amount authorized by the
ballot measure. Yes-vote share is the share of voters voting in favor of the bond measure.
Table 1.4: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Numerical Rating
Vote Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Exemplary v. Recognized Cutoff
Dist >= 0 0.939*** 0.943*** 0.951*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.926***
(0.0520) (0.0554) (0.0574) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0163)
F-Stat 326.6 289.3 273.9 3047.5 3123.9 3215.5
N 405 405 405 3384 3384 3384
Panel B: Recognized v. Acceptable Cutoff
Dist >= 0 0.838*** 0.740*** 0.864*** 0.834*** 0.774*** 0.842***
(0.0397) (0.0423) (0.0326) (0.0132) (0.0736) (0.0121)
F-Stat 444.4 306.3 702.6 3979.3 110.5 4812.1
N 1108 405 1108 7396 3384 7396
Panel C: Acceptable v. Unacceptable Cutoff
Dist >= 0 0.330 0.335 0.249 0.277*** 0.271*** 0.276***
(0.246) (0.239) (0.247) (0.0639) (0.0596) (0.0567)
F-Stat 1.800 1.954 1.014 18.75 20.63 23.67
N 284 284 284 1826 1826 1826
Year dummies N Y Y N Y Y
District covariates N N Y N N Y
Notes: Local linear regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations of the distance measure.
Vote sample is districts with bond votes; full sample is all district x year observations. Numerical ratings
conversion: 0 = unacceptable, 1 = acceptable, 2 = recognized, 3 = exemplary. Standard errors in vote
sample regressions are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.5: Effect of a Higher Rating on Yes-Vote Share
Dependent Variable: Yes-Vote Share
Exemplary v. Recognized Recognized v. Acceptable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Higher rating 0.107* 0.115** 0.0991** 0.00742 0.0281 0.0374
(0.0421) (0.0393) (0.0383) (0.0285) (0.0275) (0.0270)
Dist below cutoff -0.102 -0.0875 -0.0562 -0.0943 -0.139* -0.158*
(0.0890) (0.0858) (0.0863) (0.0625) (0.0628) (0.0622)
Dist above cutoff 0.0274 -0.0589 -0.110 0.183* 0.214* 0.235**
(0.168) (0.157) (0.154) (0.0879) (0.0849) (0.0824)
Constant 0.585*** 0.610*** 0.583*** 0.586*** 0.559*** 0.549***
(0.0271) (0.0350) (0.0440) (0.0186) (0.0199) (0.0199)
N 405 405 405 1108 1108 1108
Year dummies N Y Y N Y Y
District covariates N N Y N N Y
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations of the distance measure.
Regressions are parameterized such that the constant coefficient gives the predicted value of yes-vote share just below
the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.6: Robustness of Results to Alternative Bandwidths and Specifications
Dependent Variable: Yes-Vote Share
Local Linear Regressions Polynomial Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline BW = 1.0c- BW = 0.7c- BW = 0.3c- Quadratic Cubic
Panel A: Exemplary v. Recognized Cutoff
Higher rating 0.0991** 0.0965* 0.0820* 0.129* 0.163** 0.179**
(0.0383) (0.0433) (0.0360) (0.0509) (0.0523) (0.0569)
Constant 0.583*** 0.574*** 0.585*** 0.553*** 0.528*** 0.510***
(0.0440) (0.0365) (0.0340) (0.0549) (0.0323) (0.0407)
N 405 887 598 250 2070 2070
Panel B: Recognized v. Acceptable Cutoff
Higher rating 0.0374 0.00592 0.0219 0.0264 0.00641 0.00896
(0.0270) (0.0213) (0.0240) (0.0340) (0.0208) (0.0247)
Constant 0.549*** 0.592*** 0.580*** 0.557*** 0.595*** 0.573***
(0.0199) (0.0126) (0.0157) (0.0275) (0.0133) (0.0156)
N 1108 1693 1420 708 2070 2070
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions. Bandwidths for local linear regressions are denominated in standard
deviations of the distance measure. Regressions are parameterized such that the constant coefficient gives the predicted
value of yes-vote share just below the cutoff. All regressions include year effects and control for pre-election district
characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Higher Rating on Bond Measure Pass Rates
Dep Var: Bond
(1)
Exemp v. Recog
Measure Passed
(2)
Recog v. Acc
Higher rating 0.138 0.00701
(0.0936) (0.0726)
Dist below cutoff 0.0265 -0.350*
(0.259) (0.153)
Dist above cutoff -0.617 0.546*
(0.434) (0.224)
Constant 0.708*** 0.661***
(0.113) (0.0545)
N 405 1108
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to
0.5 standard deviations of the distance measure. Dependent variable is
a dummy for whether the bond measure passed. Regressions are pa-
rameterized such that the constant coefficient gives the predicted value
of yes-vote share just below the cutoff. All regressions include year ef-
fects and control for pre-election district characteristics. Standard errors
are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
p < 0.001
Table 1.7: Effect of a
Table 1.8: Effect of a Higher Rating on Yes-Vote Share By Prior-Year Rating
Dependent Variable: Yes-Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Last Yr Same Last Yr Dif Improvers Slippers
Panel A: Exemplary v. Recognized Cutoff
Higher rating 0.0991** 0.0960* 0.0342 0.104* 0.109
(0.0383) (0.0456) (0.0760) (0.0496) (0.142)
Dist below cutoff -0.0562 -0.0733 0.0919 -0.0496 -0.154
(0.0863) (0.102) (0.186) (0.0897) (0.425)
Dist above cutoff -0.110 -0.0666 -0.282 -0.172 0.261
(0.154) (0.191) (0.281) (0.248) (0.465)
Constant 0.583*** 0.652*** 0.701*** 0.537*** 0.522***
(0.0440) (0.0297) (0.0556) (0.0281) (0.138)
N 405 248 157 331 74
Panel B: Recognized v. Acceptable Cutoff
Higher rating 0.0374 0.0333 0.0752 0.0233 0.0454
(0.0270) (0.0364) (0.0484) (0.0349) (0.0453)
Dist below cutoff -0.158* -0.0883 -0.280* -0.171** -0.164
(0.0622) (0.0623) (0.134) (0.0661) (0.138)
Dist above cutoff 0.235** 0.170 0.338* 0.347** 0.190
(0.0824) (0.0975) (0.155) (0.124) (0.138)
Constant 0.549*** 0.566*** 0.545*** 0.556*** 0.588***
(0.0199) (0.0214) (0.0461) (0.0228) (0.0405)
N 1108 691 417 645 463
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations of the distance measure.
"Last yr same" sample is districts with the same rating as the year before. "Last yr dif" sample is districts with a
different rating this year than last year. "Improvers"' sample is districts that last year were below the relevant cutoff.
"Slippers" sample is districts that last year were above the relevant cutoff. Regressions are parameterized such that the
constant coefficient gives the predicted value of yes-vote share just below the cutoff. All regressions include year effects
and control for pre-election district characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.9: Effect of a Higher Rating on Yes-Vote Share By Time Since Ratings Were Issued
Dependent Variable: Yes-Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0-3 Months 4-6 Months 7-9 Months 10-12 Months
Panel A: Exemplary v. Recognized Cutoff
Higher rating 0.206* 0.184* 0.0392 0.0678
(0.0824) (0.0888) (0.115) (0.0708)
Dist below cutoff -0.0460 -0.186 0.298 0.0238
(0.241) (0.119) (0.213) (0.164)
Dist above cutoff -0.692 -0.198 -0.668 -0.145
(0.448) (0.304) (0.353) (0.214)
Constant 0.656*** 0.512*** 0.758*** 0.650***
(0.0835) (0.0332) (0.0977) (0.0581)
N 101 84 68 152
Panel B: Recognized v. Acceptable Cutoff
Higher rating -0.0219 0.000696 0.0918 0.0388
(0.0542) (0.0503) (0.0615) (0.0425)
Dist below cutoff -0.129 0.0123 -0.248 -0.181
(0.121) (0.0991) (0.138) (0.109)
Dist above cutoff 0.315 -0.00444 0.323 0.201
(0.161) (0.124) (0.208) (0.132)
Constant 0.635*** 0.586*** 0.629*** 0.637***
(0.0565) (0.0287) (0.0632) (0.0292)
N 233 284 175 416
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations of the distance mea-
sure. Sample is split by time between the release of the ratings and the bond election. Regressions are parameterized
such that the constant coefficient gives the predicted value of yes-vote share just below the cutoff. All regressions
include year effects and control for pre-election district characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district
x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.10: Effect of a Higher Rating on Yes-Vote Share By Type of Election
Dependent Variable: Yes-Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
High-Profile Statewide Other
Panel A: Exemplary v. Recognized Cutoff
Higher rating -0.0644 -0.0139 0.100*
(0.0351) (0.0470) (0.0415)
Dist below cutoff -0.317*** -0.0611 -0.0478
(0.0558) (0.144) (0.0923)
Dist above cutoff 0.658*** -0.0122 -0.0472
(0.0877) (0.320) (0.152)
Constant 0.526*** 0.545*** 0.615***
(0.0229) (0.0334) (0.0416)
N 22 50 355
Panel B: Recognized v. Exemplary Cutoff
Higher rating -0.0592 -0.0115 0.0471
(0.0455) (0.0493) (0.0305)
Dist below cutoff 0.0909 -0.000122 -0.207**
(0.0886) (0.109) (0.0725)
Dist above cutoff -0.0527 0.126 0.283**
(0.127) (0.167) (0.0921)
Constant 0.646*** 0.578*** 0.627***
(0.0420) (0.0309) (0.0231)
N 98 253 855
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations
of the distance measure. High profile elections are presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial
elections and presidential primaries. Regressions are parameterized such that the constant
coefficient gives the predicted value of yes-vote share just below the cutoff. All regressions
include year effects and control for pre-election district characteristics. Standard errors are
clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.11: Effect of a Higher Rating on Log Voter Turnout
Dep Var: Log
(1)
Exemp v. Recog
Voter Turnout
(2)
Recog v. Acc
Higher rating -0.214 -0.113
(0.239) (0.149)
Dist below cutoff -0.502 0.335
(0.518) (0.379)
Dist above cutoff 1.286 -0.713
(0.940) (0.499)
Constant 6.678*** 7.441***
(0.175) (0.116)
N 405 1108
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to
0.5 standard deviations of the distance measure. Dependent variable is
the log of the number of individuals voting in the election. Regressions
are parameterized such that the constant coefficient gives the predicted
value of yes-vote share just below the cutoff. All regressions include
year effects and control for pre-election district characteristics. Standard
errors are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001
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Table 1.12: Testing for Bunching in Test Pass Rates
Dependent Variable: Numnber of Indicators
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample 1996-2003 2004-2011
Panel A: Exemplary v. Recognized
Dist >= 0 99.91 224.8 10.46
(361.7) (240.4) (87.55)
Dist below cutoff 603.3*** 133.1* 299.6***
(78.95) (42.94) (13.12)
Dist above cutoff -549.2** -154.1 -221.9***
(113.4) (72.84) (30.49)
Constant 9602.9*** 3721.9*** 4737.4***
(322.5) (177.0) (61.69)
N 11 11 11
Panel B: Recognized v. Acceptable
Dist >= 0 525.5** 381.5** -81.86
(109.9) (78.40) (35.49)
Dist below cutoff 184.7*** 113.1*** 102.7***
(6.356) (17.07) (11.33)
Dist above cutoff 173.0** 36.04 72.27**
(33.66) (29.23) (14.47)
Constant 3729.3*** 2062.3*** 1622.1***
(22.33) (49.16) (27.29)
N 11 11 11
Notes: Local linear regressions with bandwidth equal to 5 percentage points.
Sample is all standardized test pass rate indicators included in the ratings formula
(i.e. standardized test pass rates for all students and for the four subgroups for
those subjects included in the formula in a given year). Dependent variable is
the number of pass rate indicators at a given distance from the cutoff. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.13: Testing for Discontinuities in Covariates at the Exemplary Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black Hispanic F/RP Lunch Enrollment Last-Yr Scores $/Student
Panel A: Full Sample
Higher rating -0.0111 -0.00571 -0.0119 -158.9 0.000212 674.0
(0.00811) (0.0177) (0.0150) (406.7) (0.00281) (628.3)
Constant 0.0573*** 0.228*** 0.433*** 736.6* 0.931*** 11874.7***
(0.00726) (0.0144) (0.0119) (351.2) (0.00254) (463.1)
N 3384 3384 3384 3384 3363 3377
Panel B: 1996-2003 Sample
Higher rating 0.00269 -0.00924 -0.00293 -197.6 -0.00321 356.3
(0.00649) (0.0213) (0.0174) (372.5) (0.00319) (701.5)
Constant 0.0430*** 0.228*** 0.479*** 222.2 0.933*** 10998.3***
(0.00669) (0.0225) (0.0176) (419.4) (0.00410) (461.7)
N 2190 2190 2190 2190 2189 2190
Panel C: 2004-2011 Sample
Higher rating -0.0383 -0.00344 -0.0203 -395.3 0.00799 832.7
(0.0202) (0.0319) (0.0281) (947.9) (0.00554) (1322.8)
Constant 0.0888*** 0.229*** 0.392*** 688.6 0.937*** 13046.4***
(0.0198) (0.0281) (0.0263) (741.2) (0.00549) (1179.9)
N 1194 1194 1194 1194 1174 1187
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations of the running variable. Black, Hispanic, and
free/RP lunch refer to the share of a district's students falling into these categories. Regressions are parameterized so that the constant
coefficient gives the predicted value of the dependent variable just below the cutoff. All regressions include year effects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.14: Testing for Discontinuities in Covariates at the Recognized Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black Hispanic F/RP Lunch Enrollment Last-Yr Scores $/Student
Panel A: Full Sample
Higher rating -0.00434 -0.00369 -0.000788 530.2 -0.0000217 -46.50
(0.00691) (0.0145) (0.0103) (739.6) (0.00285) (323.5)
Constant 0.0815*** 0.299*** 0.490*** 4940.6*** 0.872*** 10348.4***
(0.00547) (0.0111) (0.00793) (570.6) (0.00216) (214.8)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7380 7379
Panel B: 1996-2003 Sample
Higher rating -0.0124 -0.0129 -0.00807 874.0 0.00611 13.74
(0.00857) (0.0209) (0.0145) (1019.9) (0.00396) (323.8)
Constant 0.0905*** 0.324*** 0.492*** 4593.1*** 0.876*** 10131.1***
(0.00775) (0.0195) (0.0139) (935.0) (0.00396) (252.1)
N 3879 3879 3879 3879 3878 3876
Panel C: 2004-2011 Sample
Higher rating 0.00556 0.00609 0.00767 265.0 -0.00751 -96.39
(0.0110) (0.0201) (0.0148) (1080.6) (0.00409) (570.9)
Constant 0.0750*** 0.274*** 0.476*** 5003.8*** 0.874*** 10867.1***
(0.00981) (0.0176) (0.0129) (859.7) (0.00341) (459.2)
N 3517 3517 3517 3517 3502 3503
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations of the running variable. Black, Hispanic, and
free/RP lunch refer to the share of a district's students falling into these categories. Regressions are parameterized so that the constant
coefficient gives the predicted value of the dependent variable just below the cutoff. All regressions include year effects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.15: Additional Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Yes-Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Post-2004 Sample Test Scores Only
Panel A: Exemplary v. Recognized
Higher rating 0.0991** 0.292** 0.0887*
(0.0383) (0.0992) (0.0429)
Dist below cutoff -0.0562 -0.389* -0.0196
(0.0863) (0.188) (0.0585)
Dist above cutoff -0.110 -0.116 -0.101
(0.154) (0.406) (0.0866)
Constant 0.583*** 0.500*** 0.646***
(0.0440) (0.0824) (0.0398)
N 405 79 279
Panel B: Recognized v. Acceptable
Higher rating 0.0374 0.00227 0.0520*
(0.0270) (0.0352) (0.0238)
Dist below cutoff -0.158* -0.00668 -0.127**
(0.0622) (0.0788) (0.0409)
Dist above cutoff 0.235** 0.0557 0.160***
(0.0824) (0.133) (0.0432)
Constant 0.549*** 0.564*** 0.538***
(0.0199) (0.0299) (0.0198)
N 1108 425 1108
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 0.5 standard deviations
of the running variable. In the column labeled, "Test Scores Only," the distance measures
are computed based only on test pass rates. Regressions are parameterized such that the
constant coefficient gives the predicted value of the dependent variable just below the cutoff.
All regressions include year effects and control for district characteristics. Standard errors are
clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05., ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.16: Effect of a Higher Rating on Share of Districts Holding Votes
Dep Var: Held Vote
(1)
Exermp v. Recog
(2)
Recog v. Acc
Higher rating -0.0116 -0.00386
(0.0190) (0.0170)
Dist below cutoff -0.0322 -0.0120
(0.0445) (0.0396)
Dist above cutoff 0.00118 -0.0174
(0.0632) (0.0495)
Constant 0.0597*** 0.105***
(0.0146) (0.0127)
N 3384 7396
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to
0.5 standard deviations of the distance measure. Dependent variable
is a dummy for whether the district held an election. Regressions are
parameterized such that the constant coefficient gives the predicted value
of yes-vote share just below the cutoff. All regressions include year effects
and control for pre-election district characteristics. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.17: Summary Statistics for Districts with Close Elections Versus Other Districts with Votes
Close Elections Others W/Votes P-Value: Different
Mean Enrollment 6,852 6,640 0.842
Med. Enrollment 2,209 1,717 0.027
Mean Share F/RP Lunch 0.48 0.47 0.812
Mean Share Black 0.09 0.08 0.210
Mean Share Hispanic 0.31 0.32 0.357
Mean Tests Pass Rate 0.86 0.87 0.357
Mean Spending/Student 10,823 11,721 0.002
Med. Spending/Student 9,785 9,935 0.288
Mean Capital Spending/Student 1,075 1,231 0.256
Med. Capital Spending/Student 478 513 0.512
N (districts x years) 315 1,262 1577
N (districts) 252 742 782
Notes: Close elections are those where the bond measure passed or failed by 5 percentage points or less. The state tests pass
rate is computed as the average share of students in the district passing tests in reading, English language arts, math, and
(when applicable) science and social studies.
Table 1.18: Effect of Passing a Bond Measure on Capital Spending
Dep Var: Total Capital Expenditures Per Student Since Year of Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vote Year Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Full Sample
Passed Vote 44.08 1419.3** 3097.0*** 3970.9*** 3351.1** 2267.3
(175.4) (453.6) (797.0) (1095.8) (1255.4) (1162.5)
Constant 859.6*** 2309.6*** 4465.9*** 5789.4*** 6362.2*** 6862.2***
(126.9) (313.9) (520.0) (974.0) (959.9) (1128.1)
N 773 712 668 618 534 445
F-Stat 0.0632 9.792 15.10 13.13 7.125 3.804
Panel B: Low Initial Quality Sample
Passed Vote 76.88 1778.1** 3749.1** 5213.4** 4479.3* 3368.6
(215.0) (655.1) (1252.4) (1885.7) (2234.1) (1929.2)
Constant 859.7*** 2276.6*** 4451.4*** 6090.7*** 8492.9*** 7521.5**
(171.6) (475.3) (1022.1) (1541.5) (1872.1) (2273.0)
N 469 444 414 373 297 212
F-Stat 0.128 7.367 8.961 7.643 4.020 3.049
Panel C: High Initial Quality Sample
Passed Vote -62.55 891.2 2236.2* 2508.9* 2493.9* 2273.9
(267.7) (558.4) (923.5) (1148.2) (1178.5) (1383.5)
Constant 949.4*** 3636.9*** 4938.8*** 7059.5*** 8282.2*** 9556.7**
(230.5) (921.1) (1120.4) (1843.2) (2429.0) (3192.4)
N 304 268 254 245 237 233
F-Stat 0.0546 2.547 5.863 4.774 4.478 2.702
Notes: Local linear regressions with bandwidth equal to 10 percentage points of yes-vote share. Depen-
dent variable is cumulative per-student capital expenditures in the year of vote plus the specified number of
subsequent years. The low initial quality sample consists of districts at least one standard deviation below
the exemplary rating cutoff in the year before the bond vote. Regressions are parameterized such that the
constant gives the predicted value of the outcome when yes-vote share is 50%. All regressions include year
effects and control for pre-election district characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district x year
level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.19: Effect of Passing a Bond Measure on Instructional Spending
Dependent Variable: Instructional Expenditures Per Student
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vote Year Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Full Sample
Passed Vote -66.08 -76.88 -32.90 -10.10 -4.563 -86.79
(41.04) (58.57) (71.86) (59.80) (73.85) (82.27)
Constant 4652.3*** 4725.1*** 4747.5*** 4846.6*** 4838.4*** 5050.0***
(37.10) (55.62) (65.02) (107.1) (103.7) (108.1)
N 773 712 668 618 534 445
Panel B: Low Initial Quality Sample
Passed Vote -92.97 -161.5 -2.803 -2.858 73.74 -159.5
(48.28) (82.76) (101.7) (86.09) (101.9) (137.9)
Constant 4810.6*** 4969.7*** 4928.5*** 4876.5*** 4939.9*** 5023.0***
(48.03) (89.08) (109.1) (94.42) (102.3) (147.5)
N 469 444 414 373 297 212
Panel C: High Initial Quality Sample
Passed Vote -60.03 39.98 -59.18 -21.90 -39.22 -5.237
(62.86) (69.21) (77.94) (84.07) (95.85) (102.8)
Constant 4604.2*** 4629.6*** 4669.2*** 4844.0*** 4812.6*** 4556.7***
(81.65) (88.47) (127.0) (166.2) (143.1) (209.0)
N 304 268 254 245 237 233
Notes: Local linear regressions with bandwidth equal to 10 percentage points of yes-vote share. Dependent
variable is annual per-student instructional expenditures in specified year. The low initial quality sample
consists of districts at least one standard deviation below the exemplary rating cutoff in the year before the
bond vote. Regressions are parameterized such that the constant gives the predicted value of the outcome when
yes-vote share is 50%. All regressions include year effects and control for pre-election district characteristics.
Standard errors are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.20: Effect of Passing a Bond Measure on Standardized Test Pass Rates
Dep Var: Average Test Pass Rate After Four Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Low Quality High Quality Full Sample
Capital spending ($1.000s) -0.00172 -0.00238 0.00168 -0.00238
(0.00199) (0.00203) (0.00408) (0.00203)
Yes-vote share 0.0973 0.144 0.0500 0.144
(0.0803) (0.154) (0.0868) (0.154)
Yes-vote share*passed vote -0.0534 -0.105 -0.0730 -0.105
(0.108) (0.192) (0.175) (0.192)
Capital spending*high quality 0.00406
(0.00455)
Yes-vote share*high quality 
-0.0945
(0.177)
Yes-vote share*passed vote*high quality 0.0321
(0.260)
High quality 
-0.0449
(0.0477)
Constant 0.897*** 0.841*** 0.882*** 0.841***
(0.0174) (0.0241) (0.0442) (0.0241)
N 497 279 218 497
Notes: Two-stage least squares regressions with bandwidth equal to 10 percentage points of yes-vote share and bond measure passage
instrumenting for capital spending. Dependent variable is average (across subjects) pass rate on state standardized tests. Capital spending
is a, cumulative measure equal to per-student capital expenditures in the year of the bond measure plus the four subsequent years. The low
initial quality sample consists of districts at least one standard deviation below the exemplary rating cutoff in the year before the bond vote.
Regressions are parameterized such that the constant gives the predicted value of the outcome when yes-vote share is 50%. All regressions
include year effects and control for pre-election district characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district x year level. * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Chapter 2
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance:
How Important Is Forward Looking
Behavior?
(Joint Work with Liran Einav. Amy Finkelstein. and Mark Cullen')
2.1 Introduction
The size and rapid growth of the healthcare sector - and the pressure this places on public sector
budgets - has created great interest among both academics and policymakers in possible approaches
to reducing healthcare spending. On the demand side. the standard. long-standing approach to
constraining healthcare spending is through consumer cost sharing in health insurance, such as
deductibles and coinsurance. Not surprisingly therefore. there is a substantial academic literature
devoted to trying to quantify how the design of health insurance contracts affects medical spending.
These estimates have important implications for the costs of alternative health insurance contracts,
and hence for the optimal design of private insurance contracts or social insurance programs.
One aspect of this literature that we find remarkable is the near consensus on the nature of
the endeavor: the attempt to quantify the response of medical spending with respect to its (out-
of-pocket) price to the consumer. Yet. health insurance contracts in the United States are highly
'We are grateful to David Molitor and James Wang for outstanding research assistance, and to Amitabh Chandra,
Kate Ho, Joe Newhouse and numerous seminar participants for helpful comments and suggestions. The Alcoa portion
of the data were provided as part of an ongoing service and research agreement between Alcoa, Inc. and Stanford,
under which Stanford faculty, in collaboration with faculty and staff at Yale University, perform jointly agreed-upon
ongoing and ad hoc research projects on workers' health, injury, disability, and health care, and Mark Cullen serves
as Senior Medical Advisor for Alcoa, Inc. We gratefully acknowledge support from the NIA (R01 AG032449), the
National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship program (Aron-Dine), the National Science Foundation
Grant SES-0643037 (Einav), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Network on Socioeconomic Status
and Health and Alcoa, Inc. (Cullen). and the U.S. Social Security Administration through grant #5 RRC08098400-
04-00 to the National Bureau of Economic Research as part of the SSA Retirement Research Consortium. The
findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of SSA. any agency
of the Federal Government. or the NBER.
69
non-linear. so trying to estimate the behavioral response to a single out-of-pocket price is. in most
cases. not a well-posed exercise. as it begs the question "which price?"". A typical private health
insurance plan has a deductible. a coinsurance rate. and an out-of-pocket maximum (or "stop loss").
The consumer faces a price of 100% of medical expenditures until he has spent the deductible. at
which point the marginal price falls sharply to the coinsurance rate (typically around 10-20%). and
then falls to zero once out-of-pocket expenditures have reached the stop-loss amount. Public health
insurance programs. such as Medicare. also involve non-linear schedules. including occasionally
schedules in which the marginal price rises over some expenditure range and then falls again (as in
the famous "doughnut hole" in Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage).
In the context of such non-linear budget sets, trying to characterize an insurance policy by a
single price could produce very misleading inferences. For example. one cannot extrapolate from es-
tiniates of the effect of coinsurance on health spending to the effects of introducing a high-deductible
health insurance plan without knowing how forward looking individuals are in their response to
health insurance coverage. A completely myopic individual would respond to the introduction of a
deductible as if his "price" has sharply increased to 100%. whereas a fully forward looking individual
with annual health expenditures that are likely to exceed the new deductible would experience little
change in the effective marginal price of care and therefore might not change his behavior much.2
Understanding how medical spending responds to the design of health insurance contracts therefore
requires that we understand how consumers account for the non-linear budget schedule they face
in making their medical consumption decisions. A fully rational. forward-looking individual who
is not liquidity constrained should recognize that the "spot" price applied to a particular claim is
not relevant; this nominal price should not affect his consumption decisions. Rather. the decision
regarding whether to undertake some medical care should be a function only of the end-of-year
price.
In this paper. we therefore investigate whether and to what extent individuals respond to
the expected end-of-year price, or "future price." of medical care. We do so in the context of
employer-provided health insurance in the United States. which is the source of over 85% of private
health insurance coverage. Assessing whether individuals respond to the future price is empirically
challenging. which may explain why there has been relatively little work on this topic. The key
empirical difficulty arises because the spot price and the future price often vary jointly. A low
spending individual faces both a high spot price (because all his spending falls below the deductible)
and a high expected end-of-year price (because he does not expect to hit the deductible). while the
2 Indeed, once one accounts for the non-linear contract design, even characterizing which insurance contract would
provide greater incentives to economize on medical spending becomes a complicated matter. Consider, for example,
two plans with a coinsurance arm that is followed by an out-of-pocket maximum of $5,000. Imagine that Plan A has
a 10% coinsurance rate and plan B has a 50% coinsurance rate. Which plan would induce less spending? The naive
answer would be that Plan B is less generous and would therefore lead to lower medical utilization. Yet, the answer
depends on the distribution of medical spending without insurance, as well as on how forward looking individuals
are. For example, an individual who suffers a compound fracture early in the coverage period and spends $10,000
on a surgery would effectively obtain full insurance coverage for the rest of the year under Plan B, but would face a
10%W coinsurance rate (with a remaining $4,000 stop loss) under Plan A. We would therefore expect this individual
to have greater imedical utilization under Plan B.
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opposite is true for a high spending individual. Similarly. the types of variation that have most
often been used to estimate the impact of health insurance on medical spending - such as variation
in deductibles or coinsurance rates - will change the spot price and the future price jointly. This
makes it challenging to identify whether individuals respond to the future price without a tightly
specified model of expectation formation. which in turn raises concerns about the extent to which
any elasticity estimates are driven by these modeling assumptions.
The primary empirical exercise in this paper addresses this challenge by identifying situations
in which individuals face the same spot price for their consumption decision, but have substantially
different expected end-of-year prices. The key insight behind our empirical strategy is that. as a
result of certain institutional features of employer-provided health insurance in the United States.
individuals who join the same deductible plan in different months of the year initially face the same
spot price, but different expected end-of-year prices. Employer-provided health insurance resets
every year. typically on January 1. When new employees join a firm in the middle of the year,
they obtain coverage for the remainder of the year. While their premiums are pro-rated. deductible
amounts are fixed at their annual level. As a result. all else equal. the expected end-of-year price
is increasing with the join month over the calendar year; individuals who join a plan later in the
year have fewer months to spend past the deductible.
We use this feature in order to test for forward looking behavior in the response to health
insurance contracts. In other words, we test the null of completely myopic behavior, which we
define as consumption decisions that depend only on the spot price. We do so by comparing
initial medical utilization across individuals who join the same plan in different months of the year.
If individuals are forward looking in their healthcare consumption decisions, an individual who
joins the plan earlier in the calendar year should (initially) spend more than an otherwise identical
individual who joins the same plan later in the calendar year. By contrast, if individuals are myopic,
the initial spending of an individual who joins the plan earlier should be the same as the initial
spending of the individual who joins the same plan later. To account for potential confounders.
such as seasonality in healthcare spending, we use patterns of initial utilization by join month for
individuals who join no-deductible plans. in which the future price hardly varies over the course of
the year. To operationalize this strategy empirically, we draw on data from several large employers
with information on their plan details as well as their employees' plan choices. demographics, and
medical claims.
We note that individuals may fail to exhibit forward-looking behavior not only because they are
myopic but also if they are liquidity constrained or lack an understanding of their future budget
constraint. If we had failed to reject the null of completely myopic behavior, we would have
been unable to distinguish which of these factors was behind our result. In practice. however, we
reject the null and estimate that conditional on the spot price of medical care. individuals who
face a higher future price consume statistically significantly less (initial) medical care. It therefore
appears that individuals understand something about the nature of their dynamic budget constraint
and make their healthcare consumption decisions with at least some attention to forward-looking
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considerations.
In the last section of the paper we attempt to move beyond testing the null of complete myopia
and toward quantifying the extent of forward looking behavior. We estimate that a ten cent
increase in the future price (for a dollar of medical spending) is associated with a 6 to 8 percent
decline in initial medical utilization. This implies an elasticity of initial medical utilization with
respect to the future price of -0.4 to -0.6. To provide an economic interpretation of this estimate.
we develop a stylized dynamic model in which utilization behavior in response to medical shocks
depends on both the underlying willingness to substitute between health and residual income and
the degree of forward looking behavior. We draw on additional data from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment to calibrate the model. and use the calibrated model to assess the extent of
forward looking behavior implied by our estimates of the response of initial medical utilization to the
future price. On the spectrum between full myopia (individuals respond only to the spot price) and
textbook forward looking behavior (individuals respond only to the future price)., our calibration
results generally suggest that individuals' behavior is much closer to the former. Nonetheless. we
illustrate that the degree of forward looking behavior we find still has a substantial effect on the
response of annual medical spending to health insurance contracts relative to the spending response
that would be predicted under either completely myopic or completely forward looking behavior.
Thus, failing to account for dynamic considerations can greatly alter the predicted impact of non-
linear health insurance contracts on annual medical expenditures.
Our paper links to the large empirical literature that tries to estimate moral hazard in health
insurance, or the price sensitivity of demand for medical care. As already mentioned. much of this
literature tries to estimate a demand elasticity with respect to a single price. although different
studies consider a different "relevant" price to which individuals are assumed to respond. For
example. the famous RAND elasticity of -0.2 is calculated assuming individuals respond only to
the spot price (Manning et al., 1987; Keeler and Rolph, 1988; Zweifel and Manning. 2000). while
more recent estimates have assumed that individuals respond only to the expected end-of-year
price (Eichner. 1997) or to the actual (realized) end-of-year price (Eichner. 1998; Kowalski. 2010).
Our findings highlight the importance of thinking about the entire budget set rather than about a
single price; this point was emphasized in some of the early theoretical work on the impact of health
insurance on health spending (Keeler. Newhouse. and Phelps. 1977; Ellis. 1986) but until recently
has rarely been incorporated into empirical work. Several papers on the impact of health insurance
on medical spending - Ellis (1986). Cardon and Hendel (2001). and more recently Kowalski (2011).
Marsh (2011). and our own work (Einav et al.. 2011) - explicitly account for the non-linear budget
set. but a (fully forward-looking) behavioral model is assumed. rather than tested.4
3 See Chandra, Gruber, and McIKnight (2007) for a recent review of this literature and its estimates.
4 Non-linear pricing schedules are not unique to health insurance. Indeed, a large literature, going back at least
to Hausman (1985), develops methods that address the difficulties that arise in modeling selection and utilization
under non-linear budget sets. and applies these methods to other setting in which similar non-linearities are common,
such as labor supply (Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Chetty et al., 2011), electricity
utilization (Reiss and White, 2005). or cellular phones (Grubb and Osborne, 2009; Yao et al., 2011).
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Outside of the context of health insurance, a handful of papers address the question of whether
individuals respond at all to the non-linearities in their budget set. and which single price may best
approximate the non-linear schedule to which individuals respond. This is the focus of Liebman and
Zeckhauser (2004). Feldman and Katuscak (2006). and Saez (2010) in the context of the response
of labor supply to the progressive income tax schedule. and of Borenstein (2009) and Ito (2010) in
the context of residential electricity utilization. In most of these other contexts. as well as in our
own previous work on moral hazard in health insurance (Einav et al., 2011). the analysis of demand
in the presence of a non-linear pricing schedule is static. This is partly because in most non-health
contexts information about intermediate utilization levels (within the billing or tax cycle) is not
easy to obtain (for both consumers and researchers) and partly because dynamic modeling often
introduces unnecessary complications in the analysis. In this sense, our current study - utilizing
the precise timing of medical utilization within the contract year - is virtually unique within this
literature in its explicit focus on the dynamic aspect of medical utilization, and its explicit account
of expectation formation. 5
Forward looking decision making plays a key role in many economic problems, and interest in
the extent of forward looking behavior is therefore quite general. From this perspective, a closely
related work to ours is Chevalier and Goolsbee's (2009) investigation of whether durable goods
consumers are forward looking in their demand for college textbooks (they find that they are).
Despite the obvious difference in context. their empirical strategy is similar to ours. They use the
fact that static. spot incentives remain roughly constant (as pricing of textbook editions doesn't
change much until the arrival of new editions), while dynamic incentives (the expected time until
a new edition is released) change. A slightly cleaner aspect of our setting is that the constant spot
prices and varying dynamic incentives are explicitly stipulated in the coverage contract rather than
empirical facts that need to be estimated from data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sketches a simple, stylized model of medical
care utilization that is designed to provide intuition for the key concepts and our empirical strategy;
the model serves as both a guide to some of our subsequent empirical choices, and as a framework
that we use to benchmark the extent of forward looking behavior we estimate. In Section 3 we test
for forward looking behavior. We start by describing the basic idea and the data we obtained to
implement it. and then present the results. In Section 4 we calibrate the model from Section 2 to
try to quantify the extent to which individuals are forward looking. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 A simple model
Consider a model of a risk-neutral forward-looking individual who faces uncertain medical expendi-
ture. and is covered by a contract of (discrete) length T and deductible D. 6 That is. the individual
5 An exception in this regard is Keeler and Rolph (1988), who, like us, test for forward looking behavior in health
insurance contracts (but use a different empirical strategy and reach a different conclusion).
6 Assuming risk neutrality in the context of an insurance market may appear an odd modeling choice. Yet, it
mmakes the model simpler and more tractable and makes no difference for any of the qualitative insights we derive
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pays all his expenditures out of pocket up to the deductible level D. but any additional expenditure
is fully covered by the insurance provider.
The individual's utility is linear and additive in health and residual income, and we assume
that medical events that are not treated are cumulative and additively separable in their effect on
health. Medical events are given by a pair (0. w). where 0 > 0 denotes the total expenditure (paid
by either the individual or his insurance provider) required to treat the event, and w > 0 denotes
the (monetized) health consequences of the event if left untreated. We assume that individuals
need to make a discrete choice whether to fully treat an event or not; events cannot be partially
treated. We also assume that treated events are "fully" cured. and do not carry any other health
consequences. Thus. conditional on an event (0, w). the individual's flow utility is given by
r -min{O,d} if treated
u(6, W; d) = nn ,d i rae (2.1)
wj-w if not treated
where min{0, d} is the out-of-pocket cost associated with expenditure level 0, which is a function
of d, the amount left to satisfy the deductible.
Medical shocks arrive with a per-period probability A, and when they arrive they are drawn
independently from a distribution G(0, w). Given this setting, the only choice individuals make is
whether to treat or not treat each realized medical event. Optimal behavior can be characterized
by a simple finite horizon dynamic problem. The two state variables are the time left until the
end of the coverage period which we denote by t, and the amount left until the entire deductible is
spent which we denote by d. The value function v(d, t) represents the present discounted value of
expected utility along the optimal treatment path. Specifically, the value function is given by the
solution to the following Bellman equation:
v(d, t) = (1-A)6v(d, t-1)+A max -m 0, dG(6, w), (2.2)
1) A-w + v(d, t - 1)
with terminal conditions of v(d, 0) = 0 for all d. If a medical event arrives, the individual treats the
event if the value from treating. -min{0, d} + Sv(max{d - 0, 0}, t - 1). exceeds the value obtained
from not treating. -w + ov(d, t - 1).
The model implies simple and intuitive comparative statics: the treatment of a medical event is
more likely when the time left on the contract. t. is higher and the amount left until the deductible
is spent. d. is lower. This setting nests a range of possible behaviors. For example. "fully" myopic
individuals (6 = 0) would not treat any shock as long as the immediate negative health consequences
of the untreated shock. w. are less than the immediate out-of-pocket expenditure costs associated
with treating that shock., min{0, d}. Thus. if 0 < d. fully myopic individuals (6 = 0) will not treat if
w < 0. By contrast. "fully" forward looking individuals (6 _ 1) will not treat shocks if the adverse
health consequences. w. are less than the expected end-of-year cost of treating this illness, which is
from the model.
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given by fp -. where fp (for "future price") denotes the expected end-of-year price of medical care.
which is the relevant price for a "fully"* forward looking individual in deciding whether to consume
care today. Thus. if 0 < d. fully forward looking individuals will not treat if w < fp - 0. That is.
while fully myopic individuals consider the current. "spot"', or nominal price of care (which in our
example is equal to one). fully forward looking individuals only care about the future price.
To illustrate the implications of the model that will serve as the basis of our empirical strategy.
we solve the model for a simple case. where we assume that A = 0.2 and that medical events are
drawn uniformly from a two-point support of (0 = 50, w = 50) and (0 = 50, w = 45). We use
two different deductible levels (of 600 and 800) and up to 52 periods (weeks) of coverage. Figure 1
presents some of the model's implications for the case of 6 = 1. It uses metrics that are analogous
to the empirical objects we later use in the empirical exercise. The top panel presents the expected
end-of-year price of the individual as we change the deductible level and the coverage horizon.
The expected end-of-year price in this example is 1 - Pr(hit). where Pr(hit) is the fraction of
individuals who hit the deductible by the end of the year. Individuals are. of course. more likely
to hit the deductible as they have more time to do so or as the deductible level is lower. This
ex-ante probability of hitting the deductible determines the individual's expectations about his
end-of-year price. This future price in turn affects a forward looking individual's willingness to
treat medical events. The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents the (cumulative) expected spending
over the initial three months (12 weeks). Given the specific choice of parameter values, expected
spending over the initial 12 periods is at least 60 (due to the per-period 0.1 probability of a medical
event (0 = 50, w = 50) that would always be treated) and at most 120 (if all medical events are
treated).
The key comparative static that is illustrated by Figure 1 - and that will form the basis of our
empirical work - is how the expected end-of-year price (and hence initial spending by a forward
looking individual) varies with the coverage horizon. For a given deductible. the expected end-
of-year price is increasing as the coverage horizon declines (top panel of Figure 1) and therefore.
for a forward looking individual, expected initial spending also declines as the coverage horizon
declines (bottom panel of Figure 1). Specifically. when the coverage horizon is long enough and
the deductible level low enough. forward looking individuals expect to eventually hit the deductible
and therefore treat all events. so expected spending is 120. However. as the horizon gets shorter
there is a greater possibility that the deductible would not get exhausted by the end of the year.
so the end-of-year price could be 1 (rather than zero). thus making forward looking individuals not
treat the less severe medical events of (0= 50, w = 45).
The graphs also illustrate how the spot price of current medical care misses a great deal of
the incentives faced by a forward looking individual. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 we see a
fully forward looking individual's initial medical utilization (i.e.. spending in the first 12 weeks)
varying greatly with the coverage horizon despite a spot price that is always one. By contrast.
for the cases we consider. a fully myopic individual (6 = 0) who only responds to the spot price
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has expected 12-week spending of 60. regardless of the coverage horizon t (see bottom panel). 7
Likewise, the expected three-month spending of individuals in a no-deductible plan does not vary
with the coverage horizon, regardless of their 6. since the expected end-of-year price does not vary
with the coverage horizon.
Finally., we note that while we have referred to 6 as a measure of how "forward looking" the
individual is. in practice a variety of different factors can push 6 below 1 and induce a behavioral
response to the current, "spot" price. These factors include not only myopia but also liquidity con-
straints (e.g.. Adams. Einav. and Levin, 2009) and salience (e.g.. Chetty and Saez, 2009; Liebman
and Luttmer. 2011). Our research strategy does not distinguish between these. nor is it necessary
to do so for predicting how spending will respond to changes in a non-linear budget set. However.
these different sources that may affect behavior can be important for forecasting the effects of al-
ternative public policy interventions or for extrapolating our results to alternative populations. We
return to these issues briefly in the conclusion.
2.3 Testing for forward looking behavior
2.3.1 Basic idea
To test whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their behavioral response to their
health insurance contract. we design a test for whether individuals respond to the future price of
medical consumption in a setting in which similar individuals face the same spot price (i.e.. the
nominal price at the time they make their medical consumption decision) but different future prices.
In such a situation. we can test whether medical utilization changes with the future price, holding
the spot price fixed, and interpret a non-zero coefficient as evidence of forward looking behavior
and as a rejection of the null of complete myopia.
The central empirical challenge therefore is to identify individuals who face the same spot price
but different future prices for medical consumption. Our novel observation is that the institutional
features of employer-provided health insurance in the United States provide such variation. Specif-
ically, we use the fact that unlike other lines of private insurance (e.g.. auto insurance or home
insurance), the coverage period of employer-provided health insurance is not customized to individ-
ual employees. This presumably reflects the need for synchronization within the company., such as
benefits sessions. open enrollment periods. and tax treatment. Therefore. (annual) coverage begins
(and ends. unless it is terminated due to job separation) at the same date - typically on January 1 -
for almost all employees. Although all employees can choose to join a new plan for the subsequent
year during the open enrollment period (typically in October or November). there are only two
reasons employees can join a plan in the middle of the year: either they are new hires or they have
7 A fully myopic individual (6 = 0) would (like the fully forward looking individual) always treat (0 = 50, w = 50)
shocks but as long as he is still in the deductible range would never treat (0 = 50, w = 45) shocks. Given this
behavior, with a 600 or 800 deductible, there is a zero probability that the deductible would be reached within the
first 12 weeks.
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a qualifying event that allows them to change plans in the middle of the year. 8 In order to transition
new employees (and occasionally existing employees who have a qualifying event) into the regular
cycle. the common practice is to let employees choose from the regular menu of coverage options.
to pro-rate linearly the annual premium associated with their choices. but to maintain constant (at
its annual level) the deductible amount. As a result. individuals who are hired at different points
in the year. but are covered by the same (deductible) plan. face the same spot price (of one) but
different future prices. Thus. as long as employees join the company at different times for reasons
that are exogenous to their medical utilization behavior, variation in hire date (or in the timing of
qualifying events) generates quasi-experimental variation in the future price that allows us to test
for forward looking behavior.
To illustrate. consider two identical employees who select a plan with an $800 (annual) de-
ductible. The first individual is hired by the company in January and the second in July. The
difference in their incentives is analogous to the simple model presented in Figure 1. Individuals
who join in a later month during the year have a shorter coverage horizon t until coverage resets (on
January 1). Individuals who join early in the year have a longer coverage horizon. The early joiners
are therefore more likely to hit their deductible by the time their coverage resets. Therefore. as in
the top panel of Figure 1. early joiners have a lower expected end-of-year price. As in the bottom
panel of Figure 1. if individuals are forward looking, then early joiners have a greater incentive
to utilize medical care upon joining the plan. Crucially., just after they get hired. both January
and July joiners have yet to hit their deductible, so their spot price is (at least initially) the same.
Thus. differences in (initial) spending cannot be attributed to differences in spot prices, and there-
fore must reflect dynamic considerations. By contrast, as Figure 1 also illustrates, if individuals are
completely myopic (or join a plan with no deductible so that the expected end-of-year price does
not vary with the month they join the plan). initial utilization will not vary for the early and later
joiners.
2.3.2 Data
Data construction With this strategy in mind, we obtained claim-level data on employer-
provided health insurance in the United States. We limited our sample to firms that offered at
least one plan with a deductible (which would generate variation in expected end-of-year price
based on the employee's join month, as in the top panel of Figure 1) and at least one plan with no
deductible. The relationship between initial utilization and join month in the no-deductible plan
is used to try to control for other potential confounding patterns in initial medical utilization by
join month (such as seasonal flu); in a typical no-deductible plan. the expected end-of-year price is
roughly constant by join month. so - absent confounding effects that vary by join month - initial
medical utilization of employees covered by a no-deductible plan should not systematically vary
with join month (bottom panel of Figure 1).
8 Qualifying events include marriage, divorce, birth or adoption of a child, a spouse's loss of employment, or death
of a dependent.
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The data come from two sources. The first is Alcoa. Inc.. a large multinational producer of
aluminum and related products. We have four years of data (2004-2007) on the health insurance
options. choices., and medical insurance claims of its employees (and any insured dependents) in
the United States. We study the two most common health insurance plans at Alcoa. one with
a deductible for in-network expenditure of $250 for single coverage ($500 for family coverage).
and one with no deductible associated with in-network spending. While Alcoa employed (and
the data cover) about 45.000 U.S.-based individuals every year. the key variation we use in this
paper is driven by mid-year plan enrollment by individuals not previously insured by the firm. thus
restricting our analysis to only about 7.000 unique employees (over the four years) that meet our
sample criteria. 9 Of the employees at Alcoa who join a plan mid-year and did not previously have
insurance at Alcoa that year. about 80% are new hires, while the other 20% are employees who
were at Alcoa but uninsured at the firm, had a qualifying event that allowed them to change plans
in the middle of the year. and chose to switch to Alcoa-provided insurance.
The Alcoa data are almost ideal for our purposes, with the important exception of sample
size. Ex ante, sample size was a key concern given the large variation in medical spending across
individuals. To increase statistical power we examined the set of firms (and plans) available through
the National Bureau of Economic Research's (NBER) files of Medstat's MarketScan database. The
data on plan choices and medical spending are virtually identical in nature and structure across
the three firms (indeed. Alcoa administers its health insurance claims via Medstat); they include
coverage and claim-level information from an employer-provided health insurance context. provided
by a set of (anonymous) large employers.
We selected two firms that satisfied our basic criteria of being relatively large and offering both
deductible and no-deductible options to their employees. Each firm has about 60.000 employees
who join one of these plans in the middle of the year over the approximately six years of our data.
This substantially larger sample size is a critical advantage over the Alcoa data. The disadvantages
of these data are that we cannot tell apart new hires from existing employees who are new to
the firm's health coverage (presumably due to qualifying events that allow them to join a health
insurance plan in the middle of the year). we cannot distinguish between in-network and out-of-
network spending. there is less demographic information on the employees, and the coinsurance
rate for one of the plans in one of the firms is not known.
Because employers in MarketScan are anonymous (and we essentially know nothing about them).
we will refer to these two additional employers as firm B and firm C. We focus on two plans offered
by firm B. We have five years of data (2001-2005) for these plans. during which firm B offered one
plan with no in-network deductible and one plan that had a $150 ($300) in-network single (family)
deductible. The data for firm C are similar. except that the features of the deductible plan have
changed slightly over time. We have seven years of data for firm C (1999-2005). during which the
firm continuously offered a no-deductible plan (in-network) alongside a plan with a deductible. The
9 We restrict our analysis to employees who are not insured at the firm prior to joining a plan in the middle of the
year because if individuals change plans within the firm (due to a qualifying event), the deductible would not reset.
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deductible amount increased over time. with a single (family) in-network deductible of $200 ($500)
during 1999 and 2000. of $250 ($625) during 2001 and 2002. and $300 ($750) during 2004 and 2005.
Table 1 summarizes the key features of the plans (and their enrollment) that are covered by
our final data set. In all three firms, we limit our analysis to employees who join a plan between
February and October. and who did not have insurance at the firm immediately prior to this
join date. We omit employees who join in January for reasons related to the way the data are
organized that make it difficult to tell apart new hires who join the firm in January from existing
employees. We omit employees who join in November or December because. as we discuss in more
detail below, we use data from the first three months after enrollment to construct our measures of
"initial" medical utilization. Table 1 also summarizes. by plan. the limited demographic information
we observe on each covered employee, namely the type of coverage they chose (family or single),
and the employee's gender, age. and enrollment month. 10
Measuring the expected end-of-year price Table 2 describes the key variation we use in our
empirical analysis. For each plan, we report the expected end-of-year price as a function of the
time within the year an employee joined the plan. 1 Specifically. we define the expected end-of-year
price, or future price. fp. as
fpjm =1 - Pr(hitjm), (2.3)
where Pr(hitjm) is the probability an employee who joins plan j in month m will hit (i.e.. spend
more than) the in-network deductible by the end of the year; we calculate Pr(hit) as the fraction
of employees in a given plan and join month who have spent more than the in-network deductible
by the end of the year.12 For example, consider a plan with a $500 deductible and full coverage
for any medical expenditures beyond the deductible. If 80% of the employees who joined the plan
in February have hit the deductible by the end of the year. the expected end-of-year price would
be 0.8 - 0 + 0.2 . 1 = 0.2. If only 40% of the employees who joined the plan in August have hit the
deductible by the end of the year. their expected end-of-year price would be 0.4 - 0 + 0.6 - 1 = 0.6.
Thus. the future price is the average (out-of-pocket) end-of-year price of an extra dollar of in-
network spending. It is a function of one's plan j. join month m. and the annual spending of all
the employees in one's plan and join month.
Table 2 summarizes the average future price for each plan based on the quarter of the year
in which one joins the plan. For plans with no deductible (AO. BO. and CO). the future price is
mechanically zero (since everyone "hits" the zero deductible). regardless of the join month. For
'
0 In each firm we lose roughly 15 to 30 percent of new plan joiners because of some combination of missing
information about the employee's plan, missing plan details, or missing claims data (because the plan is an HMO or
a partially or fully capitated POS plan).
"In this and all subsequent analyses we pool the three different deductible plans in firm C which were offered at
different times over our sample period.
1 2 We calculate Pr(hit) separately for employees with individual and family coverage (since both the deductible
amount and spending patterns vary with the coverage tier). and therefore in all of our analyses fp varies with
coverage tier. However, for conciseness. in the tables we pool coverage tiers and report the (weighted) average across
coverage tiers within each plan.
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deductible plans. however. the future price varies with the join month. Only a small fraction of
the individuals who join plans late in the year (August through October) hit their deductible. so
their future price is greater than 0.8 on average. In contrast. many more employees who join a
deductible plan early in the year (February to April) hit their deductible, so for such employees the
future price is just over 0.5. Thus. early joiners who select plans with a deductible face an average
end-of-year price that is about 30 percentage points lower than the end-of-year price faced by late
joiners. Yet, initially (just after they join) both types of employees have yet to hit their deductible.
so they all face a spot price of one. Differences in initial spending between the groups therefore
plausibly reflects their dynamic response to the future price. This baseline definition of the future
price - the fraction of employees who join a given plan in a given month whose spending does not
exceed the in-network deductible by the end of the calendar year - will be used as the key right
hand variable in much of our subsequent empirical work.
Our baseline measure of the future price abstracts from several additional characteristics of the
plans. which are summarized in Appendix Table Al. First, it ignores any coinsurance features of
the plans. Plans AO, Al. and Cl-C3 all have a 10% coinsurance rate, while plans BO and CO have
a zero coinsurance rate. The coinsurance rate for plan B1 is unknown (to us). Second, we use only
the in-network plan features and assume that all spending occurs in network. In practice. each
plan (including the no-deductible plan) has deductibles and higher consumer coinsurance rates for
medical spending that occurs out of network.
There are two consequences of these abstractions, both of which bias any estimated impact
of the future price on behavior toward zero. First, abstracting from these features introduces
measurement error into the future price. Second. our analysis assumes that for the no-deductible
plans there is no variation in the future price for employees who join in different months (i.e..
the spot price and the future price are always the same). In practice. both a positive in-network
coinsurance rate (prior to the stop-loss) and the existence of out-of-network deductibles in all of
the no-deductible (in-network) plans mean that the future price also increases with the join month
for employees in the no-deductible plans. In the robustness section below we show that accounting
for these additional features - to the extent we are able to - makes little quantitative difference to
either our measurement of the future price or its estimated effect.
A final point worth noting about our definition of the future price is that it is constructed based
on the observed spending patterns of people who join a specific plan (and coverage tier) in a specific
month. For forward looking individuals, this spending may of course be influenced by the future
price. As we discuss in more detail below, this is not a problem for testing the null of complete
myopia (because under this null spending is not affected by the future price). Yet, for quantifying
the extent of forward looking behavior in Section 4 we will implement an instrumental variable
strategy designed to purge the calculated future price of any endogenous spending response.
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2.3.3 Estimating equations and results
Patterns of initial utilization by plan and join month We proxy for "initial' utilization
with two alternative measures. The first is a measure of the time (in days) to the first claim, while
the second is a measure of total spending (in dollars) over some initial duration (we will use three
months). In both cases. the measures of utilization encompass the utilization of the employee and
any covered dependents.
Average three month spending in our sample is about $600. It is zero for about 42% of the
sample. Since time to first claim is censored at as low a value as 92 days (for individuals who join
in October). we censor time to first claim at 92 for all the individuals (regardless of join month)
who have their first claim more than 92 days after joining the firm's coverage. The average time to
first claim for the remaining 58% of the individuals is 35 days, so with 42% of the sample censored
at 92 days. the sample average for the censored variable is 58 days.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for these measures of initial medical utilization by join month
for each plan. These statistics already indicate what appears to be a response to dynamic incentives.
For the no-deductible plans the average initial spending (left panel) and time to first claim (right
panel) are somewhat noisy. but do not reveal any systematic relationship with join month. By
contrast. employees who are in deductible plans appear to spend substantially less within the first
three months after joining the plan. or have a substantially longer time to first claim, if they join
the plan later in the year. presumably due to dynamic considerations. As illustrated in the bottom
panel of Figure 1. this is exactly the qualitative pattern one would expect from forward looking
individuals.
We operationalize this analysis a little more formally by regressing the measures of initial
utilization on join month. A unit of observation is an employee e who joins health insurance plan
j during calendar month m. As mentioned. we limit attention to employees who join new plans
between February and October. so m E {2, .... 10}. The simplest way by which we can implement
our strategy is to look within a given health plan that has a positive deductible associated with it
and regress a measure of initial medical utilization ye on the join month me and possibly a set of
controls xe. so that:
Ye = fjme + Xeg + Ile. (2.4)
Absent any confounding influences of join month on ye. we would expect an estimate of #j = 0
for deductible plans if individuals are fully myopic (6 = 0) and #j < 0 for spending (#j > 0 for
time to first claim) if individuals are not (6 > 0). We include an additional covariate for whether
the employee has family (as opposed to single) coverage to account for the fact that the deductible
varies within a plan by coverage tier (see Table 1) and that there naturally exist large differences
in average medical utilization in family vs. single coverage plans.
For our analysis of initial spending. our baseline dependent variable is log(s + 1). where s is
total medical spending (in dollars) by the employee and any covered dependents during their first
three months in the plan. Given that medical utilization is highly skewed. the log transformation
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helps in improving precision and reducing the effect of outliers. 13 An added attraction of the log
specification is that it facilitates comparison of the results to those from our analysis of time to
first claim. For the latter analysis. we use a Tobit specification on log(time)., where time measures
the time to first claim (in days) by the employee and any covered dependents; the Tobit is used to
account for the censoring at 92 days described above. We explore alternative functional forms for
both dependent variables below.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 report results from estimating equation 4 on these two dependent
variables, separately for each plan. The key right-hand-side variable is the join month. enumerated
from 2 (February) to 10 (October). In plans that have a deductible (Al. B1. and C1-C3). dynamic
considerations would imply a negative relationship between join month and initial spending and
a positive relationship between join month and time to first claim. The results show exactly this
qualitative pattern.
Patterns of initial utilization by join month for deductible vs. no-deductible plan If
seasonality in medical utilization is an important factor, it could confound the interpretation of the
estimated relationship that we have just discussed as a test for the null of full myopia. For example.
if spending in the spring is greater than spending in the summer due to. say. seasonal flu, then we
may incorrectly attribute the decline in "spot" utilization for late joiners as a response to dynamic
incentives. To address this concern (and other possible confounding differences across employees
who join plans at different months of the year). we use as a control group employees within the
same firm who join the health insurance plan with no deductible in different months. As discussed
earlier, such employees are in a plan in which the spot price and future price are (roughly) the
same so that changes in their initial utilization over the year (or lack thereof) provides a way to
measure and control for factors that influence initial utilization by join month that are unrelated
to dynamic incentives.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4. discussed earlier. also show the plan-level analysis of the
relationship between initial medical utilization and join month for the no-deductible plans (AO. BO.
and 00). The coefficient on join month for the no-deductible plans tends to be much smaller than
the coefficient for the deductible plan in the same firm (and is often statistically indistinguishable
from zero). This suggests that the difference-in-difference estimates of the pattern of spending by
join month in deductible plans relative to the analogous pattern in no-deductible plans will look very
similar to the patterns in the deductible plans. Indeed., this is what we find. as reported in columns
(2) and (4) of Table 4. which report this difference-in-difference analysis in which the no-deductible
plan (within the same firm) is used to control for the seasonal pattern of initial utilization by join
month in the "absence"' of dynamic incentives. Specifically. the difference-in-differences specification
1 3While conceptually a concave transformation is therefore useful, we have no theoretical guidance as to the "right"
functional form; any transformation therefore (including the one we choose) is ad hoc. and we simply choose one that
is convenient and easy to implement. We note however that Box-Cox analysis of the s + 1 variable suggests that a
log transformation is appropriate.
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is
ye = 'meDj + pj +T7, + x' + ve. (2.5)
where p are plan fixed effects. Tm are join-month fixed effects. and Dj is a dummy variable that is
equal to one when j is a deductible plan. The "plan fixed effects"' (the pu "s) include separate fixed
effects for each plan by coverage tier (family or single) since the coverage tier affects the deductible
amount (see Table 1). Again, our coefficient of interest is j3'. where ,3' = 0 would be consistent
with the lack of response to dynamic incentives (i.e.. full myopia) while 3' < 0 (for spending; or
/' > 0 for time to first claim) implies that the evidence is consistent with forward looking behavior.
Since we are now pooling results across plans (deductible and no-deductible plans). the parameter
of interest /' no longer has a j subscript.
The results in Table 4 indicate that. except at Alcoa where we have much smaller sample sizes.
the difference-in-difference estimates for each firm are all statistically significant and with the sign
that is consistent with dynamic considerations. For example. in Firm B we find that enrollment a
month later in a plan with a ($150 or $300) deductible relative to enrollment a month later in a
plan with no deductible is associated with an 8% decline in medical expenditure during the first
three months. and a 3% increase in the time to first claim. In Firm C these numbers are a 2%
decline and a 2% increase, respectively.
Of course. employees who self select into a no-deductible plan are likely to be sicker and to
utilize medical care more frequently than those employees who select plans with a deductible (due
to both selection and moral hazard effects). Indeed. Table 1 shows that there are. not surprisingly.
some observable differences between employees within a firm who choose the no-deductible option
instead of the deductible option. Our key identifying assumption is that while initial medical
utilization may differ on average between employees who join deductible plans and those who join
no-deductible plans, the within-year pattern of initial utilization by join month does not vary based
on whether the employee joined the deductible or no-deductible plan except for dynamic incentives.
In other words, we assume that any differences in initial utilization between those who join the no-
deductible plan and the deductible plan within a firm can be controlled for by a single (join month
invariant) dummy variable. We return to this below, when we discuss possible threats to this
identifying assumption and attempt to examine its validity.
Testing the relationship between expected end-of-year price and initial utilization In
order to provide an economic interpretation to the parameter of interest., it is useful to convert the
key right-hand-side variable, join month (me). into a variable that is closer to the underlying object
of interest: the expected end-of-year price. We therefore start by analyzing variants of the single-
plan analysis (equation 4) and the difference-in difference analysis (equation 5) in which we replace
the join month variable (me) with the future price variable fp defined earlier (recall equation 3 for
a definition. and Table 2 for summary statistics). The estimating equations are thus modified to
ye = jfpm + xeI + He, (2.6)
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and
and =~ i3fp] i + j + Fm + <3' + i<(2.7)
where (as before) jare plan (by coverage tier) fixed effects. and ~m are join-month fixed effects.
This transformation also aids in addressing the likely non-linear effect of join month on both
expected end-of-year price and on expected spending. Figure 1 illustrates how this relationship
may be non-linear. and Table 2 indicates that. indeed, our measure of the end-of-year price varies
non-linearly over time.
Table 5 reports the results. The first three rows report the results for each firm. We report the
results for the deductible plan in each firm in columns (1) and (3) and the difference-in-difference
results that use the deductible and no-deductible plan within each firm in columns (2) and (4).1
The difference-in-difference results in Firm B and Firm C (where the sample sizes are much bigger)
suggest that a 10 cent increase in the expected end-of-year price is associated with an 8 to 17
percent reduction in initial medical spending and with a 2.5 to 7 percent increase in the time to
first claim. These results are almost always statistically significant.
Thus far. all of the analysis has been of single plans or pairs of plans within a firm. The use of
future price (rather than join month) also allows us to more sensibly pool results across firms and
summarize them with a single number, since the relationship between join month and future price
will vary both with the level of the deductible (see Figure 1) and with the employee population.
In pooling the data, however, we continue to rely on only within firm variation, since we know
little about the different firms or about how comparable (or not) their employee populations are
(although we show in the appendix that in practice this does not make a substantive difference
to the results). Thus. our final specification allows the join month dummy variables Fm's to vary
by firm. so that all of the identification is coming from the differential effect of the join month on
employees in deductible plans relative to no-deductible plans within the same firm. That is. we
estimate
Ye = 0 fPjm + pj + F5 + xe, +Ve, (2.8)
where ~~mf denotes a full set of join month by firm fixed effects. The bottom rows of Table 5 report
the results from this regression. The OLS results (penultimate row of Table 5) will represent our
baseline specification in the rest of this section. We defer discussion of the IV results (last row of
Table 5) to the next section.
The effect of future price is statistically significant for both dependent variables. The OLS
results in the penultimate row indicate that an increase of 10 cents in the future price is associated
with an 11% decline in initial medical spending and a 3.6% increase in time to first claim. Overall.
the results suggest that we can reject the null of complete myopia (6 = 0). Individuals appear to
respond to the future price of medical care in making current medical care utilization decisions.
In other words. among individuals who face the same spot price of medical care. individuals who
14 Note that, by design, fp is constant for no-deductible plans, so that we cannot estimate the single-plan analysis
of the relationship between initial medical utilization and future price for the no-deductible plans.
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face a higher expected end-of-year price - because they join the plan later in the year initially
consuine less nedical care.
We also investigated the margin on which the individual's response to the future price oc-
curs. About three quarters of medical expenditures in our data represent outpatient spending;
per episode. inpatient care is more expensive and perhaps less discretionary than outpatient care.
Perhaps not surprisingly therefore. we find clear evidence of a response of outpatient spending to
the future price. but we are unable to reject the null of no response of inpatient spending to the
future price (although the point estimates are of the expected sign); Appendix Table A2 contains
the results.
Robustness We explored the robustness of our results to a number of our modeling choices. The
first six rows of Table 6 shows that our finding is quite robust across alternative functional forms
for the dependent variable. The first row shows the baseline results, where for initial spending the
dependent variable is log(s + 1), where s is total medical spending in the three months after joining
the plan, and for time-to-first-claim we estimate a Tobit model for log(time). where time is the
number of days until the first claim, censored at 92.
Row (2) of Table 6 uses levels (rather than logs) of s and time (maintaining the Tobit specifi-
cation for the time analysis). The statistically significant estimates are comparable in magnitude
to those in the baseline specification. Relative to the mean of the dependent variable, the results in
row (2) suggest that a 10 cent increase in the future price is associated with a 7% decline in initial
spending (compared to an 11% decline estimated in the baseline specification). and a 2.5% increase
in the time to first claim (compared to a 3.6% increase in the baseline). In row (3) we report
results from quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson estimation and calculate the fully-robust variance
covariance matrix (Wooldridge. 2002. pp. 674-676); this is an alternative proportional model to
the log specification. and one that allows us to incorporate the frequent occurrence of zero initial
spending without adding 1 when the dependent variable is based on three-month spending. The
estimate is still statistically significant. although somewhat smaller than our baseline estimate for
initial spending (suggesting that a 10 cent increase in the future price is associated with a 7% rather
than 11% decline in initial spending).
The next three rows investigate alternative ways of handling the time to first claim analysis.
Row (4) shows that estimating the baseline specification by OLS instead of Tobit produces estimates
that are still statistically significant but are somewhat smaller than the baseline (a 1.1% rather
than 3.6% increase in time to first claim). Row (5) reports result from estimating a censored-normal
regression on our baseline dependent variable log(time). which allows for the censoring value to
vary across observations. This allows us to make use of the fact that while we only observe 92 days
of medical claims for individuals who join in October. we can expand the observation period for
individuals who join in earlier months. The advantage of such a specification is that it makes use of
more information: the disadvantage is that it may not be as comparable to the spending estimates
since it implicitly gives more weiglht to individuals who join earlier in the year. The results are
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virtually identical to the baseline specification. In row (6) we estimate a Cox semi-parametric
proportional hazard model of the time to first claim (censored at 92 days for all observations).
Consistent with the previous specifications. the results indicate that an increase in the future price
is associated with a statistically significant decline in the probability of a claim arrival (i.e.. a longer
time to first claim).
In Appendix Table A3 (Panels A and B) we further show the robustness of our results to
alternative choices of covariates regarding the firm and coverage tier fixed effects. We also explore
an alternative measure of the future price which. unlike our baseline measure. accounts for the in-
network coinsurance rates in both the deductible and no-deductible plans for the two firms in which
this information is available (Alcoa and Firm C; see Appendix Table Al). Accounting for the in-
network coinsurance rates for Alcoa and Firm C makes little difference to either our measurement
of the future price (Appendix Table A4) or its estimated effect (Appendix Table A3, Panel C).
although the results in Appendix Table A3 suggest that, as expected (see discussion in Section
3.2), not accounting for the coinsurance rate slightly biases downward the estimated impact of the
future price in our baseline specification. 16
2.3.4 Assessing the identifying assumption
The results suggest that we can reject the null of complete myopia in favor of some form of forward
looking behavior. The key identifying assumption behind this interpretation of the results is that
there are no confounding differences in initial medical utilization among employees by their plan
and join month. In other words., any differential patterns of initial medical utilization that we
observe across plans by join month is caused by differences in expected end-of-year price. This
identifying assumption might not be correct if for some reason individuals who join a particular
plan in different months vary in their underlying propensity to use medical care. In particular, one
might be concerned that the same forward looking behavior that may lead to differential medical
care utilization might also lead to differential selection into a deductible compared to a no-deductible
plan on the basis of join month.
A priori, it is not clear if forward looking individuals would engage in differential selection into
a deductible vs. no-deductible plan based on the month they are joining the plan. A selection
story that would be most detrimental to the interpretation of our results is that individuals who
have high expected initial medical expenditure would be more likely to select the no-deductible
plan later in the year. For example. if an individual knows that all he needs is a single (urgent)
15 Van der Berg (2001) discusses the trade-offs involved in analyzing a duration model using a linear model with
the logarithm of the duration as the dependent variable, relative to a proportional hazard model. As he explains,
neither model strictly dominates the other.
16We do not observe the breakdown of spending by in-network vs. out-of-network in Firm B or Firm C, so we
cannot account for out-of-network spending in our construction of the future price at either of these firms. We do
know that in Alcoa, where the data allow us to tell apart, in-network spending from out-of-network spending, about
95% of the spending is done in network. We therefore suspect that the accounting for out-of-network spending and
out-of-network features of the plan would have little quantitative impact on our estimates of either the future price
or the response to it.
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doctor's appointment of $100 (which is below the deductible amount). it may be worth joining the
no-deductible plan (and paying the higher monthly premium) if he joins the plan later in the year
but not earlier in the year. as late in the year the incremental premium of a no-deductible plan is
lower and would be less than the $100 benefits it would provide. This would introduce a positive
relationship between individuals who join the no-deductible plan in later months and initial medical
utilization and could cause us to erroneously interpret the lack of such a pattern in the deductible
plans as evidence that individuals respond to the future price.
On the other hand. there are many reasons to expect no selection. even in the context of forward
looking individuals, if there are additional choice or preference parameters governing insurance plan
selection that do not directly determine medical utilization. For example. if individuals anticipate
the apparently large switching costs associated with subsequent re-optimization of plan choice (as in
Handel. 2011) they might make their initial. mid-year plan choice based on their subsequent optimal
open enrollment selection for a complete year. In such a case. we would not expect differential
selection into plans by join month. Ultimately. whether there is quantitatively important differential
selection and its nature is an empirical question.
The summary statistics in Table 2 present some suggestive evidence that individuals may be
(slightly) more likely to select the deductible plan relative to the no-deductible plan later in the
year.17 Quantitatively, however, the probability of selecting the deductible vs. no-deductible plan
is very similar over the course of the year. When we regress an indicator variable for whether
the employee chose a deductible plan on the employee's join month (enumerated, as before, from
2 to 10), together with a dummy variable for coverage tier and firm fixed effects to parallel our
main specification. the coefficient on join month is 0.0034 (standard error 0.0018). Qualitatively,
the pattern of greater probability of choosing a deductible later in the year is the opposite of
what could produce a confounding explanation for our main empirical results. More importantly.
quantitatively the results suggest trivial differential plan selection by join month; joining a month
later is associated with only a 0.3 percentage point increase in the probability of choosing the
deductible plan. or 0.9% relative to the 32% probability of choosing the deductible plan in the
sample. This very similar share of choices of deductible vs. no-deductible plans over the course of
the year implies that differential plan selection is unlikely to drive our findings.
We also examined whether the observable characteristics - i.e. age and gender - of individuals
joining a deductible vs. no-deductible plan within each of the three firms varied by join month. In
general. the results (shown in Appendix Table A5) show little evidence of systematic differences
by join month.' 8 To examine whether our findings are sensitive to these observable differences.
in Row 7 of Table 6 we re-estimate our baseline specification (equation 8) adding controls for the
1 7 Over the three join quarters shown in Table 2, the share joining the deductible plan varies in Alcoa from 0.49 to
0.53 to 0.53, in firm B from 0.20 to 0.22 to 0.19. and in firm C from 0.38 to 0.40 to 0.44.
18 While there are two exceptions that show statistically significant differential selection by join month. they are
both quantitatively trivial. Employees at Alcoa who join a deductible vs. no-deductible plan one month later in the
year are 0.9 percentage points (about 2 %) more likely to be female. Employees at Firm B who join a deductible vs.
no-deductible plan one month later in the year are 0.6 percentage points (about 2%) less likely to be over 45 (or 0.2
months younger (not shown in the table)).
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observable demographic characteristics of the employees: employee age. gender. and join year (see
Table 1). In keeping with the "within-firm" spirit of the entire analysis. we interact each of these
variables with the firm fixed effects. This specification controls for potential observable differences
across employees within a firm by plan type and join month. The results indicate that the impact of
these controls is neither substantial nor systematic. The effect of a 10 cent increase in the expected
end-of-year price on initial spending declines from 11% in the baseline specification to 10% with
the demographic controls. while the effect on time to first claim increases from 3.6% in the baseline
specification to 5.2% with the demographic controls. All the results remain statistically significant.
As another potential way to investigate the validity of the identifying assumption. we implement
an imperfect "placebo test" by re-estimating our baseline specification (equation 8 with the depen-
dent variable as the "initial" medical utilization in the second year the employee is in the plan. In
other words, we continue to define "initial medical utilization" relative to the join month (so that
the calendar month in which we measure initial medical utilization varies in the same way as in
our baseline specification across employees by join month) but we now measure it in the second
year the employee is in the plan. For example. for employees who joined the plan in July 2004, we
look at their medical spending during July through September 2005. In principle, when employees
are in the plan for a full year there should be no effect of join month (of the previous year) on
their expected end-of-year price, and therefore no difference in "initial" utilization by join month
across the plans. In practice, the test suffers from the problem that the amount of medical care
consumed in the join year could influence (either positively or negatively) the amount consumed
in the second year, either because of inter-temporal substitution (which could generate negative
serial correlation) or because medical care creates demand for further care (e.g.. follow up visits or
further tests), which could generate positive serial correlation.
Row (8) of Table 6 shows the baseline results limited to the approximately 60% of the employees
who remain at the firm for the entire second year. We continue to find the same basic pattern
in this smaller sample although the point estimate declines (in absolute value) and the time to
first claim results are no longer statistically significantly different from zero. For this subsample
of employees, row (9) shows the results when we now measure "initial medical spending" in the
same three months but in the second year.' 9 Here we find that an increase in the future price is
associated with a much smaller and statistically insignificant decline in medical spending measured
over the same three month period but in the second year. We interpret this as generally supportive
of the identifying assumption. and suggestive of positive serial correlation in medical spending.
Finally, in row (10) we investigate the extent to which the decrease in utilization in response to
a higher future price represents inter-temporal substitution of medical spending to the next year.
Such inter-temporal substitution would not be a threat to our empirical design - indeed. it might
be viewed as evidence of another form of forward-looking behavior in medical spending - but it
would affect the interpretation of our estimates and is of interest in its own right. We therefore
19 We perform this "second year" analysis only for the dependent variable "initial medical spending" as it seemed
awkward to us to examine "time to first claim" from an arbitrary starting point in the second year (when in fact the
individual has had prior months to make his first claim).
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re-run our baseline specification but now with the dependent variables measured in January to
March of the second year. The results indicate that individuals who face a higher future price
(and therefore consume less medical care) also consume less medical care in the beginning of the
subsequent year. This suggests that inter-temporal substitution. in the form of postponement of
care to the subsequent calendar year. is unlikely to drive the decrease in care associated with a
higher future price.
2.4 Quantifying forward looking behavior
Our results thus far have rejected the null of no response to the future price and presented evidence
consistent with some form of forward looking behavior. A natural subsequent question is to ask how
forward looking the behavior is. In other words, having rejected one extreme of complete myopia
(6 = 0), we would like to get a sense of where individuals lie on the spectrum between complete
myopia (6 = 0) and "full" forward looking behavior (3 ~ 1). Relatedly. we are also interested in
the implications (relative to either of these extremes) of the amount of forward looking behavior
we detect for the the impact of alternative health insurance contracts on annual medical spending.
2.4.1 Quantifying the effect of the future price on initial medical utilization
We start by quantifying the elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price.
The results reported in the previous section tested whether there was a relationship between the
future price and initial medical utilization. However, a concern with interpreting this relationship
as the causal effect of the future price on initial medical utilization is that there is a mechanical
relationship between initial medical utilization (the dependent variable) and our measure of the
future price (the right-hand-side variable). The future price is a function of the plan (by coverage
tier) chosen, the month joined, and the monthly medical spending of people who join that plan (by
coverage tier) in that month; thus. the future price is a function of medical spending which is also
used in constructing the dependent variable. This is not a concern for testing the null of complete
myopia (i.e.. testing whether the coefficient on the future price is zero) which was the focus of the
last section. because under the null of complete myopia medical spending is not a function of the
future price. However, under the alternative hypothesis that individuals are forward looking., this
can bias away from zero the estimated response to the future price.
To address this concern, we present results from estimating an instrumental variable version
of equation 8 in which we instrument for the future price with a simulated future price. Like the
future price, the simulated future price is computed based on the characteristics of the plan (by
coverage tier) chosen and the month joined. However, unlike the future price which is calculated
based on the spending of people who joined that plan (by coverage tier) that month. the simulated
future price is calculated based on the spending of all employees in that firm and coverage tier in
our sample who joined either the deductible or no-deductible plan. regardless of join month. 20 By
2 0 Specifically, for every employee in our sample in a given firm and coverage tier (regardless of plan and join month)
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using a common sample of employee spending that does not vary with plan or join month. the
instrument is "purged" of any potential variation in initial medical utilization that is correlated
with plan and join month. in very much the same spirit as Currie and Gruber's (1996) simulated
Medicaid eligibility instrument. An additional attraction of this IV strategy is that it helps correct
for any measurement error in our calculated future price (which would bias the coefficient toward
zero). On net. therefore. the OLS may be biased upward or downward relative to the IV.
The bottom row of Table 5 shows the results from this IV strategy. As would be expected.
the first stage is very strong and the IV estimates are statistically significant. 21 For the dependent
variable log initial spending, the point estimate from the IV results suggests that a 10 cent increase
in the expected end-of-year price is associated with a 7.8% decline in initial medical spending.
Given an average expected end-of-year price for people in our sample who choose the deductible
plan of about 70 cents. this suggests an elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the
future price of -0.56. For the dependent variable log time to first claim, the IV results suggest
that a 10 cent increase in the expected end-of-year price is associated with a 5.6% increase in the
time to first claim, or an elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price of
about -0.39.22
2.4.2 Mapping the estimated elasticity to economic primitives of interest
There are (at least) two related reasons why this estimate of the elasticity of initial medical utiliza-
tion with respect to the future price is an unsatisfactory answer to the question: how important
is forward looking behavior? The first reason is that this elasticity measures the effect of future
price on initial spending. while we suspect that total (annual) spending is the outcome variable
we compute their monthly spending for all months that we observe them during the year that they join the plan,
creating a common monthly spending pool. We then simulate the future price faced by an employee in a particular
plan and join month by drawing (with replacement) 110,000 draws of monthly spending from this common pool, for
every month we need a monthly spending measure. For the first month we draw from the pool of first month spending
(since people may join the plan in the middle of the month, the first month's spending has a different distribution
from other months) whereas for all other months in the plan that year we draw from the pool (across families and
months) of non first month spending. For each simulation we then compute the expected end-of-year price based on
the draws.
2 1 The first stage coefficient from the regression of the future price on the instrument (as well as plan-by-coverage
tier fixed effects and firm-by-start month fixed effects) yields a coefficient (on, the instrument) of 0.56 (standard error
0.024).
221In principle, the IV estimate of the impact of the future price on the first three months' spending could be biased
upward since, over the first three months, 17% of the individuals in deductible plans spend past the deductible. If
individuals are at least partially forward looking, the probability of hitting the deductible in the first three months
could be correlated with join month, which would introduce variation during the first three month in the spot price
among individuals who join the same plan in different months. Once again, this is not a problem for testing the null
of complete myopia; nor is it a problem when the dependent variable is the time to first claim (since the spot price
is the same for all individuals within a plan at the time of first claim). In practice, moreover, any upward bias is
likely unimportant quantitatively. We estimate a virtually identical response to the future price when the dependent
variable is based on two-month (instead of three-month) spending, even though the fraction hitting the deductible
within the initial utilization period (and therefore the likely magnitude of the bias) drops by almost a half. Moreover,
there is no noticeable trend in the likelihood of hitting the deductible within the first three months by the join month:
hit ting the deductible within a short time after enrollment therefore appears to be primarily determined by large and
possibly non-discretionary health shocks. rather than an endogenous spending response to the future price.
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of interest for nost research or policy questions associated with health insurance utilization. The
importance of dynamic incentives for annual spending may well be much lower than for initial
spending since the wedge between the spot price and the future price becomes smaller as health
shocks accumulate within the year and/or the end of the coverage period nears.
The second reason is that it is difficult to assess whether the elasticity is large or small without
appropriate benchmarks. We would like to compare our estimated elasticity with respect to the
future price to the "primitive" price elasticity., i.e. the underlying elasticity that is driven by
substitution between health and income and is purged of dynamic incentives. However. the same
motivation that prompted us to write this paper also implies that the prior empirical literature does
not provide such benchmarks. As noted in the introduction, most papers in this literature estimate
the elasticity of demand for medical care with respect to its price under a specific assumption
about how forward looking individuals are. For example, the commonly cited price elasticity of
demand for medical care of -0.2 from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment was estimated
under the assumption that individual behavior is completely myopic (Keeler and Rolph, 1988).
which is precisely the question we are investigating.2 3
Some assumption about the nature and extent of forward looking behavior is required in the
existing literature because it has not examined the impact of linear contracts on spending. If we had
an estimate of the utilization response to the coinsurance rate in a linear contract. for which the price
of medical care is constant for an individual throughout the year, this would be a useful benchmark
against which to compare our estimated response to the future price. In a linear contract. dynamic
considerations should not affect utilization decisions. so that the behavioral response to different
prices (coinsurance rates) would be invariant to the extent of forward looking behavior, and could
therefore shed light on the "primitive" substitution between health and income. However, we know
of no estimates of the response to a linear contract, nor a source of clean variation in the (constant)
coinsurance rate that could be used to identify this response. 24 In the remainder of this section.
we therefore calibrate a stylized dynamic model in order to translate our baseline estimate of the
response to the future price into economic primitives of interest.
Calibration exercise To try to gauge what our estimated elasticity with respect to the future
price implies for how forward looking individuals are. as well as to assess the implications of this
finding for the impact of alternative health insurance contracts on annual medical spending. we
turn to the stylized model of medical utilization decisions in response to health shocks that we
2 3 More precisely, Keeler and Rolph (1988) assume that individuals are completely myopic about the possibility of
future health shocks in making current medical spending, but that they have perfect foresight regarding all of the
year's medical spending associated with a given health shock.
2 4 In the Appendix we show how we can use the experimental variation from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
in both the coinsurance rate and the out-of-pocket maximum to extrapolate (out of sample) to the effect of the
coinsurance rate in a plan with an infinite out-of-pocket maximum, which thus approximates the response to a linear
contract. Our point estimates, while quite imprecise in most specifications, tend to suggest a semi-elasticity of
medical utilization with respect to the price of a linear contract that ranges from our estimate of the semi-elasticity
with respect to the future price to lip to twice as large as this estimate. We interpret the results of this exercise as
suggestive of potentially substantial. but perhaps not full, forward looking behavior.
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developed in Section 2. We investigate what degree of forward looking behavior (6) is needed in
that model to generate the magnitude of the response of initial medical utilization to the future
price that we estimated in our data. Specifically, we calibrate the other parameters of the model
and then simulate the response of initial medical utilization to the future price under alternative
assumptions about 6: we search for the value of 6 that. in this calibrated model, produces the
response to the future price that we estimated in the foregoing empirical work.
To do this exercise requires that we calibrate the other primitives of the model in Section 2.
These are the arrival rate A of medical shocks. and the distribution of medical shocks G(0. w) when
they arrive. The latter can be rewritten as G(0,w) = G2 (wjO)G1(9). That is. G1 (0) represents
the unconditional distribution of the total spending that would be required to treat medical shocks
and G2(w|0) represents the distribution of the (monetized) utility loss from not treating a medical
shock of size 0; in that sense. the distribution of w relative to 0 (or simply the distribution of the
ratio w/0) can be thought of as the "primitive" price elasticity that captures substitution between
health and income. As w/0 is higher (lower), the utility loss is greater (smaller) relative to the cost
of treating the shock, so (conditional on the price) the medical shock is more (less) likely to be
treated.
We draw on data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment to calibrate these additional
parameters. 25 Conducted over three to five years in the 1970s on a representative population of
individuals under 65. the key feature of the RAND experiment was to experimentally vary the
health insurance plans to which individuals were assigned. In particular. the coinsurance in the
plans varied from "free care" (zero coinsurance rate) to 100% coinsurance rate, with individuals
also assigned to 25%. 50%. and 95% coinsurance rates. The details of the experimental design as
well as the main results in terms of the impact of consumer cost sharing on healthcare spending
and health have been summarized elsewhere (Manning et al.. 1987; Newhouse et al., 1993).26 The
estimates from this famous study still remain the standard reference for calibration exercises that
require a moral hazard estimate for health insurance (e.g.. Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo.
2008; Mahoney. 2010; Gross and Notowidigdo. 2011) and the standard benchmark with which to
compare newer estimates of the impact of health insurance on health spending (e.g.. Finkelstein.
2007; Chandra, Gruber. and McKnight. 2010; Finkelstein et al.. 2011).
Two features of the RAND experiment are very useful for our particular calibration exercise.
First, the existence of detailed data on medical claims under a zero cost sharing (free care) plan
is not something that. to our knowledge. exists elsewhere. Such data allow us to calibrate the
distribution of medical shocks (A and G1(0)) from data that is "uncensored" by any response to cost-
sharing; by contrast, any other plan with positive consumer cost sharing only provides information
on the medical shocks that are endogenously treated. Second. the experimental variation in plan
assignment helps us calibrate the primitive price elasticity G 2(wlO).
25 The data from the RAND experiment have, very helpfully, been made publicly available by the RAND investi-
gators through ICPSR.
2 6 In the Appendix we provide some more details on the experimental design and the data.
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We defer many of the calibration details to the Appendix. and only summarize them here briefly.
In the first step of our calibration exercise. we perform a simple statistical exercise to calibrate the
weekly arrival and distribution of medical shocks (A and G1 (0)) based on the detailed utilization
data for the approximately 2.400 family-years we observe in the RAND's free care plan.
In the second step. we use the experimental plan variation in the RAND data to calibrate
G2 (wO). As mentioned above and discussed in more detail in the Appendix. the RAND exper-
iment does not involve variation in linear contracts that would allow us to directly estimate the
"cprimitive" price elasticity G 2(WO). Rather. families in the experiment were randomized into plans
with different coinsurance rates and then. within each positive coinsurance rate. they were further
randomized into plans with different out-of-pocket maximums. The observed changes in behavior.
as both the coinsurance rate and the out-of-pocket maximum are experimentally varied, are there-
fore influenced by both G2 (wl0) and 6. Our second step of the calibration exercise uses the random
assignment of families to plans and our calibrated model of the arrival and distribution of medical
shocks. to map the spending response to different plans to values of G 2(WO) and 6 that would
rationalize this spending response. Fortunately. the resultant values of G2 (wl0) are quite stable.
and are not at all sensitive to the value of 6. so that we can use the RAND experiment to calibrate
G 2 (WO) without knowledge of 6.27 We can thus use the experimental variation to calibrate G 2 (W 10).
and are left with 6 as the only remaining unknown primitive.
In the final step of the calibration exercise, we use the calibrated parameters of the model
that we have just described to simulate initial medical utilization under deductible contracts with
coverage horizons of 3 to 11 months. artificially replicating the setting in which we obtained our
estimated elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price. We repeat this
simulation under alternative assumptions about the value of 3. Higher values of 3 correspond to
greater changes in initial medical utilization as the coverage horizon varies. To quantify this., we
regress. for each 6. initial medical utilization in the simulated data on the future price. We then
ask what value of 3 gives rise to the magnitude of the change in initial medical utilization with
respect to the future price that we estimated based on variation in the coverage horizon in our
employer-provided data (see last two rows of Table 5).
Calibrated value of 3 Figure 2 illustrates our exercise by plotting the semi-elasticity of initial
(three month) medical spending with respect to the future price implied by each value of 6. Our
2 7 Less fortunately, the converse is not true: the RAND experiment by itself does not allow us to pin down 6 with any
confidence. In principle, the experimental variation in both coinsurance rates and out of pocket maximums makes
the RAND data seem perfectly suited to test and quantify forward looking behavior (since there is experimental
variation in the future price conditional on the experimentally determined spot price). In practice, however, using
the RAND data to estimate the behavioral response to the future price encounters two important obstacles. The first
is conceptual: the combination of non-trivial risks of fairly large expenditure shocks and a preponderance of relatively
low out-of-pocket maximums means that is difficult to isolate variation in the future price, as it mechanically generates
variation in spot prices that is driven by large medical shocks that are greater than the (lower) out of pocket
maximums. The second obstacle is practical: given its much smaller sample size, our attempt to use the RAND
variation (despite the first issue) to estimate the behavioral response to the future price produced extremely noisy
estimates. The Appendix provides additional details and results of this analysis.
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point estimate of the relationship between initial medical spending and future price was -1.08 in
the OLS estimation in the penultimate row of Table 5. with the 95% confidence interval ranging
from -1.66 to -0.50. Figure 2 indicates that this point estimate in the simulated data is achieved
with 6 = 0.2. with the 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.06 to 0.45. Table 7 summarizes
the implied 6's from the simulation exercises using the alternative dependent variable (time to first
claim) and based on IV estimation rather than OLS estimation in both the actual and simulated
data.2 8 Across the four specifications, the point estimate of 6 are centered around 0.2. with a low
of around 0.1 and a high of around 0.7.
These calibration results therefore suggest that while we find evidence of forward looking be-
havior. the extent of forward looking behavior is far from what would be implied by a perfectly
rational, fully forward looking individual (6 ~ 1) and closer to what would be implied by a fully
myopic individual (6 = 0). Of course, as we noted at the outset. 6 - or "forward looking" behavior
in our context - should not be interpreted as a pure rate of time preference; liquidity constraints
and/or imperfect understanding of the coverage details can push the estimated 6 below the rate of
time preference, and presumably do so in our context.
Implications for impact of health insurance on spending behavior We can also use our
calibrated model to try to assess whether the positive but low 6 we have calibrated is quantitatively
important for understanding the response of medical utilization to non-linear health insurance
contracts. In other words, we try to get a feel for whether. despite the fact that our testing exercise
in the main part of the paper rejects fully myopic behavior, myopia could be a reasonable way to
approximate behavior. The answer will depend of course not only on our estimate of 6 but also on
the other parameters of the model and the contracts examined. For example, if the deductible level
is low and the vast majority of individuals will exhaust it quickly. most individuals will spend most
of the time past the deductible. where they are effectively covered by a linear contract. so that the
extent of forward looking behavior would not matter much for the impact of the health insurance
contract on medical utilization.
Figure 3 uses the calibrated model to report total annual spending for contracts with different
deductible levels in the range of what is common in employer-provided health insurance contracts.
and full coverage (zero coinsurance rate) beyond the deductible. It shows results under alternative
assumptions about S. The annual spending levels are based on simulated results from the cali-
brated model. We are interested in whether low values of S (of. say. 0.1 or 0.2) can be reasonably
approximated by an assumption of either complete myopia (6 = 0) - as underlies for example the
famous RAND estimate of the price elasticity of demand for medical care - or an assumption of
perfectly forward looking behavior (6 ~ 1) - as has beeni assumed by other papers estimating the
responsiveness of medical care to health insurance contracts. The results in the figure suggest that
both these extremes produce substantively different results for the impact of these health insurance
2 8 Since the endogeneity of the measured future price to initial nedical utilization exists in both the actual and
simulated data. coinaring the OLS estimates from the actual data to the OLS estimates of the simulated data - or
comparing the IV estimates from the actual data to the IV estimates from the simulated data - are both meaningful.
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contracts on total spending relative to our calibrated estimates of 6. For example., across all the
deductible levels we consider. as we move from the no-deducible plan to a positive deductible plan
the decrease in spending implied by 6 = 0.2 is 25 to 50 percent smaller than what would be implied
by myopic behavior (6 0). and 50 to 270 percent greater than what would be implied by 6 = 1.
These results point to the empirical importance of accounting for dynamic incentives in analyses
of the impact of health insurance on medical utilization. and relatedly to the dangers in trying to
summarize health insurance contracts with a single price.
2.5 Conclusion
Our paper rejects the null of completely myopic behavior in individuals' response to the non-linear
price of medical care. This result jointly indicates that individuals understand something about
the non-linear pricing schedule they face. and that they take account of the future price of care in
making current medical decisions. Calibration results from our stylized, dynamic model of medical
utilization suggest that. at least in the populations we study. individuals may be far from fully
forward looking., but that, nonetheless. the extent of forward looking behavior we detect has a non-
trivial impact for forecasting how medical spending will respond to changes in non-linear health
insurance contracts.
These findings have important implications for estimating or forecasting the impact of alterna-
tive health insurance contracts on medical spending. which is a topic that receives great interest and
attention both by academics and in the public policy arena. As we noted at the outset. the work
to date has almost exclusively focused on estimating (and then using) the elasticity of demand for
medical care with respect to its price. However, faced with a non-linear budget set. unless individ-
uals are completely myopic or completely forward looking in their decision making. characterizing
moral hazard in health insurance using a single elasticity estimate is neither informative as to how
it should be used (relative to which price?) nor is it conceptually well-defined (there are at least
two price elasticities that are relevant). Thus. our results highlight the need for more complete
modeling of medical utilization induced by the health insurance contract in estimating and fore-
casting the likely effects of these non-linear pricing schedules among forward looking individuals.
More generally. our results speak to the question of whether individuals understand and respond
to the incentives embodied in non-linear pricing schedules. of which health insurance contracts are
just one of many common examples.
Of course. our findings are specific to our population. which consists of individuals with employer-
provided health insurance. Such individuals may be more forward looking than the general pop-
ulation. or may be less liquidity constrained and therefore less responsive to the spot price. It is
therefore very possible that in other populations. particularly populations with lower education or
income. the extent or even the existence of forward looking behavior might be very different. In
settings where individuals appear to behave mostly or entirely myopically it becomes both interest-
ing and important to understand the sources of this apparent myopia. such as the relative roles of
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time horizon and liquidity constraints. We think that extending our analysis to other settings and
attempting to decompose the sources of any myopic component of behavior are promising directions
for future work.
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Figure 2.1: Model illustration
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Figure illustrates the implications from a numerical solution to a simple version of the model described
in Section 2. We assume A = 0.2 and medical events are drawn uniformly from a two-point support of
(0 = 50. w = 50) and (0 = 50, w = 45). Expected end-of-year price is equal to one minus the probability
of hitting the deductible by the end of the year.
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Figure 2.2: Calibration of 6
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Figure illustrates our calibration exercise. The plot presents the relationship implied by our calibration
exercise (see the Appendix for details) between 6 and the semi-elasticity of initial medical spending with
respect to the future price. The arrows then illustrate how the point estimate and the confidence interval
of our semi-elasticity OLS estimate of the impact of the future price on initial spending (penultimate row of
Table 5) translate to a point estimate and a confidence interval for 6.
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Figure 2.3: The effect of 6 on annual spending
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Figure illustrates the implications 6 on overall (annual) spending, given the calibration exercise (see the
Appendix for details), for a range of possible contracts. The black line represents a case of full insurance, in
which overall spending is highest and does not depend on 6. The other lines represent overall spending for
deductible contracts which provide full insurance (zero coinsurance rate) once the deductible level has been
reached.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Mid-year new In-network deductible ($) "Average"Employer Plan Years Offered . Fraction family Fraction female Average age enrollme b
enrollees' Single Family enrollment month
Alcoa AO 04-07 3,269 0 0 0.622 0.379 38.56 6.28
Al 04-07 3,542 250 500 0.408 0.254 35.68 6.42
Firm B BO 01-05 37,759 0 0 0.530 0.362 36.77 6.35
BI 01-05 9,553 150 300 0.382 0.341 36.87 6.29
CO 99-02, 04-05 27,968 0 0 0.348 0.623 36.40 7.35
Firm Cc C1 99-00 6,243 200 500 0.348 0.622 37.53 7.50
C2 01-02 8,055 250 625 0.323 0.606 38.66 7.56
C3 04-05 5,633 300 750 0.299 0.660 38.51 7.67
b
The sample includes employees who enroll in February through October.
In computing the "average" enrollment month we number the join months from 2 (February) through 10 (October).
We omit 2003 from the analysis since the plan documentation regarding the deductible plan was incomplete in that year.
Table 2.2: Variation in expected end-of-year price
Deductible Expected end-of-year price"
Employer Plan (Single/Family) Joined plan in:
[N = enrollees] Feb-Apr May-Jul Aug-Oct
A0 0/0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Alcoa [N = 3,269] (N = 1,007) (N = 981) (N = 1,281)
Al 250/500 0.512 0.603 0.775[N = 3,542] (N = 975) (N = 1,114) (N = 1,453)
BO 0/0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm B [N = 37,759] (N = 8,863) (N = 15,102) (N = 13,794)
B1 150/300 0.529 0.630 0.806[N = 9,553] (N = 2,165) (N = 4,175) (N = 3,213)
C0 0/0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm C [N = 27,968] (N = 6,504) (N = 6,158) (N = 15,306)
C1-C3b 200-300/500-750 0.543 0.633 0.811[N = 19,931] (N = 4,001) (N = 4,143) (N = 11,787)
a Expected end-of-year price is equal to the fraction of individuals who do not hit the deductible by the end of
the calendar year (and therefore face a marginal price of 1). It is computed based on the plan's deductible
level(s), the join month, and the annual spending of all the employees who joined that plan in that month; we
compute it separately for family and single coverage within a plan and report the enrollment-weighted average.
6 In firm C, we pool the three different deductible plans (C1, C2, and C3) that are offered in different years.
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Table 2.3: Initial medical utilization by join quarter
Deductible Average initial (first 3 months) spending ($) Average days to first claim (censored")
Employer Plan (Single/Family) Joined plan in: Joined plan in:
[N = enrollees] Feb-Apr May-Jul Aug-Oct Feb-Apr May-Jul Aug-Oct
A0 0/0 1,092 1,409 1,270 42.8 43.2 43.7
Alcoa [N = 3,269] (s.d. = 2,679) (s.d. = 9,217) (s.d. = 4,733) (s.d. = 33.2) (s.d. = 33.4) (s.d. = 33.06)
Al 250/500 727 788 451 63.9 63.4 66.7
[N = 3,542] (s.d. = 3,730) (s.d. = 4,324) (s.d. = 2,216) (s.d. = 33.4) (s.d. = 33.6) (s.d. = 32.7)
BO 0/0 628 596 647 57.0 58.3 58.8
Firm B [N - 37,759] (s.d. = 4,841) (s.d. = 3,632) (s.d. = 2,886) (s.d. = 33.3) (s.d. = 33.7) (s.d. = 33.1)
B1 150/300 723 682 521 65.0 65.5 71.1[N = 9,553] (s.d. = 4,587) (s.d. = 4,046) (s.d. = 2,896) (s.d. = 32.3) (s.d. = 31.8) (s.d. = 29.7)
CO 0/0 539 546 505 57.1 58.1 57.0
Firm C [N = 27,968] (s.d. = 3,087) (s.d. = 2,305) (s.d. = 3,017) (s.d. 34.6) (s.d. = 34.0) (s.d. = 34.5)
C1-C3 200-300/500-750 515 581 495 56.1 56.2 57.6
[N = 19,931] (s.d. = 1,842) (s.d. = 2,126) (s.d. = 2,556) (s.d. = 35.0) (s.d. = 34.6) (s.d. = 34.8)
All utilization measures refer to utilization by the employee and any covered dependents.
" Days to first claim is censored for all employees at 92 days. 42% of the observations are censored.
Table 2.4: The relationship between join month and initial medical utilization
Deductible Log Initial Spending' Log Time to First Claim b
Employer Plan (Single/Family) Difference DD Difference DD
[N = enrollees] (1) (2) (3) (4)
AO 0/0 -0.003 0.007
Alcoa [N = 3,269] (0.023) (0.010)
Al 250/500 -0.015 -0.012 0.003 -0.005[N = 3,542] (0.021) (0.027) (0.014) (0.015)
BO 0/0 -0.015 0.024
Firm B [N = 37,759] (0.007) (0.008)
B1 150/300 -0.091 -0.075 0.059 0.033[N = 9,553] (0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.010)
CI 0/0 -0.004 0.003
Firm C [N = 27,968] (0.013) (0.006)
C1-C3 200-300/500-750 -0.027 -0.022 0.019 0.016[N = 19,931] (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Table reports coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing a measure of initial medical care utilization (defined in the top row) on join
month (which ranges from 2 (February) to 10 (October)). Columns (1) and (3) report the coefficient on join month separately for each plan, based on
estimating equation 4; the regressions also include an indicator variable for coverage tier (single vs. family). Columns (2) and (4) report the
difference-in-differences coefficient on the interaction of join month and having a deductible plan, separately for each firm, based on estimating equation 5;
the regressions also include plan by coverage tier fixed effects and join month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier.
o Dependent variable is log(s + 1) where s is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered family members in their first three months in the
plan.
b Dependent variable is log(tire) where "time" is the number of days to first claim by any covered family member, censored at 92. We estimate the
regressions in columns (3) and (4) by Tobit.
Table 2.5: The relationship between expected end-of-year price and initial medical utilization
Log Initial Spending" Log Time to First Claimb
Sample N Difference DD Difference DD
(1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.92 -0.76 0.294 0.046
(0.30) (0.51) (0.176) (0.191)
Firm B 47,312 -2.02 -1.73 1.171 0.677(0.57) (0.54) (0.363) (0.227)
-0.89 -0.81 0.357 0.254
(0.39) (0.37) (0.234) (0.143)
Pooled (OLS) 102,022 -1.08 0.357(0.29) (0.113)
-0.78 0.564Pooled (IV) 102,022 (0.7) 0.5)
(0.27) (0.135)
Table reports coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing a measure of initial medical care
utilization (defined in the top row) on the expected end-of-year price, computed for each plan (by coverage tier)
and join month. Columns (1) and (3) report the coefficient on expected end-of-year price fp separately for each
deductible plan in each firm, based on estimating equation 6; the regressions also include an indicator variable
for coverage tier (single vs. family). Columns (2) and (4) report the coefficient on expected end-of-year price fp
from estimating equation 7, which now includes the no-deductible plans as well; these regressions also include
plan by coverage tier fixed effects and join month fixed effects. In the bottom two rows, we report the
coefficient on expected end-of-year price fp from estimating equation 8 using OLS and IV (respectively) by
pooling the data from all firms and plans; in addition to plan by coverage tier and join month fixed effects, these
regressions now also include firm by join month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by
coverage tier by firm. The IV specification makes use of a simulated end-of-year price as an instrument for the
expected end-of-year price (see text for details). The coefficient on the instrument in the first stage is 0.56
(standard error 0.024); the F-statistic on the instrument is 524.
a Dependent variable is log(s + 1) where s is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered family
members in their first three months in the plan
b Dependent variable is log(time) where "time" is the number of days to first claim by any covered family
member, censored at 92 days. We estimate the regressions in columns (3) and (4) by Tobit.
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Table 2.6: Robustness and specification checks
Initial Spending Time to First Claim
Specification N Coeff on fp Std. err. Coeff on fp Std. err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Baseline (logs) 102,022 -1.08 (0.29) 0.357 (0.113)
(2) Level 102,022 -394.43 (162.12) 14.842 (4.429)
(3) QMLE Poisson 102,022 -0.70 (0.25) -
(4) OLS (No Tobit) 102,022 - - 0.114 (0.057)
(5) Varying censor points 102,022 - - 0.330 (0.114)
(6) Cox proportional hazard model 102,022 - - -0.347 (0.109)
(7) Control for demographics 102,014 -0.98 (0.26) 0.524 (0.121)
(8) Only those who remain for 2nd year 64,398 -0.73 (0.34) 0.161 (0.133)
(9) Dep. var measured in 2nd year 64,398 -0.17 (0.31) -
(10) Dep. var measured Jan-Mar of 2nd year 64,398 -0.44 (0.26) 0.172 (0.106)
Table reports results from alternative analyses of the relationship between initial medical utilization and expected end-of-year price. Row (1) shows the
baseline results from estimating equation 8 by OLS in columns 1 and 2 and by Tobit in columns 3 and 4, as in the penultimate row of Table 5. Alternative
rows report single deviations from this baseline as explained below. In row (2) the dependent variables are defined in levels rather than logs. Mean
dependent variables are 596.2 dollars (initial spending) and 58.3 days ((censored) time to first claim). In row (3) the dependent variable is defined in levels
(not logs) and the regression is estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson instead of OLS. In row (4) the regression is estimated by OLS rather than
Tobit. In row (5) we estimate the same regression as in the baseline, but we now allow the censoring point to vary with join month, from 92 days if the
employee joined in October to 334 days if the employee joined in February. In row (6) we estimate a Cox semi-parametric proportional hazard model on the
time to first claim (censored at 92 days); note that here a longer time to first claim is indicated by a negative coefficient (a lower "failure" rate). In row (7)
we add controls for age, gender, and start year (as well as interactions of each of those with the firm fixed effects) to the baseline specification. In row (8)
we estimate the baseline specification on a smaller sample of employees who remain in the firm for the entire subsequent year; in row (9) we estimate the
baseline specification on this same sample, but defining the dependent variable based on utilization in the same three months of the subsequent year (i.e.,
their first full year in the firm); in row (10) we estimate the baseline specification on this same sample but now define the dependent variable based on
utilization in January to March of the first full year in the firm.
Table 2.7: Calibrating 6
Log(Three Month Spending) Log(Time To First Claim)
OLS IV Tobit Tobit lVa
Estimated semi-elasticity
Point Estimate -1.08 -0.78 0.36 0.56
Cl Lower Bound -0.50 -0.24 0.14 0.30
Cl Upper Bound -1.67 -1.33 0.58 0.83
Implied delta
Point Estimate 0.20 0.12 0.26 0.67
Cl Lower Bound 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.19
Cl Upper Bound 0.45 0.28 0.76 1.00
Panel A reports the estimated semi-elasticities of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price; these
are taken directly from the last two rows of Table 5. Panel B shows the implied values of 6 associated with each
estimate based on the calibration exercise described in the text.
a We impose 1 for the upper bound of the confidence interval for the implied 6 in the Tobit IV case based on
our a priori knowledge that 6 cannot be higher than 1; no S less than 1 produces a semi-elasticity as large as
0.83 in our model.
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Appendix
This appendix describes in more detail the uses we make of data from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment.2 9 Appendix A describes our attempt to use the RAND experiment random assign-
ment of out-of-pocket maximums as the basis for an additional test for forward looking behavior.
Appendix B discusses our attempt to use the RAND data to approximately the "primitive" price
elasticity of demand. to serve as a benchmark for our estimated response to the future price. Ap-
pendix C provides a detailed explanation of how we use the RAND data for the calibration exercises
described in Section 4.
As explained in the main text, the RAND experiment, conducted in 1974-1981, randomly as-
signed participating families to health insurance plans with different levels of cost sharing. Each
plan was characterized by two parameters: the coinsurance rate (the share of initial expenditures
paid by the enrollee) and the out-of-pocket maximum, referred to as the "Maximum Dollar Ex-
penditure" (MDE). Families were assigned to plans with coinsurance rates ranging from 0% ("free
care") to 100%. Within each coinsurance rate, families were randomly assigned to plans with MDEs
set equal to 5%. 10%. or 15% of family income, up to a maximum of $750 or $1,000.30
A. Testing forward-looking behavior using the RAND data
The latter feature of the RAND plan assignment process - random assignment of MDEs - would
seem to provide an ideal experimental setting for a test of forward looking behavior since it po-
tentially provides random variation in the future price among individuals assigned to the same
coinsurance (and hence the same spot price). While differences in MDEs across individual families
were due in part to differences in family income, differences in average MDE and average end-of-
year price across plans can be treated as randomly assigned. Appendix Table A6 provides sample
counts and various summary statistics for the RAND plans. 3 1 As the table shows. average MDEs
were considerably higher in plans where the MDE was set equal to 10% or 15% of family income
than in plans where the MDE was set to 5% of income. These differences generated corresponding
differences in the share of families hitting the MDE and in expected end-of-year price (columns (5)
and (6)).
Columns (8) and (9) of Appendix Table A6 present results from a regression of time to first
claim on expected end-of-year price in the RAND. Specifically, we run the regression
Log(Time-to-First-Claim)j = fpy + y - coinsj + X + Ef, (2.9)
where fp is the future price (or expected end-of-year price)., coins is the coinsurance rate. f indexes
2 9The original RAND investigators have very helpfully made their data publicly available. We accessed the data
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
3 0 For a detailed description of the plans and other aspects of the experiment, see Newhouse et al. (1993).
3 'Appendix Table A6 omits the RAND's "individual deductible plans."which had coinsurance rates of 0% for inpa-
tient services and 100% or 95% for outpatient services, because there was no MDE variation within this coinsurance
rate structure.
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families. J indexes plans. and Xf is a vector of dummy variables for site and start month in the
experiment by year.: As shown. we run the regression separately for each coinsurance rate group
and then pool all groups (or all groups except the free care plan) to maximize power (we also run a
specification with a full set of coinsurance rate dummies in place of the coinsurance rate term). We
run both OLS and Tobit regressions. where the latter account for censoring of time to first claim
at 367 days.
There are two important limitations to this analysis. so that despite its apparent advantages. the
RAND variation is in fact inferior to the variation generated by employee hire dates (the primary
variation used in the paper). First. as a practical matter, the RAND setting gives us much less
power to detect differences in spending by expected end-of-year price. The samples are smaller
(with a total sample size of 5,653 family-year observations across all plans. relative to more than
100.000 in the combined employer-provided sample), and there is much less variation in end-of-year
price. As a result. our estimates based on the RAND data are quite imprecise. Even in our most
inclusive specification (bottom row of Table A6). we can neither reject the null of no response to
the future price nor reject a coefficient on the future price of 3. far larger than what we find in the
employer-provided data.
Second. conceptually. the variation in the MDE in the RAND data is not as clean for testing for
forward looking behavior as the variation in the coverage horizon that we use in the paper. To see
this. note that differences in expected end-of-year price are correlated with differences in spot price
even under the null hypothesis of no forward-looking behavior. Even if people are fully myopic.
families in low MDE plans will meet their MDEs sooner and will spend more of the year facing a 0%
spot price. As a result. they will have higher spending even if they are not at all forward-looking.33
Because 12% of families in the lowest MDE, highest coinsurance rate plan hit the MDE within the
very first month of the experiment, this is a concern even when looking just at initial (e.g.. one
month) spending.
We attempted to solve this problem by using time to first claim as the outcome variable.
Unfortunately. however, some of RAND's MDE levels are quite low, so they can affect even the
spot prices families face when making decisions about their very first health expenditure. To see
this. consider two families in plans with a 100% coinsurance rate. The first family has an MDE
of $150. the second an MDE of $300. Suppose that, before either family has any other health
expenditures. each experiences a health shock that would cost $300 to treat. The out-of-pocket
cost of treating this shock would be $150 for the low MDE family but $300 for the high MDE
family. meaning that the low MDE family faces a spot price of only 50% for the episode. compared
to 100% for the high MDE family. Hence, the low MDE family will be more likely to treat the
3 2 Plan assignment was random only conditional on which of the experiment's six sites a family lived at and when
the family enrolled in the experiment. For details, see Newhouse et al. (1993, Appendix B).
3 3 In contrast, this is not a problem when using the variation in end-of-year price generated by month of hire. If
people are fully myopic, then early hires will have the same levels of three-month spending as late hires, and so the
two groups will be equally likely to hit their deductibles within three months and will face the same average spot
price.
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episode. even if both families are fully myopic.
Because about half of outpatient episodes (defined as in Appendix B below) are larger than
the smallest MDEs in the RAND sample. this problem is potentially quite significant. Indeed, in
simulations mimicking the RAND setting. we obtain a large and statistically significant coefficient
on end-of-year price in a regression for time to first claim, even when we assume complete myopia.
Thus. we conclude that. even apart from the precision problems. we cannot use the RAND setting
to generate variation in the future price conditional on the spot price to test for forward looking
behavior.3 4
B. Approximating the "primitive" price elasticity using RAND data
Before turning to the model-based calibration exercise in the next sub-section, we first present a
loose way of trying to gauge the extent of forward looking behavior by using the experimental
variation in contracts in the RAND data to generate an estimate of the "primitive" price elasticity
of medical care utilization which we then compare to our previously estimated response to the
future price from the main empirical work in the paper.
The variation used in the main empirical work in the paper is not useful in this regard. as
we observe neither linear contracts nor identifying variation for plan assignment. The RAND
experiment does not provide this ideal variation either. since all of the RAND contracts (except
for the free care contract) involve a non-linear pricing schedule; families were randomized into
coinsurance rates and then. within each positive coinsurance rate. they were further randomized
into plans with an out-of-pocket maximum (known as the "maximum dollar amount" or MDE in
the RAND context) of either 5%. 10%, or 15% of income (up to a maximum of $1.000 or $750);
above the MDE the price of care is zero.35 However, RAND's experimental variation (within
each coinsurance rate) in the out-of-pocket maximum allows us to estimate its effect. and then to
extrapolate out of sample to obtain the behavioral response to a contract where the out-of-pocket
maximum is sufficiently high. thus approximating a linear contract.
Specifically. we estimate the regression
Yfj = 71 - coinsj + 72 - Share Hitj + r/3 . coinsj - Share-Hitj + V5J, (2.10)
where yfj is a measure of medical utilization by family f in plan j. coinsj is the coinsurance rate of
the plan the family was randomized into (which is either 0%. 25%. 50%. or 95%), and ShareHits
3Two of the original RAND investigators, Keeler and Rolph (1988), also attempt to use the RAND data to test
for forward looking behavior, but they use a different empirical strategy. They do not exploit the MDE variation,
and instead rely on within-year variation in how close families are to their MDEs. They test whether spending is
higher among families who are closer to hitting their MDEs, as would be expected - all else equal - if people are
forward looking. They make several modeling assumptions to try to address the (selection) problem that families
with higher underlying propensities to spend are more likely to come close to hitting their MDEs. They also assume
that individuals have perfect foresight regarding all the subsequent medical expenses within a year associated with a
given health shock. They conclude that they cannot reject the null of complete myopia with respect to future health
shocks.
3 5 All dollar amounts are reported in current (1970s) dollars.
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is the fraction of families within the same coinsurance rate and MDE assignment that hit (i.e..
spent past) the MDE during the year. For the positive coinsurance plans this number ranges from
8 percent to 40 percent depending on the plan assignment (see Appendix Table A6. column (5)).
The coefficient of interest is qj. which we interpret as the responsiveness of medical utilization to
a change in the coinsurance rate of a linear contract: this involves extrapolating out of sample to
where Share-Hitj = 0, which would be the case for a sufficiently high MDE.
Because the share of families in a given plan assignment that hit the MDE depends on family
spending behavior, which itself may be endogenous to plan assignment. we also present IV specifi-
cations in which we instrument for the share of families in a given plan that hit the MDE with the
simulated share hitting the MDE. The "simulated share" is calculated as the share of the entire
(common) sample of individuals across all plans that would have hit the MDE if assigned to the
given plan, in a similar spirit to the IV exercise we reported in the previous section.
Appendix Table A7 presents the results. Our sample size is approximately 1,500 families (about
5,600 family-years). 3 6 As in the previous analysis. we analyze both the responsiveness of the first
three months of spending and the time to first claim. Here, we also add total (annual) spending as
an additional outcome (as the proportional response to a linear contract should not. in principle.
be different for initial and total spending).
The response to the linear coinsurance - while fairly imprecise in most specifications - can now
be compared to our estimates of the response to the future price from the previous sub-section.
Using the IV specification, we find a spending semi-elasticity with respect to the price of a linear
contract that ranges from -1.2 to -1.7. which is roughly twice as large as the semi-elasticity of
-0.78 with respect to the future price that we found in last section (see last row of Table 5).
Similarly. we estimate that the semi-elasticity of the time to first claim with respect to the price
of a linear contract is 0.53. which is virtually identical to our analogous semi-elasticity estimate of
0.56 with respect to the future price. Thus. overall the results are indicative of substantial. but
perhaps not full. forward looking behavior.
C. Model calibration
In Section 4 of the main text. we explain how we use the RAND data to calibrate a model that
allows us to map the estimated elasticity of initial spending with respect to the end-of-year price
to the parameter 6. Here, we provide more details about this calibration exercise.
Calibrating the medical shock process (A and G 1 (0)) We calibrate the medical shock process
using data from the 620 families (approximately 2.400 family-years) participating in the RAND's
"free care" plan. We calibrate the distribution of inpatient and outpatient shocks separately and
3 6 Appendix Table A6 shows the exact plans we study and the distribution of families across those plans. The
entire RAND experiment involved about 2.400 families. We exclude from this analysis the approximately 400 families
randomized into the 95%O coinsurance plan with a fixed ($150 per person) MDE plan (also know as the "individual
deductible" plan) because for this IDE only the coinsurance rate differed (it was 95% for outpatient care but free
for inpatienlt care), and the approximately 400 families randomized into an HM0.
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also allow for heterogeneity across families in the distribution of shocks. Specifically., letting f index
families and ( index types of spending (inpatient or outpatient). we assume that in each period t.
family f draws a shock of type ( with probability Af(. In periods where a family does experience
shocks of type (. the shocks are drawn i.i.d. from a lognormal distribution with mean pf and
variance a.
Our procedure for obtaining the various spending distribution parameters is as follows. We
define a period t as a week. We group together all claims of a given type separated by less than
one week and define each grouped set of claims as one episode. assigning it to the first week of the
episode; this generated about 6.000 inpatient episodes and about 77.000 outpatient episodes over
the course of the entire experiment. For each family and each type of spending. we then compute:
Af( as the share of weeks (over the course of the entire experiment 3 7) in which family f experienced
an episode of type (, we set pf( as the average size of family f's episodes of type (. and o-f( as the
variance of family f's episodes of type (. Because o-f( is extremely noisy (even more so than pyf)
and because it is unavailable for families with only one shock of a given type, we set o to be the
average of uf( for all families.
Partly to reduce noise and partly to make simulating the model computationally feasible, we
next divide families into five-percentile groups based on their values of A. We replace each value
of Af( and pbtf with the mean of the respective variable for family f's percentile group. This
approach eliminates cases where the probability of outpatient shock is zero, but leaves 55% of the
sample with a zero probability of inpatient medical shocks. This is consistent with our intuition
that every family faces some meaningful risk of experiencing an outpatient shock, but some families
(specifically, those who experience no inpatient episodes at any point during the experiment) may
face so little risk of an inpatient episode that they perceive it as approximately zero.
Appendix Figure Al and Appendix Table A8 compare the actual distributions of expenditures
in the free care plan with the simulated distributions. Appendix Figure Al presents a histogram of
total (the sum of inpatient and outpatient) spending. while Appendix Table A8 reports the means
and standard deviations of log inpatient, outpatient. and total spending. as well as the share of
families with no inpatient, outpatient. or total spending over the course of a year (T = 52).38
The fit is notably better for outpatient than inpatient spending, basically because. as others
have also found (see. e.g., French and Jones, 2004). the lognormal distribution is a better fit
for outpatient than inpatient spending. Nonetheless. the fit is fairly good for both categories of
spending. and seems (to us) to capture the main properties of health spending for the purpose of
our calibration exercise.
Calibrating the distribution of valuations (G 2 (w/0)) Recall that w represents the (mone-
tized) health cost of a given shock. and so w/0 represents the health cost of a given shock relative
to the cost of treatment. For example, if w/0 = 0.5 then the health cost of not treating a given
3 7 Families participated in the experiment for p)eriods of either three or five years.
3 8 Throughout, we define log spending as log(spending + 1) in order to avoid missing values.
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shock is equal to half the cost of the treatment.
We calibrate the distribution of w/O for outpatient shocks,. but assume w/O 1 for all inpatient
shocks. That is, we assume that individuals treat all inpatient shocks. regardless of what share of
the cost of treatment they pay out of pocket. This analytic choice is done primarily to make the
calibration exercise much more feasible (inpatient shocks are sufficiently rare relative to outpatient
shocks that it is much harder to use the data to calibrate w/O for them). It also reflects our intuition
that most health shocks for which treatment requires hospitalization are much less discretionary
than outpatient care; this is consistent with the basic findings from the RAND experiment itself
(Newhouse et al.. 1993) as well as subsequent quasi-experimental evidence (e.g.. Einav et al.. 2011)
and our findings in this paper that only outpatient care appears to respond to the future price
(Appendix Table A2).
For outpatient shocks, we assume that w/ follows a Beta distribution with parameters a and
b. so that w/ ~ #(a, b). Thus. a > 0 and b > 0 are the key primitive price elasticity parameters of
the model. The ratio a/(a + b) gives the mean value of w/. We use data on the 95%. 50%. and
25% coinsurance RAND plans to calibrate a and b.3 We simulate the model described in Section
2 to generate utilization data for each coinsurance rate. We then try to match three moments of
the actual RAND data for each coinsurance rate: the mean of log spending. the standard deviation
of log spending, and the share of the sample with zero spending.4 0 Specifically. we minimize the
sum of squared differences, weighting by the different coinsurance rates' RAND sample sizes.
So far, we have glossed over a tension with our calibration strategy. Namely. that the distribution
of spending (using the model of Section 2) depends not only on the distributions of A. 0, and w/0,
but also on 6. And yet our goal is to obtain the parameters of the w/O distribution without
knowing 6 so that we can then determine what value of 6 yields the elasticities we obtained from
the employer-provided data.
Our strategy succeeds simply because it happens that the objective function is quite flat in 6
but quite steep (and generally invariant to 6) in a and b. Panel A of Appendix Table A9 shows. for
11 values of 6 ranging from zero to one. the optimal values of a and b and the resulting values of the
objective function. As the table shows. the model selects very similar values of a and b regardless
of the assumed value of 6. and yields similar values of the objective function (at the optimal values
of a and b). Basically. whatever the choice of 6. the best fit involves E[W/0] ~ 0.55 and a highly
bimodal distribution for w/. with modes near 0 and 1.41
Based on eyeballing the simulation results. we select a = 0.3 and b = 0.25 for our calibration
exercise; these are the values that minimize the objective function averaged over the possible values
of 6 we examine. Panel B of Appendix Table A9 shows that these values yield a fairly tight fit to
3 9 We do not make use of the data from the "mixed coinsurance rate"' plans included in Appendix Table A6.
Incorporating these plans would have required further complicating the model in order to introduce multiple types
of outpatient spending.
40As before, we define log spending as log(spending + 1) to avoid missing values.
4 1Intuitively, the bimodal distribution reflects the fact that the sample means from the RAND data are almost the
same for the 25% and 50% coinsurance rate plans, implying that, for most outpatient shocks, people either will not
treat the shock at a coinsurance rate of 25% or will treat it unless the coinsurance rate is quite high.
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the RAND data for any assumed value of 6.
Mapping the elasticity of initial spending with respect to end-of-year price to 6 Having
calibrated the key elements of the model. the final step in our calibration exercise is to simulate the
data generating process from our employer-provided data and obtain estimates of the responsiveness
of initial spending to the expected end-of-year price in the simulated data.
We consider plans with deductible of $0. $250. $750, and $1.000. with no cost-sharing above the
deductible. For each of these plans. we use the calibrated parameters described above, and a range
of values for 6 (the only remaining free parameter). and simulate spending given time horizons of
47. 42. 37. 32. 27, 22. 17. or 12 weeks (analogous to hire dates ranging from February to October).
For each of 10.000 simulated families in each deductible-horizon combination, we obtain simulated
spending in the first 12 periods (analogous to first three month spending) and time to first claim
(here measured in weeks and censored at 12); in addition. for each deductible/horizon combination.
we obtain average "end-of-year" price (here. just average price at the end of the horizon).
Letting d denote levels of the deductible, h index horizon lengths, and f index families, we use
the simulated data to estimate the regression
Outcome2 = / . fPdh + Y + Ef. (2.11)
Here, 3 is the coefficient of interest, while the NY's are dummy variables for deductible level. We
estimate the regression for log("three month") spending (spending in the first 12 periods) and for
time to first claim. For reasons explained in the main text. we run both OLS and IV regressions, in
the latter case instrumenting for fPdh with the average end-of-period price after h periods among
families with the maximum time horizon (47 weeks).
We repeat the above exercise for 101 values of 6 ranging from 0 to 1. We can then obtain point
estimates and confidence intervals for 6 by comparing the estimates of the responsiveness of initial
spending to end-of-year price obtained in the simulations with the estimates and the bounds of
the confidence intervals obtained from the employer-provided data. 42 The results are presented in
Figure 2 in the main text.
4 2Technically, the confidence intervals on 6 should also take into account the standard errors on # from the regres-
sions in the simulated data. However, because we can make the simulations so large - we simulate 10,000 families
for each deductible horizon paid - the standard errors on # are effectively zero. 3 simply describes the relationships
imposed by the model and the calibrated parameters.
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Figure Al: Fit of the calibration exercise of medical events
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Figure shows the distribution of annual medical spending in the "free care" RAND data based on the actual
(black bars) and simulated (gray bars) data. The simulations use the calibrated parameters, as explained in
the Appendix. The actual data is based on the 2,376 family-years of data in the free care plan.
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Appendix Table Al: Additional plan details
Mid-year In-network features Out-of-network features
Employer Plan Years new Deductible ($) Coinsb Copay ($) Stop loss ($) Deductible ($) Coins b Copay ($) Stop loss ($)
enrollees" Single Family Single Family Single Family Single Family
Alcoa AO 2004-07 3,269 0 0 0.10 0 2,500 5,000 250 500 0.3 0 5,000 10,000
Al 2004-07 3,542 250 500 0.10 0 2,750 5,500 500 1,000 0.3 0 5,500 11,000
Firm B BO 2001-05 37,759 0 0 0.00 15 0 0 250 500 0.2 0 1,250 2,500
B1 2001-05 9,553 150 300 ?? ?? ?? 1,100 ?? ?? ?? 0 ?? ??
CO 1999-05 27,968 0 0 0.00 15 0 0 300 750 0.3 0 3,000 6,000
Firm C C1 1999-00 6,243 200 500 0.10 0 1,000 2,000 ?? ?? 0.3 0 3,750 7,500
C2 2001-02 8,055 250 625 0.10 0 1,250 2,500 250 625 0.3 0 3,900 7,800
C3 2004-05 5,633 300 750 0.10 0 1,300 2,600 300 750 0.3 0 3,900 7,800
"??" denotes an unknown feature of a plan.
The sample includes employees who enroll in February through October.
b Coinsurance denotes the fraction of medical expenditures the insured must pay out of pocket after hitting the deductible and prior to reaching the "stop loss."
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Appendix Table A2: Responsiveness of different types of care to the future price
Dependent variable Mean of the Coeff on Std. Errordep. var. future price
(1) Log initial spending 3.32 -1.08 (0.29)
(2) Log initial outpatient spending 3.29 -1.06 (0.29)
(3) Initial spending 596.2 -394.4 (162.1)
(4) Initial outpatient spending 445.0 -375.8 (107.7)
(5) Initial inpatient spending 147.5 -19.8 (99.1)
(6) Any initial inpatient spending 0.014 -0.008 (0.006)
Table reports results for different types of medical spending of the analysis of the relationship between initial
medical spending and expected end-of-year price ("future price"). All rows show the results from estimating
equation 8 by OLS using different dependent variables; in addition to "future price" the covariates in this
regression include plan by coverage tier fixed effects, join month fixed effects and firm by join month fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier by firm. The first row shows the baseline results
(see penultimate row in Table 5) for the dependent variable log initial spending (plus 1). In row 2 the dependent
variable is the log of initial outpatient spending (plus 1). Rows 3 through 5 show results for the level of initial
medical spending, the level of initial outpatient spending and the level of initial inpatient spending respectively.
The last row shows the results for an indicator variable for any initial inpatient spending. "Initial" spending is
defined as spending in the first three months of the plan for all covered members of the plan. N = 102, 022.
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Appendix Table A3: Additional Robustness Exercises
Specification N Log Initial Spending Log Time to First Claim
Coeff on fp (S.E.) Coeff on fp (S.E.)
(1) Baseline 102,022 -1.08 (0.29) 0.357 (0.114)
Panel A: Alternative sets of fixed effects
(2) Don't limit to within firm 102,022 -1.07 (0.30) 0.320 (0.121)
(3) Don't control for tier 102,022 -3.98 (0.76) 1.943 (0.373)
(4) Tier x firm interactions 102,022 -1.04 (0.29) 0.355 (0.114)
Panel B: Family vs. single tier
(5) Family tier 43,358 -0.90 (0.42) 0.132 (0.124)
(6) Single tier 58,664 -1.15 (0.40) 0.579 (0.193)
Panel C: Using additional plan characteristics to construct mp
(7) Baseline (Firms A and C) 54,710 -0.81 (0.32) 0.263 (0.127)
(8) Firms A and C, refined fp measure 54,710 -0.90 (0.36) 0.293 (0.141)
Table reports results from alternative analyses of the relationship between initial medical utilization and expected
end of year marginal price. The first row shows the baseline results (see last row in Table 5) from estimating
equation 8 which pools the data across firms. In addition to the expected end of year marginal price, the
regressions also include plan by coverage tier fixed effects, join month fixed effects and firm by month fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier by firm. Alternative rows report single
deviations from this baseline. In Row 2 we remove the firm by join month fixed effects from the baseline. In
Row 3 we remove the controls for coverage tier (so that there are plan fixed effects but not plan by coverage tier
fixed effects) from the baseline. In row 4 we add firm by coverage tier fixed effects and firm by coverage tier by
join month fixed effects to the baseline. In rows 5 and 6 we stratify the sample by coverage tier. In Panel C we
limit the analysis to the two firms (Alcoa and Firm C) in which we observe the in-network coinsurance rate for
all plans (see Appendix Table Al for details). Row 7 reports the baseline results limited to those two firms; Row
8 shows the sensitivity to using a refined measure of future price which accounts for the coinsurance rate (see
Appendix Table A4 for details). As expected, not accounting for the coinsurance rate in our baseline future price
measure (row 7) biases downward our estimated impact of the future price (compare rows 7 and 8).
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Appendix Table A4: Alternative construction of future price
Expected end-of-year price' Refined expected end-of-year priceb
Employer Plan Joined plan in: Joined plan in:
Feb-Apr May-Jul Aug-Oct Feb-Apr May-Jul Aug-Oct
Alcoa AO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0994 0.0995 0.0997
Al 0.512 0.603 0.775 0.560 0.643 0.798
CO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Firm C C1-C3 0.543 0.633 0.811 0.589 0.670 0.830
" Expected end-of-year price is equal to the fraction of individuals who do not hit the deductible by the end of
the calendar year (and therefore face a marginal price of 1). It is computed based on the plan's deductible
level(s), join month, and the annual spending of all the employees in one's plan and join month; we compute it
separately for family and single coverage within a plan and report the enrollment-weighted average.
b "Refined" expected end-of-year price is equal to the coinsurance rate times the fraction of individuals who hit
the deductible but not the out-of-pocket maximum by the end of the year (and therefore face a marginal price
equal to the coinsurance rate) + the fraction of individuals who do not hit the deductible by the end of the
calendar year (and therefore face a marginal price of 1.) The refined expected end-of-year price is computed in
the same manner as described above for the expected end-of-year price.
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Appendix Table A5: Differences in observables by plan and join month
Deductible Indicator for Old (>=45) Indicator for Female
Employer Plan (Single/Family) Difference DD Difference DD
[N = enrollees] (1) (2) (3) (4)
AO 0 -0.009 -0.011
Alcoa [N = 3,269] (0.004) (0.003)
Al 250/500 -0.008 0.0020 -0.002 0.009
[N = 3,542] (0.002) (0.0041) (0.003) (0.004)
BO 0 -0.004 -0.003
Firm B [N 37,759] (0.003) (0.002)
BI 150/300 -0.010 -0.0059 -0.004 -0.001[N 9,553] (0.004) (0.0026) (0.004) (0.003)
CO 0 -0.014 0.009
Firm C [N = 27,968] (0.002) (0.002)
C1-C3 200-300/500-750 -0.019 -0.0045 0.009 0.000
[N = 19,931] (0.003) (0.0032) (0.003) (0.003)
Table reports coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing the dependent variable on join
month (which ranges from 2 (February) to 10 (October)). The dependent variables are demographic
characteristics (defined in the top row) with overall means for "old" (i.e. age 45+) of 0.27 and for female of
0.48. Columns (1) and (3) report the coefficient on join month separately for each plan, based on estimating
equation 4; the regressions also include an indicator variable for coverage tier (single vs. family). Columns (2)
and (4) report the difference-in-differences coefficient on the interaction of join month and having a deductible
plan, separately for each firm, based on estimating equation 5; the regressions also include plan by coverage tier
fixed effects and join month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier.
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Appendix Table A6: Summary statistics of the Rand data
Number of Share of Avg. time Effect of end-of-year
Coinsurance Maximum Dollar family years Average MDE family years Expected end-of to first price on
rate Expenditure (MDE) (Number of (Adjusted") who hit year priceb claim Log(Time to First Claim)d
families in year 1) the MDE (Days)' OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Plan-by-plan analysis
5% of income up to $1,000 33 (33) $533 0.33 0.67 70 -2.94 -2.66
100% 10% of income up to $1,000 29 (29) $801 0.21 0.79 82 (2.65) (2.84)
15% of income up to $1,000 33 (33) $794 0.21 0.79 64
5% of income up to $1,000 418 (84) $559 0.40 0.57 88 -0.10 -0.70
95% 10% of income up to $1,000 342 (80) $746 0.34 0.63 86 (2.19) (2.41)
15% of income up to $1,000 470 (101) $817 0.33 0.63 99
5% of income up to $1,000 111 (26) $535 0.28 0.36 58 4.16 5.30
50% 10% of income up to $1,000 76 (17) $779 0.16 0.42 84 (4.98) (5.25)
15% of income up to $1,000 308 (84) $847 0.19 0.40 80
50% for 5% of income up to $750 189 (41) $499 0.28 0.22 78 4.77 4.89
dental and 10% of income up to $750 226 (44) $584 0.31 0.22 59 (3.82) (3.80)
mental 15% of income up to $750 159 (30) $689 0.16 0.26 62
health; 5% of income up to $1,000 18 (18) $523 0.28 0.23 27
25% for 10% of income up to $1,000 19 (19) $600 0.16 0.26 40
all other 15% of income up to $1,000 13 (13) $837 0.08 0.29 65
5% of income up to $750 192 (22) $518 0.17 0.21 73 0.09 -2.26
10% of income up to $750 208 (31) $617 0.17 0.21 61 (21.71) (22.15)
25% 15% of income up to $750 207 (26) $683 0.18 0.21 615% of income up to $1,000 86 (52) $535 0.14 0.22 71
10% of income up to $1,000 70 (43) $818 0.11 0.22 38
15% of income up to $1,000 70 (44) $816 0.16 0.21 37
0% - 2,376 (620) - 1.00 0.00 46
Panel B: Pooling across plans
All positive coins plans, with coins dummies 3,277 (870) -0.36 -0.08
(1.51) (1.64)
All positive coins plans, pooled 3,277 (870) 0.52 0.73
(1.12) (1.23)
All plans, pooled 5,653 (1,490) 1.90 1.96
(0.83) (0.90)
"Regression adjusted for differences in site, start month, and year across plans (see Newhouse et al. (1993, Appendix B) for more details).
" Expected end-of-year price equals the share of families not hitting the MDE (in the given plan) times the coinsurance rate. For the mixed coinsurance rates plans, we
weight the two coinsurance rates based on their shares of initial claims in the full sample; 25% of initial claims are for mental/dental.
For families with no claims in a given year, time to first claim is coded as 367.
d Columns (8) and (9) show the coefficient on the expected end-of-year price fp from estimating variants of equation 9. In Panel A we regress log time-to- first-claim
on the expected end-of-year price (see column (6)) and site and enrollment month by year dummies; plan assignment in the RAND experiment was random conditional
on the location (site) and when the family enrolled in the experiment (see Newhouse et al. (1993, Appendix B) for more details). In Panel B we pool across plans and
therefore add additional controls in the form of either coinsurance dummies (first row) or the coinsurance level directly (bottom two rows); the final row adds in the free
care (0% coinsurance) plan. Standard errors are clustered on family.
Appendix Table A7: Approximating the response to a linear contract in the RAND data
Dependent Variable
Regressor Log Initial Spending' Log Annual Spendingb Log Time to First Claimc
OLS IV OLS IV Tobit Tobit IV
Coins rate -1.21 -1.19 -1.78 -1.65 0.88 0.51
(0.73) (1.03) (0.73) (1.03) (0.55) 0.49)
Share hitting MDE 0.45 0.43 0.20 0.21 -0.23 -0.25
(0.21) (0.25) (0.20) (0.24) (0.15) (0.12)
Coins rate* 0.58 0.52 1.76 1.40 -0.54 0.14
Share hitting MDE (1.79) (2.53) (1.78) (2.53) (1.32) (1.21)
Sample consists of 5,653 family-years (1,490 unique families) in the RAND data in one of the positive
coinsurance plans or the free care plan. "Share hit MDE" is the share of families in a given coinsurance and
maximum dollar expenditure (MDE) plan who spend past the MDE during the year. Because plan assignment in
the RAND experiment was random only conditional on site and month of enrollment in the experiment, all
regressions control for site and start month fixed effects (see Newhouse et al. (1993, Appendix B) for more
details). All regressions cluster standard errors on the family, except for the Tobit IV specifications, which is
estimated using a minimum distance estimator (Newey, 1987). In the IV specifications, we instrument for the
share of families in a given coinsurance and MDE plan who hit the MDE with the "simulated" share hitting the
MDE; the "simulated" share is calculated as the share of the full (N = 5, 653) sample which, given their
observed spending, would have hit the MDE if (counterfactually) assigned to the given plan; the coefficient on
the instrument in the first stage is 1.05 (standard error 0.003); the F-statistic on the instrument is 120,000.
Appendix Table A6 provides more details on the plans in the RAND experiment, the distribution of the sample
across the different plans, and the share of families who hit the MDE in each plan.
a Dependent variable is log(s + 1) where s is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered family
members in their first three months in the plan.
6 Dependent variable is log(s + 1) where s is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered family
members in their full year in the plan.
c Dependent variable is log (time) where "time" is the number of days to first claim by any covered family
member, censored at 367 days
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Appendix Table A8: Fit of the calibration exercise of medical events
Total Spending Inpatient Outpatient
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
Mean of log spending 6.57 6.53 2.08 1.61 6.18 6.06
Standard deviation of log spending 2.17 2.10 3.58 3.28 1.96 2.04
Share with any spending 93.7% 93.8% 25.8% 19.7% 93.5% 92.5%
The table reports summary statistics of the actual and simulated moments of the spending distribution for the RAND "free care" plan. Log spending is
computed as log(spending+1) to avoid missing values. Simulated data are generated as described in Appendix B.
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Appendix Table A9: Calibration and fit of the "primitive" price elasticity parameters
Imputed Value of Value of obj. function Value of a Value of b Implied
6 at optimum at optimum at optimmum E(w)
0 19.9 0.30 0.20 0.60
0.1 10.1 0.25 0.20 0.56
0.2 15.5 0.25 0.20 0.56
0.3 11.6 0.30 0.25 0.55
0.4 11.9 0.30 0.25 0.55
0.5 14.0 0.35 0.30 0.54
0.6 16.6 0.35 0.30 0.54
0.7 24.5 0.35 0.30 54
0.8 34.6 0.35 0.35 0.50
0.9 28.7 0.35 0.35 0.50
1 29.7 0.35 0.35 0.50
Imposed Value of Mean log spending Std. log spending Share with zero spending
6 obj. function Coins 25% Coins 50% Coins 95% Coins 25% Coins 50% Coins 95% Coins 25% Coins 50% Coins 95%
Actual (observed) moments 6.08 6.04 5.53 2.36 2.35 2.71 90.7% 90.7% 85.2%
0 113.9 6.09 5.92 5.28 2.28 2.39 2.81 91.8% 90.6% 84.0%
0.1 45.3 6.09 5.93 5.39 2.28 2.39 2.77 91.8% 90.6% 84.8%
0.2 20.1 6.09 5.94 5.46 2.28 2.39 2.75 91.8% 90.6% 85.3%
0.3 11.6 6.10 5.95 5.52 2.28 2.39 2.73 91.8% 90.7% 85.7%
0.4 11.9 6.10 5.95 5.57 2.28 2.39 2.72 91.8% 90.7% 86.0%
0.5 17.7 6.10 5.96 5.61 2.28 2.39 2.71 91.8% 90.7% 86.3%
0.6 27.6 6.10 5.97 5.65 2.28 2.39 2.70 91.8% 90.7% 86.5%
0.7 40.3 6.11 5.98 5.68 2.28 2.38 2.69 91.8% 90.7% 86.7%
0.8 55.8 6.11 5.99 5.72 2.28 2.38 2.68 91.9% 90.8% 86.9%
0.9 74.1 6.11 6.00 5.75 2.28 2.38 2.67 91.9% 90.8% 87.1%
1 97.5 6.11 6.01 4.79 2.28 2.38 2.67 91.9% 90.8% 87.2%
The top panel reports the values of a and b that minimize the objective function for different values of J. The bottom panel reports goodness of fit
measures for our choice of a = 0.3 and b = 0.25 for different values of 6.
data are generated as described in Appendix B.
Log spending is computed as log(spending+1) to avoid missing values. Simulated
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Financial Aid on
College Enrollment and Completion:
Evidence From a Discontinuity in
Federal Financial Aid Rules1
3.1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the effect of financial aid on college enrollment. The
topic has obvious policy relevance, given that the federal and state governments provide tens of
billions of dollars of financial aid each year with the goal of expanding access to college. In addition,
understanding the effect of aid on enrollment can help answer the question of whether credit market
failures are significantly reducing college enrollment rates. In theory. students who expect high
returns from continued education should be able to borrow to pay for it, and so students should
never fail to go to college for lack of funds. In practice. private credit markets may be incomplete
due to adverse selection. moral hazard. and other factors. and. while the federal student loan
program exists in part to remedy this market failure., federal loans are available only up to specified
limits. Thus, it is possible that students are liquidity constrained.
There is a large literature on the effects of grant aid on college enrollment. which has converged
on the estimate that enrollment increases by about 3-4 percentage points per $1.000 increase in
available grant aid (see for example Dynarski (2002). Dynarski (2003), and Kane (2003); for a
similar estimate for older students. see Seftor and Turner (2002)). There is also some evidence that
additional grant aid leads students to choose more expensive colleges than they otherwise would.
'I am grateful to Amy Finkelstein and David Autor for extensive feedback on this project. I also thank Joshua
Angrist, Sarah Cohodes, Daniel Fetter, Matthew Fiedler. Heidi Williams, and participants in the MIT Labor Lunch
for helpful comments and suggestions and Leila Agha, Dan Feenberg, Brad Larson, and Amanda Pallais for help
accessing data. Financial support from the National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship is also gratefully
acknowledged.
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in particular. to choose private over public colleges (Kane. 2003). Because grant aid both provides
additional liquidity and lowers the price of college. examining the effect of additional grant aid on
enrollment is not a perfect test for liquidity constraints. However, the large responses researchers
have found to fairly modest reductions in the price of college are at least suggestive of credit market
failures.
Somewhat surprisingly, there is much less evidence on the effect of financial aid on persistence
and completion. topics of increasing policy importance. 2 Over the past several decades. college
participation rates in the United States have risen rapidly. but growth in degree attainment has
stalled. Since the late 1960s. the share of 23-year-olds with any college education has increased by
almost 30 percent. but the share with a B.A. has remained roughly flat. implying a sharp decline in
completion rates (Turner. 2004). Among the most recent cohorts. degree attainment rates are quite
low. Only 58% of students who started college at four-year institutions in 2003-2004 obtained a
B.A. within six years; among students starting at two-year community colleges. only 35% obtained
any degree within six years (Hunt-White. 2010).
Policymakers have become increasingly focused on the large number of students who start college
but never finish. President Obama drew attention to low college completion rates during a major
education policy address in 2010. and. in March of 2011, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan
announced new incentives for colleges to raise graduation rates (Obama, 2010; Lewin. 2011). The
Gates Foundation, the Lumina Foundation. and the American Association of Community Colleges
have also all introduced major college completion initiatives within the past few years.
College completion rates are especially low for students from low-income families, and. when
asked. many non-completers cite financial pressure as a reason they dropped out of college (Hunt-
White. 2010). Moreover, over the same period in which college completion rates have fallen. college
costs have risen rapidly. the share of costs covered by federal financial aid programs has gone down,
and the share of students attempting to work part- or full-time while in college has gone up (Turner.
2004). Thus, it seems plausible that financial stress might be part of the reason for low and falling
college completion rates and that additional financial aid might increase persistence. In addition.
from a policy perspective, financial aid is a relatively simple lever to manipulate. and so it would
be useful to know whether and how much increases in financial aid could contribute to raising
completion rates.
As with enrollment. evidence on the effect of financial aid on completion is also important
because it sheds light on whether credit market failures are responsible for a meaningful share of
the dropout rate. Some have suggested that high college dropout rates are actually the result of
an optimal learning process in which many students "try" college to see whether it passes a cost
benefit test. learn things about themselves or the college experience that show it does not. and then
(appropriately) leave (see for example Strange (2009)). On the other hand. if college completion
rates are sensitive to modest increases in financial aid. then it seems more likely that students are
2There is a, larger literature on the effects of counseling and remediation services on persistence. See for example
Bettinger and Baker (2011) and Calcagno and Long (2008).
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dropping out for lack of liquidity.
Recently, there has been some very interesting experimental work on the effect of performance-
contingent financial aid on persistence. In an experimental intervention focused on low-income
single mothers at two Louisiana community colleges. R.ichburg-Hayes et al. (2009) find that of-
fering $1.000 per-semester performance-based scholarships. along with various counseling services.
increases persistence from year one to year two by 10-15 percentage points. A similar interven-
tion focused on traditional-age college students at a large Canadian University found smaller but
positive effects on persistence for women, though no effect for men (Angrist et al.. 2009).
In this paper. I estimate the effect of non-performance-based aid on persistence for a nationally
representative sample of non-traditional age college students. Understanding the effect of non-
performance-based aid is valuable both because the overwhelming majority of financial aid is not
based on performance and because the response to non-performance-based aid is closer to a pure
liquidity effect. Put differently, by estimating the effect of non-performance-based aid on persistence
and completion. I can isolate the effect of relaxing financial constraints, as opposed to the combined
effect of relaxing financial constraints and creating new incentives.
My basic strategy is to exploit a discontinuity in federal financial aid rules that allows 24-year-
old students to qualify for substantially more federal financial aid than 23-year-olds. Specifically, I
take advantage of the fact that, for purposes of federal financial aid. undergraduate students who
are not married and do not have children are classified as "dependent" or "independent" based on
whether they have turned 24 by January 1 of the "award year" (the academic year for which they
are receiving financial aid). Independent students qualify for additional grant aid and are eligible
to take out much larger federal loans.
The discontinuity in financial aid at age 24 creates a quasi-experiment for looking at the effects
of financial aid on persistence. Consider two students who both enter college at age 22; one turns 23
on December 31. while the other turns 23 on January 1. Because of this trivial difference. the first
student may qualify for thousands of dollars more aid for her second year of college. By examining
persistence and completion rates by date of birth. I should thus be able to estimate the effect of
aid on persistence and completion.
In addition to examining the effect of aid on persistence. I also estimate the effect on total
enrollment at different types of institutions. Most of the previous research on grant aid and en-
rollment predates the explosive growth of for-profit institutions. Using more recent data. I find
suggestive evidence that enrollment at these institutions may be especially sensitive to financial
aid. For-profit colleges have recently come under intense scrunity from policymakers who are con-
cerned about the quality of education they provide as well as about the costs they impose on the
federal financial aid system. Thus. understanding the effects of federal financial aid on enrollment
at for-profit institutions is particularly relevant to current policy debates.
Because of the nature of the quasi-experiment. my results will be most relevant to older. "non-
traditional age" college students. While these students are a minority of U.S. undergraduates.
they are a sizable and growing group. Roughly five million college students. or about 25% of all
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U.S. undergraduates. are between 23 and 30 years old: this percentage is uinch higher than it was
a few decades ago and is projected to rise over the next ten years. Older students drop out of
college at much higher rates than traditional-age students. and they have been much less studied
(Hunt-White. 2010). They are also a major constituency of for-profit colleges.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the federal
financial aid system and additional detail about the quasi-experiment. Section 3 outlines my em-
pirical framework. and section 4 describes my data. Section 5 analyzes the increase in aid at age
24. section 6 presents results on enrollment and school choice. and section 7 presents results on
persistence and completion. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Background on the Federal Financial Aid System
The federal government is a major source of financial assistance for college students. providing about
$33 billion in grant aid and originating more than $100 billion in students loans each year. The first
step in determining a student's eligibility for federal financial aid is to classify her as dependent
or independent (of her parents). Students are classified as independent if they are married. have
children or other dependents. are veterans or orphans or wards of the court. or - crucially for my
purposes - if they are 24-years-old as of January 1 of the award year. Differences in how dependent
and independent students are treated for purposes of awarding both grants and loans create my
quasi-experiment.
3.2.1 Federal Grants
Federal grants are means-tested, and so they are awarded based on information provided on the
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). a form used to elicit detailed information on
income and assets. The information provided on the FAFSA is plugged into what is effectively a
tax schedule. yielding the student's expected family contribution (EFC). The EFC represents what
the federal formula implies the student and her parents can afford to pay for college.
The formula used to compute the EFC from total income and total assets is the same for
dependent and independent students. but independent students do not have to report their parents'
income or assets on the FAFSA. That is.
EFCdep = f (incomeparents + incomestudent , assetsparents + asset sstudent),
while
EFCind = f (incomesndent. assetstudent).
So the EFC for a given student if she is classified as independent will be weakly less than her EFC
if she is classified as dependent. 3
3This is not quite strictly true, because independent students can qualify for an automatic $0 EFC if their parents'
incomes are low enough. irrespective of their own incomes. Hence, a high-income student with low-income parents
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As a result. a students federal grants will be weakly larger if she is classified as independent.
Pell Grants. the most important federal grant program. are calculated as cost of attendance less
EFC. up to some maximum (currently $5.550). so when a student's EFC goes down. her Pell Grant
goes up as much as one for one.4 Other. smaller federal grant programs have additional criteria
besides financial need. but they all require that students be need-eligible for Pell Grants. Thus.
a student's chance of qualifying for other federal grants is also (weakly) higher if she is classified
as independent. Additionally, most state grant programs and some institutional grant programs
piggyback on the federal EFC calculation, and so being classified as independent may also increase
a student's state and institutional grant awards.
3.2.2 Federal Loans
The largest federal loan program. the Stafford Loan Program. is not means-tested. but independent
students are still eligible for larger loans. Specifically. Stafford loans are available to all students.
irrespective of financial need, credit history. or other criteria, but only up to specified annual limits
(shown in Table 3.1) that depend on a student's year in school and on whether she is classified
as dependent or independent. Independent students are eligible to take out $4.000-$5.000 more
in Stafford Loans each year. (To put these and other figures in this paper in context. average
tuition and fees at two-year public colleges in 2010-2011 were about $2,700. average tuition and
fees at four-year public colleges were about $7,600, average tuition and fees at for-profit colleges
were about $13.900. and average tuition and fees at non-profit private colleges were about $27,300
(College Board. 2010). So while the higher loan limits available to independent students would not
put much of a dent in the difference in cost between attending a private non-profit and a public
four-year college. they come close to covering the difference in tuition between community colleges
and four-year public colleges or between four-year public colleges and for-profit colleges.)
Independent students are also more likely to qualify for other federal loans with lower interest
rates. The interest rate on Stafford Loans is currently 6.8%. but students with high financial need
(as determined by their EFC) can qualify for "subsidized Stafford Loans." with an interest rate of
4.5%. or Perkins Loans, with an interest rate of 5%. Since a given student will have a lower EFC
if classified as independent, being classified as independent makes her more likely to qualify for
these lower-interest rate loans. (The limits on annual borrowing apply to the sum of a student's
subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans. though they exclude Perkins Loans. which are much
less prevalent.)
The federal government also provides loans to college students' parents through the PLUS Loan
Program. This could be a source of nonmonotonicity in my quasi-experiment, since PLUS Loans
are available to parents of dependent but not independent students. and they are limited only by
could actually be better off if classified as dependent. However, at most 2.5% of students fall into this category, and
probably less.
4 "Cost of attendance" is an estimate provided by the student's school that includes not only tuition but also other
fees, books, and room and board. Hence. a student's Pell Grant can exceed her tuition.
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the student's total cost of attendance. Thus. in theory. a student's total borrowing capacity could
actually fall at age 24 due to the loss of access to the PLUS Loan Program. However. a student
could only lose from being classified as independent if her parents would otherwise have borrowed
more than $4.000 on her behalf. Since less than 3 percent of 23-year-old students' parents borrow
this much through the PLUS Program. the nonmonotonicity problem is minimal.
3.3 Empirical Framework
My analysis is a "fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD)" design in which the running variable is age
as of January 1 of the award year (with a cut-off at 24). the first stage is the effect of being classified
as independent on financial aid. and the reduced form is the effect of being classified as independent
on enrollment or persistence.
In this paper. I analyze the first stage and reduced form separately. Because being classified
as independent increases both grant aid and available federal loans, it is difficult to summarize
the first stage in a single number and therefore difficult to know what to use as the first stage in
computing two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates. Thus. it seems to make more sense to analyze
the various components of the first stage and then analyze the reduced form. 5
My basic specification is a local linear regression model with a bandwidth of 1.7 years., using
a triangular kernel. That is. for any given first stage or reduced form outcome, I estimate the
equation:
Outcomei = a + f 1Over24j + /32 |Agei - 241 + /33 Agei - 241 * Over24 + Ei,
where i indexes students. the coefficient of interest is 01, and observations are weighted according
to lagei-24| 6 The advantage of parameterizing the age variables as the absolute value of age less
24 is that. with this parametrization, a gives the "control group mean" (the estimate for students
who are 23 and eleven months years-old), and so gives the percent change in the outcome at age
24. Age is measured in months. I report robust standard errors. 7
5 Another concern is that, if there is an enrollment response, then the estimated first stage may in part reflect
changes in the composition of the student population (due to the increase in enrollment). In principle, one might
therefore prefer to compute the first stage by calculating how much more aid 23-year-old students would have received
if they were 24, instead of by comparing 23-year-old and 24-year-old students. To try to evaluate how big a difference
this would make, I take advantage of the fact that the EFC is close to a summary statistic for federal financial aid
eligibility. I calculate EFCs for all students (below and above 24) as if they were classified as independent and look
for a discontinuity in the average EFC at age 24. I find no evidence of such a discontinuity, suggesting that, even if
there is an enrollment response to the increase in aid at age 24, it does not change the composition of the student
population in such a way as to have much effect on the estimated first stage.
6 For the enrollment outcomes, I regress total enrollment by age on the various age variables. So for these regres-
sions, i indexes birth months, rather than students.
7 Because I only have data on month of birth (not time of birth with unlimited precision), my running variable is
effectively discrete. In such cases, Lee and Card (2008) recommend clustering standard errors on the running variable.
None of my results would change if I reported clustered rather than robust standard errors, but the robust standard
errors are generally more conservative (i.e. larger).
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I chose a bandwidth of 1.7 years (i.e. including students age 22.3 to age 25.7) based on a combi-
nation of the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm and "a priori" information (Imbens and Kalyanara-
man. 2009). Applied to my data. the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm yields optimal bandwidths
ranging from one to two years depending on the particular outcome variable. I wanted to fix a
single bandwidth across outcomes. I also thought it made sense to choose a bandwidth that would
exclude most students who started college straight out of high school, since these "traditional"
students would be expected to be quite different from the non-traditional age students affected by
my instrument. If they started elementary school at the typical age and were never held back a
grade. the oldest traditional students would be 22.25-years-old as of January 1 of their senior year
of college. and so a bandwidth of 1.7 years just excludes them. However., I also experimented with
bandwidths of 1. 1.5. and 2 years. and the results reported in this paper are robust to the choice
of bandwidth.
I restrict my sample to students who are classified as dependent or independent based on age.
and so I drop students who are married, have dependent children. or are veterans, orphans, or
wards of the court. (Dropping the unaffected students should not affect the 2SLS estimates, but it
does make the first stage and reduced form estimates more easily interpretable and may improve
power.) In some cases, I also consider subgroups of students, such as students whose parents did
not finish college or students attending a particular type of institution.
3.3.1 Possible Confounds
There are two possible confounds that could invalidate the interpretation of my results as reflecting
the causal effect of financial aid. First, there might be other direct effects of age as of January 1.
In particular, some states and school districts use age on January 1 as a cut-off for kindergarten
entry, allowing students to enter kindergarten if they will be five-years-old by January 1 of their
kindergarten year. Thus, students who are just-24 versus not-quite-24-years-old as of January 1 of
a given academic year may have entered school with different cohorts and may be different numbers
of years out of high school. These "cohort effects" might directly influence students' college-going
or persistence decisions.
I attempt to address these possible cohort effects by including month of birth dummies in all
regressions. If the cohort effects are roughly equal at the age 23. age 24. and age 25 cut-offs. then
this should solve the problem. In practice. I find that including month of birth dummies in the
regressions makes almost no difference to the results. which suggests that cohort effects may not
be that important.
In addition. it turns out that, during the period in which students in my sample entered school.
more states used a September 1 than a January 1 cut-off for kindergarten entry. Thus. if cohort
effects were driving either the first stage or the reduced form results. one would expect to see even
larger discontinuities between students who are just-24 versus not-quite-24 as of September 1. But
there do not appear to be any discontinuities at this cut-off.
A second possible confounding influence would be anticipation effects. Suppose students are
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fully informed about the federal financial aid system and fully understand the discontinuity at age
24. In that case. 23-year-olds with January or later birthdays who are thinking about enrolling in
college might decide to wait a year. potentially invalidating the comparison between just-24-year-old
and not-quite-24-year-old college students.
In principle, one could test for anticipation effects by looking for a discontinuity in enrollment
at age 23. Consider two students who are both 22-years-old in September of a given year and are
contemplating enrolling in college; one will turn 23 in December and the other in January. The first
student need delay enrollment only one year in order to be classified as an independent student,
but the second student would have to delay for two years. Thus, assuming the cost of delay rises
with the length of the delay. anticipation should produce a discontinuity in college enrollment at
age 23.
While the estimates are not terribly precise. I do not find any evidence of a decrease in total
enrollment or enrollment at any particular category of institution (including for-profits) at age 23.
3.4 Data
I implement my analysis using the restricted use versions of two datasets available through the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics of the Department of Education: the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study (NPSAS) and the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study (BPS).
The NPSAS, which is conducted every four years. surveys a representative sample of the U.S.
undergraduate population. I pool the three most recent (and largest) waves of the NPSAS. the
1999-2000, 2003-2004. and 2007-2008 surveys. 8 Each of these surveys covers 50.000-100.000 students
(roughly a 0.25%-0.5% sample of the full undergraduate population)., yielding a total sample of
about 243.000 students. From this. I construct a sample of 32.705 students who are between 22.3-
and 25.7-years-old as of January 1 and who are potentially affected by the instrument (i.e. who
are not married, do not have children. and are not veterans. orphans. or wards of the court).
Fortunately. as shown in Table 3.1. the relevant federal student aid rules were quite stable over the
1999-2008 period, allowing me to pool survey waves without having to worry about major policy
differences. 9
The major virtue of the NPSAS is that it contains excellent administrative data on financial
aid. Students in the NPSAS are matched to their FAFSAs and to their records in the federal grant
and loan data systems. and so I have accurate and precise data on federal grant and loan receipt.
as well as detailed data on income and assets.1 0 I also have school-reported data on state and
institutional grants and student-reported data on private loans. In addition. I know what school
or schools each student attended. and I have a variety of demographic data for students. including
month of birth as well as race. gender. and parents' educational attainment.
8 Earlier waves of the NPSAS do not have administrative data on financial aid.
9I do adjust all financial aid variables for inflation, using the CPI-U. Dollar amounts are reported in 2010 dollars.
"
13Because the financial data come from the FAFSA, I have information on both students' and parents' income and
assets for dependent students; for independent students., I have only the student's financial data.
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The main deficiency of the NPSAS for my purposes is that it has no panel component. All I know
is that students were enrolled in college during the academic year covered by a given NPSAS wave:
I do not know whether they were enrolled during the previous or subsequent year. Hence. while I
use the NPSAS to estimate the first stage and to estimate the effect of aid on total enrollment. I
cannot use these data to estimate effects on persistence or completion.
For some waves of the NPSAS. however, there is a corresponding wave of the BPS that follows
a sub-sample of the NPSAS first-time. first-year students for the following four or five years. I
pool all available waves of the BPS. which follow the 1989-1990, 1995-1996. and 2003-2004 NPSAS
cohorts. (Again, as shown in Table 3.1, the federal student aid rules were fairly stable over the rel-
evant period.) The BPS provides detailed information on students' enrollment patterns and degree
attainment during the follow-up period, and so it is highly appropriate for examining persistence
and completion. It also provides basic demographic information, including month of birth.
The downside of the BPS is that is is extremely small. Each wave covers only 7.000-19.000
students total, and there are also substantial attrition problems. Thus, even pooling waves. I end
up with a sample of only 1.231 first-year students who will be between 22.3- and 25.7-years-old as
of January 1 of the next academic year. who are potentially affected by the instrument, and for
whom I have second-year enrollment data. I also examine year-to-year persistence for a sample of
all students who are between 22.3- and 25.7-years-old at any point during the BPS survey and who
are still enrolled in school and have not yet completed a degree at that point. Even this approach.
however. gives me only 2,238 observations for which I have next-year enrollment data.
3.4.1 Sample Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for my NPSAS sample and compares these students with
the traditional-age (18 - 21-year-old) college students in the NPSAS. Table 3.3 provides summary
statistics for my BPS first-year students sample and compares these students with traditional-age
(18 - 19-year-old) first-year students in the BPS.
Based on observable characteristics. the students in the NPSAS sample actually do not look
that difference from traditional-age college students. More of them are men (reflecting the sample
restriction that drops married students and students with dependent children). but their family
backgrounds seem similar to those of traditional-age students. They are more likely to be attending
four-year colleges and are much less likely to be enrolled full-time.
In contrast. the students in the BPS sample do look quite different from traditional-age first-
year students. More of them are black or Hispanic. and fewer of their parents went to college. They
are much more likely to be attending community colleges or for-profit colleges (fully 30.5% attend
for-profits) and much less likely to be attending four-year public or non-profit colleges. In addition.
their persistence rates are far below those of traditional-age students.
It is not surprising that the students in the BPS first-year students sample come from less
privileged backgrounds than the students in the NPSAS sample. since students who are just starting
college at age 23 or 24 are more negatively selected than students who are simply still enrolled at
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age 23 or 24 (and the NPSAS sample includes both types of students. whereas the BPS sample
includes only the former). It is potentially somewhat worrisome, however., that the sample I use
to compute the first stage is so different from the sample I use to examine persistence. For this
reason. I do not report "split sample" 2SLS results. If I had more power in the BPS. I would try
to reweight my NPSAS first stage to match the characteristics of the BPS sample. However. as
discussed below. my BPS results are so imprecise that this did not seem worth doing.
3.5 The Increase in Financial Aid at Age 24
3.5.1 Grants
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and Table 3.4 show the increase in grant aid that occurs at age 24. In the graphs.
each circle is an average for students born in a given month; the red. solid circles correspond to
the 22.3 - 25.7-year-old students included in the regressions. As noted above, the regressions are
parametrized such that the coefficient on the constant is the "control group mean." the average
level of aid for students who are 23 and eleven months years-old.
As shown in the graphs and table. there is a sharp. roughly 20 percentage point increase at age
24 in the share of students receiving Pell Grants. as well as a sharp. roughly $650 (90%) increase
in the average Pell Grant per student. Since only 50% of 24-year-olds (and 30% of 23-year-olds)
receive Pell Grants. this is perhaps better thought of as a roughly $1.300 average increase in aid
for about half of students, with no change for the remainder.
The increase in Pell Grants is amplified by a $185 increase in other federal grants and a $190
increase in state grants. presumably due to state programs that base their grant awards on the
federal EFC.11 There is no statistically significant change in institutional grant aid. implying that.
on average, institutions neither raise their awards in response to the drop in the EFC at age 24 nor
lower them to offset the increases in federal and state aid.12
Total grant aid per student increases by about $1.100. or 55%. at age 24. Again, however.
since only 60% of 24-year-olds (and a smaller fraction of 23-year-olds) receive any grant aid. this
is perhaps best thought of as a roughly $1.800 increase in average grant aid for 60% of students.
"In the other federal grants, state grants, and institutional grants graphs, there is a striking increase in aid from
age 20 to 22, followed by a dramatic fall, with an apparent discontinuity at 22.25-years-old. In the case of other
federal grants and state grants, the rise appears to be due to the fact that certain grants are only available to juniors
and seniors. In the case of institutional grants, the increase is due to a compositional effect: a larger share of 20 -
22-year-olds are going to private non-profit institutions, which provide substantial institutional aid, while a smaller
share are going to two-year public colleges, which provide very little.
The discontinuity at age 22.25 reflects the fact that the oldest "traditional" students (i.e. students who went
straight from high school to college) are 22.25 on January 1 of their senior year of college. Thus, traditional students
make up a meaningful share of all students to the left of age 22.25, but a negligible share to the right. Traditional
students are more likely to be eligible for non-Pell federal grants and state grants and are more likely to attend
institutions that award significant grant aid than are non-traditional students. Note that the regressions exclude
students younger than 22.3-years-old.
12 had thought that both responses might be occurring and roughly offsetting each other. with institutional
aid increasing at public institutions and falling at non-profits. It turns out, however, that there is no statistically
significant change in institutional grants at any category of institution.
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with no change for the remainder.
3.5.2 Loans
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 and Table 3.5 show the changes in borrowing that occur at age 24. Figure 3.3.
and the first column of the table. show that 12% of students take advantage of the higher federal
loan limits available to independent students. While about 15% of not-quite-24-year-olds have total
federal loans above the dependent student loan limits (either because their parents take out PLUS
loans on their behalf or because they are eligible for Perkins Loans). about 27% of just-24-year-
olds do. This implies that about 12% of not-quite-24-year-olds are constrained by the federal loan
limits (in spite of their parents' ability to borrow on their behalf). or. equivalently, that 12% of
just-24-year-olds take out larger federal loans than they would have if they were not eligible for the
independent student loan limits.
Figure 3.3 and the second column of Table 3.5 show that the higher federal loan limits appear
to partially displace borrowing from private lenders but mostly increase total borrowing. 13 The
increase in the share of students with total loans above the dependent student loan limits is 8
percentage points, less than the increase in the share of students with federal loans over the limits.
but still quite substantial.
Figure 3.4 and the remaining columns of Table 3.5 show the changes in average federal. private.
and total borrowing at age 24. These average changes are fairly small (and not statistically sig-
nificant in the case of total borrowing). not surprising given that they are the result of increased
borrowing by just the 12% of students who take advantage of the higher independent student loan
limits. Moreover, some students may actually decrease their borrowing as a result of being classified
as independent, if increases in their grant aid lead them to decrease their loans.
Thus. a more meaningful way to think about the changes in borrowing at age 24 may be to
focus on the 12% of students who take advantage of the higher loan limits. The estimated increases
in average federal and total borrowing imply that these students must be increasing their federal
and total borrowing by an average of about $3,750 and $2.250 respectively. These figures are
broadly consistent with the results of quantile regressions. which. while highly imprecise. suggest
that borrowing at the 8 0 th to 90 th percentiles of the distribution of total borrowing increases by
about $2.000 at age 24.
As explained above, parents of dependent students are allowed to take out federal PLUS loans
on their behalf. Thus. the fact that total federal borrowing increases sharply at age 24 indicates
that there are younger students who would like to borrow more than the dependent student loan
limits allow and whose parents will not borrow on their behalf. If the interest rates on PLUS
loans and Stafford loans were the same. this result would imply a failure of contracting within the
family. since. with perfect contracting. parents should be willing to take out PLUS loans which the
students would then pay off. However. since the interest rate on PLUS loans is modestly higher
13 By "private lenders," I mean lenders who are offering loans outside the federal student loan system, not private
lenders who are originating and servicing federal student loans through the Federal Family Education Loan Program.
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than the interest rate on Stafford loans. it could also be the case that the dependent students who
would like to borrow more at the Stafford loan interest rates would not want to borrow more at
the PLUS loan rates.
3.6 Effects on Total Enrollment and Enrollment By Type of In-
stitution
Figure 3.5 plots the log of total NPSAS enrollment by age by type of institution, while Table 3.6
shows the estimated change in log enrollment at age 24.
These results are very imprecise. While the graph of log total enrollment, for example, looks
fairly smooth around age 24. the 95% confidence interval from the regression includes both a decline
in enrollment and an increase of more than 7%. The results for enrollment at two-year and four-year
public colleges and private non-profit colleges are similarly uninformative.
The results for for-profit colleges are more interesting. The point estimate is marginally sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.057). and. visually, it looks like there may be a
discontinuity in the graph. Moreover, the point estimate, 0.11 log points, is quite large.
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.7 show enrollment results limited to students whose parents do not have
college degrees. Such students might be expected to be more sensitive to financial aid than the
children of college graduates; they are also the main constituency of for-profit colleges. 14 While
most of the results for the subgroup are just as uninformative as the results for the full sample
(the point estimates are larger. but naturally even less precise), there is a clear discontinuity in the
graph of for-profit enrollment at age 24. The table shows that the estimated increase in enrollment
at for-profit institutions is 0.24 log points and is statistically significant at the 99% level.
These results provide evidence that enrollment at for-profit colleges. especially enrollment of
students from lower-SES backgrounds. is quite sensitive to financial aid. Because of the general
imprecision of the results. I cannot definitely compare the response at for-profits to the response
at other types of institutions. Based on the point estimates, however, the response at for-profits
appears to be considerably larger.
3.7 Effects on Persistence and Completion
Figure 3.7 and Table 3.8 show results for persistence and completion. using the BPS data. The first
panel of Figure 3.7 plots the share of first-year students continuing to year two by their age as of
January 1 of year two (the age that determines their eligibility for financial aid for the second year).
The next panel plots the share of all students who have not yet completed a degree continuing on
to the following year. again by their age as of January 1 of the following year. The final panel plots
14 restrict the sample based on parents' education rather than parents' income because I do not have data on
parents' income for independent students.
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the share of students obtaining a degree by the end of year five by their age as of January 1 of year
two.1
Unfortunately. as is evident from the graphs and from the standard errors in the regression
table. I do not have nearly enough power to draw any conclusions about persistence or completion.
For example. the estimated effect on year one to year two persistence is small and negative (-0.6
percentage points). But the 95% confidence interval includes a 12 percentage point increase in
retention, or about 11 percentage points per thousand dollars of grant aid.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper documents that the federal student aid rules lead to a large increase in aid at age
24. Grant aid increases by about $1,000 per-student. or 55%. at age 24. or by about $1,800 per
affected student. About 12% of students take advantage of the higher federal loan limits available
to independent students. and many of these students increase their federal borrowing by thousands
of dollars.
Unfortunately. my data do not provide enough statistical power for me to reach conclusions
about the effect of additional aid on persistence and completion. I do find evidence that enrollment
at for-profit colleges is quite sensitive to federal financial aid. with an especially large enrollment
increase among students whose parents are not college graduates. The fact that enrollment at
for-profit institutions appears to be so sensitive to financial aid is especially interesting given that
policymakers are currently quite concerned about whether these institutions are serving their stu-
dents well and about the costs they impose on the federal student aid programs.
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Figure 3.1: Share of Students Receiving Pell Grants by Age in Months
INotes: Datapoints are means by age in months. Solid circles denote datapoints
within the bandwidth used for the regressions (1.7 years).
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Figure 3.2: Average Grant Aid Per Student by Age in Months
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Age on Jan 1 of Award Year
Notes: Datapoints are means by age in months. Solid circles denote datapoints within the band-
width used for the regressions (1.7 years).
141
Figure 3.3: Share of Students with Loans Over Dependent Student Federal Limits by A,
Notes: Datapoints are means by age in months. Solid circles denote datapoints within the
bandwidth used for the regressions (1.7 years).
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Figure 3.4: Average Loans Per Student by Age in Months
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Figure 3.5: Log Enrollment by Age in Months
Notes: Datapoints are means by age in months. Solid circles denote datapoints witinn the band-
width used for the regressions (1.7 years).
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Figure 3.6: Log Enrollment by Age in Months. Students Whose Parents Are Not College Graduates
Notes: Datapoints are means by age in months. Solid circles denote datapoints within the band-
width used for the regressions (1.7 years).
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Figure 3.7: Persistence Measures by Age in Months
Notes: Datapoints are means by age in months. Solid circles denote datapoints within the band-
width used for the regressions (1.7 years).
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Table 3.1: Federal Financial Aid Parameters for Dataset Years
Dependent Loan Limits Independent Loan Limits
Max Pell Grant Year 1 Year 2 Beyond Year 1 Year 2 Beyond
Current Dollars
1989-1990 2.300 2.625 2.625 4.000 6.625 6,625 8.000
1995-1996 2,340 2,625 2.625 5.500 6.625 7.500 10.500
1999-2000 3.125 2.625 2.625 5.500 6.625 7.500 10.500
2003-2004 4.050 2.625 2,625 5.500 6.625 7,500 10,500
2007-2008 4.310 3.500 4,500 5.500 7.500 8.500 10.500
2010 Dollars
1989-1990 3.942 4.499 4.499 6.856 11.355 11.355 13,712
1995-1996 3.295 3.697 4.929 7,745 9.331 10.562 14.787
1999-2000 4,016 3.374 4.498 7.069 8.516 9.640 13.495
2003-2004 4.735 3.069 4.092 6.430 7.747 8.769 12.276
2007-2008 4.430 3.598 4.625 5.652 7.709 8.737 10.793
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for NPSAS Sample
Sample Traditional Students
Percent Std. Err. Percent Std. Err.
Female 49.9 0.3 57.7 0.2
White 74.6 0.2 73.5 0.1
Black 12.3 0.2 14.2 0.1
Hispanic 12.8 0.2 13.9 0.1
Other Race 7.1 0.1 6.5 0.1
Parent Any College 65.5 0.3 66.4 0.1
Parent BA 45.3 0.3 45.9 0.2
2-Year Public 20.5 0.2 26.8 0.1
4-Year Public 50.1 0.3 37.0 0.1
Non-Profit 18.9 0.2 25.8 0.1
For-Profit 9.9 0.2 10.4 0.1
Full-Time Student 54.0 0.3 70.7 0.1
N 32,705 109.689
"Traditional students" are defined as those age 18-21 as of January 1 of the award year.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for BPS First-Year Students Sample
Female
White
Black
Hispanic
Other Race
Parent Any College
Parent BA
2-Year Public
4-Year Public
Non-Profit
For-Profit
Full-Time Student
Persist to Year Two
N
"Traditional students" are
Percen
43.0
61.3
16.9
14.4
7.8
44.3
24.0
41.8
13.8
13.9
30.5
45.4
62.1
1.231
defined as
Sample
t Std. Err.
14.
1.4
1.1
1.0
0.8
1.5
1.3
1.4
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.5
1.4
those age 18-21 as
Traditional Students
Percent Std. Err.
56.2 0.3
73.0 0.3
10.3 0.2
10.7 0.2
6.3 0.2
67.4 0.3
48.3 0.3
19.9 0.3
38.1 0.3
34.6 0.3
7.3 0.2
76.0 0.3
87.6 0.2
25.383
January 1 of the award year.
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Table 3.4: Effects on Grant Aid
Pell
Over24 653.3***
(40.38)
Age 12.89
(25.19)
Age*Over24 -156.6***
(46.28)
Cons 717.4***
(40.44)
32705N
Other Federal
186.2***
(19.99)
65.97***
(12.07)
-129.3***
(22.36)
118.1***
(19.61)
32705
State
191.4***
(30.16)
171.7***
(20.68)
-264.3***
(34.31)
302.5***
(28.63)
32705
Institutional Other
104.8 -7.430
(67.21) (34.16)
519.5***
(50.99)
-633.9***
(75.98)
637.2***
(75.68)
32705
36.74
(24.66)
-37.14
(38.06)
252.2***
(31.64)
32705
Bandwidth is 1.7 years.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include month of birth dummies.
* p< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Total
1128.3***
(109.4)
806.8***
(76.65)
-1221.3***
(123.9)
2027.4***
(111.1)
32705
Table 3.5: Effects on Borrowing
Federal Loans Total Loans
Overaep Limis o e Lis Federal Loans Private Loans Total LoansOver Dep Limits Over Dep Lunits
Over24 0.120*** 0.0822*** 451.2*** -170.8* 274.2
(0.0107) (0.0117) (115.2) (80.68) (152.0)
Age -0.00502 0.00611 271.2** 58.57 342.5**
(0.00648) (0.00766) (82.48) (57.63) (108.3)
Age*Over24 0.0301* 0.0130 -73.69 -82.79 -181.9
(0.0125) (0.0135) (130.6) (90.29) (171.8)
Const 0.146*** 0.222*** 2830.2*** 817.8*** 3698.0***
(0.0102) (0.0117) (124.7) (75.40) (154.6)
N 32705 32705 32705 32705 32705
Bandwidth is 1.7 years.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include month of birth dummies.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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of InstitutionTable 3.6: Effects on Log Enrollment by Type
Total Public 2-Year Public 4-Year
Over24 0.0161 0.0382 -0.0309
(0.0333) (0.0576) (0.0487)
Age 0.628*** 0.398*** 0.690***
(0.0234) (0.0388) (0.0421)
Age*Over24 -0.990*** -0.654*** -1.153***
(0.0359) (0.0616) (0.0545)
Cons 6.494*** 4.911*** 5.851***
(0.0301) (0.0225) (0.0407)
N 41 41 41
Bandwidth is 1.7 years.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include month of birth dummies.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Non-Profit For-Profit
0.0292 0.110
(0.0612) (0.0553)
0.894*** 0.199***
(0.0514) (0.0496)
-1.267*** -0.418***
(0.0658) (0.0645)
4.605*** 4.391***
(0.0360) (0.0773)
41 41
Table 3.7: Effects on Log Total Enrollment by Type of Institution. Students Whose Parents Are
Not College Graduates
Over24
Age
Age*Over24
Cons
Total
0.0451
(0.0366)
0.535***
(0.0199)
-0.902***
(0.0371)
5.984***
(0.0165)
Public 2-Year
0.0562
(0.0591)
0.391***
(0.0438)
-0.676***
(0.0574)
4.488***
(0.0273)
Public 4-Year Non-Profit For-Profit
-0.0366 0.0597 0.237**
(0.0553) (0.0907) (0.0739)
0.566***
(0.0321)
-1.032***
(0.0625)
5.282***
(0.0241)
0.802***
(0.0718)
-1.107***
(0.100)
4.085***
(0.0477)
0.297***
(0.0594)
-0.578***
(0.0712)
3.957***
(0.0759)
N 41 41 41 41 41
Bandwidth is 1.7 years.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include month of birth dummies.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 3.8: Effects on Persistence and Completion
Persist to Year 2 Persist. Any Year Complete Degree
Over24 -0.00632 0.0625 0.0211
(0.0641) (0.0460) (0.0826)
Age 0.00465 0.0277 0.0335
(0.0484) (0.0356) (0.0651)
Age*Over24 -0.0319 -0.137* -0.0706
(0.0717) (0.0531) (0.0917)
Cons 0.646*** 0.704*** 0.299**
(0.0740) (0.0515) (0.102)
N 1231 2238 509
Bandwidth is 1.7 years.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include month of birth dummies.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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